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ABSTRACT
The link between religion and interstate military conflict has attracted a lot of attention
among scholars of international relations and also foreign policy makers and religious
organizations. This study examines whether religious differences between states in a dyad may
partly affect various types of militarized conflict. It is argued in the literature that religion
promotes stronger loyalty and sense of obligation than other cultural identities (Juergensmeyer,
1993); I argue that religious identity may be used by states effectively to mobilize people by
means of rhetoric to generate and sustain popular support for conflict with other states. Thus I
expect that states with different predominant religions to be more likely to engage in various
dimensions of rivalry. The objective of this research is to contribute to understanding why
certain dyads may be more likely to engage in military conflict.
I construct new datasets and develop statistical models to evaluate the connection
between religion and interstate military conflict. I focus on the onset of different types of
interstate rivalries and war and examine the link of each of these types with different kinds of
religious differences. I explore whether (a) interstate dyads with religious difference, (b)
Christian/Muslim dyads, and (c) interstate dyads with different religious denominations have a
higher propensity to engage in (a) enduring rivalry, (b) rivalry recurrence, and (c) war. This
study covers the time period between 1945 and 2001. I conduct the analyses using logit models
that incorporate alternative explanations of each of these three dimensions of rivalry. In
addition, I provide a case study of the 1947 India-Pakistan war to examine closer the mechanism
of the relationship between religious difference in this dyad and war. Analysis results suggest
that dyads with “religious difference” are associated with rivalry recurrence and war;
iii

“Christian/Muslim Differences” do not appear to have an effect on rivalry. The findings of this
research are expected to offer a better understanding of rivalry between dyads.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Question
In 1947, India and Pakistan went to war over the “formally independent state of Jammu and
Kashmir” and have since been “locked in an embrace of seemingly unending [conflict]1”
(Ganguly, 2001: 1). India, predominantly Hindu, and Pakistan, predominantly Muslim, remain
in conflict despite several resolution efforts. The conflict pattern in the India-Pakistan case
relates to the question I seek to address in this dissertation. Do the varying religious identities2 in
this dyad3 contribute to this unending militarized conflict? It is commonly argued in the
literature that [religious] identity is an essential clue for understanding interstate relations
(Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006). This thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the link
between religion and conflict. In particular, do religious differences between states in a dyad
partly affect various types of rivalry and war? I use social identity theory to understand the
connection between states with different religions and their propensity for militarized conflict.
Since religion may play a role in people’s social and political life (Chriss, 2013), I argue that
when some collective group identity such as religion is in place, states may use the opportunity
to mobilize the main population of adherents by means of rhetoric to generate and sustain
popular support for conflict with other states.

1

India and Pakistan experienced an enduring rivalry from 1947 to 2001, with a total of 46 militarized disputes.
They have also engaged in four wars throughout this period: “in 1947-48, they fought a long and intense battle
over the formerly independent state of Jammu and Kashmir; in 1965 they fought another war over the same piece
of land; in 1971 the two engaged during the civil war that severed East Pakistan into the nascent state of
Bangladesh; and in 1999 they fought once more in the mountains of Kashmir” (Ganguly, 2001: 1).
2
I sometimes refer to them as ‘interreligious dyads’ throughout this dissertation.
3
A ‘dyads’ is a concept used to describe “pairs of states” involved in a dispute (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006: 337).

1

Since the end of World War II in 1945, several dyads4 (e.g., France-China [1945-1949],
Italy-Albania [1950-1952], Greece-Turkey [1945-1958], and Russia-Turkey [1978-1993]) have
engaged in enduring or recurring militarized rivalries5, with some disputes ending in wars. Other
states ceased further hostilities and have had extended periods of peace (e.g., France and
Germany post-World War II) (Rudkevich, Travlos, & Diehl, 2013). Throughout intractable
rivalry, states incur significant devastation to their defense capabilities, interstate positions, and
domestic societies. Nevertheless, some state rivalries persist over time. Could religion be a
contributing factor in interstate rivalry? In other words, does the existence of religious
differences in a dyad6 increase the likelihood for the two states to seek conflict-based avenues?
The literature on the determinants of interstate militarized conflict raises some central
questions in the field of security studies and international relations. Scholars identify links
between culture and conflict and ethnicity and conflict, but do not test empirically how religion
in particular is linked to interstate militarized conflicts. Although Huntington (1993, 1996)
argues that some states are undergoing a ‘clash of civilizations’ and thus some interstate
relationships are more conflict prone than others, there is no inquiry into the specific role of
religion in such conflicts. Additionally, ethnic conflict literature (e.g., Sadowski, 1998; Smith,
1999) seeks to explain conflict behavior on the basis of ethnic identities. Civilizational and
ethnic characteristics may be linked to conflict, yet the relationship between religion and conflict

4

Each state in a dyad refers to a sovereign state governments. Throughout this dissertation, the word ‘state’
refers to state leader, who is the final decision maker in matters of rivalry.
5
Other examples of seemingly perpetual rivalries include Hungary and Yugoslavia from 1968 to 1991; Italy and
Yugoslavia from 1972 to 1992 (Rudkevich, Travlos, & Diehl, 2013).
6
According to Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), “rivalries consist of the same pair of states [dyads] competing with
each other, and the expectation of a future conflict relationship is one that is specific as to whom the opponent
will be” (333). Basically, the players in rivalries include states, “and rivalries are dyadic” (Ibid., 2006: 333).
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remains understudied. Thus the lack of systematic scholarship on the link between religion and
militarized conflict is partially due to conceptual ambiguity. Scholars who attempt to analyze the
effect of religious differences on interstate conflict use concepts such as ‘culture’ or ‘ethnic’ and
not specifically ‘religious’ differences. Such conceptual limitations do not allow for systematic
inquiry in the connection between religion and conflict. To contribute to the existing literature, I
treat ‘religion’ as an exclusive concept to examine the connection between religious differences
and three dimensions of militarized conflict.
Huntington (1993) argues that “decreasingly able to mobilize support and form
coalitions on the basis of ideology, [states] will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by
appealing to common religion and civilization identity” (9). Since Huntington’s (1993, 1996)
prediction7, 9/11 ushered a new-found need to understand the religion-conflict nexus since
evidently religion had its part in the calamity. Soon after, scholars began studying the role of the
religion in relation to the terror attacks in particular and conflict in general. The ‘religion’
category has since become an important reference in the dynamics of interstate politics. Both
state and faction leaders may have the ability to mobilize the public’s support against other states
with different religious beliefs. It is argued that prior to onset of militarized conflict campaigns,
leaders may use religious discourse to recruit successfully believers to partake or support their
cause. For example, in states such as Algeria, India, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia, “religious
motivations overlay political conflicts with violent ramifications” (Gill, 2001: 118). Long term
peace may be less likely once militarized campaigns erupt between religiously different dyads.

7

According to Huntington (1993), “civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture,
tradition and, most important, religion” (25). The distinct variance of these civilizations from one another, history
of prolonged violent conflicts, and other political factors may heighten the rivalry between each other.

3

Svensson (2007) explains that “religious armed conflicts are more intractable than nonreligious
conflicts” (930). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that religious differences and different
dimensions of conflict are correlated because religious identity has distinct properties for
mobilization. The religious differences and militarized conflict nexus is not only of academic
interest, but also has policy implications. Examining this link is an important inquiry in the
international relations literature that will increase our understanding of militarized conflict but
also for policymakers. This study may provide insight for policy makers to better understand the
importance of religious differences via its mobilization potential on militarized conflict behavior.
This is a quantitative study that estimates the effects of religious differences between two
states in a dyad on the likelihood to pursue rivalry and war. That is, are dyads with religious
differences more disposed to militarized conflict? In particular, I examine the effects of religious
differences within dyads on three types of militarized conflict: enduring rivalry, rivalry
recurrence, and war8.

8

Studies on interstate rivalries propose an empirically based direction for understanding militarized conflict.
Typically, scholars have discussed rivalry in relation to “enmity” (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006; Cox, 2010),
“protracted conflict” (Ayoob, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2002), and “enduring rivalry” (Goertz & Diehl, 1992, 1993;
Vasquez, 1993; and Barnett, 1999). Each term denotes in the general sense “a longstanding, competitive
relationship between two or more adversaries” (Hensel, 1998: 3) and is characterized by intense militarized
disputes that may evolve into repeated confrontations (enduring rivalry) or abate over time (protracted rivalry).
The clear difference between the rivalry disputes is that some do not have a militarized aspect and their renewal is
not studied. Although some scholars consider “interstate rivalry” as identical to “enduring interstate rivalry,” the
present research treats the term “rivalry” in a more specific sense. This dissertation will focus on three types of
rivalry: (a) enduring rivalries, (b) rivalry recurrence, and (c) interstate war in the period between 1945 and 2001;
thus, data on interstate rivalries are used to show whether various dimensions of rivalries may be partly motivated
by the religious differences between the two states in a dyad. It is possible to derive more general predictions
related to the initiation of religiously motivated militarized rivalries.

4

The Main Argument
This research aims to examine whether religious differences between states affect
different dimensions of interstate rivalry and war9. As has been generally observed, cultural
identities, such as religion, appear to have become more significant as a source of mobilization in
the past two decades (Hechter, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Huntington, 2002). Seul (1999) argues
that “religion is not the cause of religious conflict; rather for many . . . it frequently supplies the
fault line along which intergroup identity and resource competition occurs” (564). Since religion
has a significant impact on the political setting, the state may use religion to motivate various
types of state policies. Haynes (1994) argues that there are implications in such “religio-political
movements” that seek to utilize religion through political means (30). Essentially, states may use
“religious myths and symbols to influence the political process, [thus] espousing both religious
and secular goals” (Fox, 2002: 108).
An extensive search through the literature on religion and conflict did not produce any
distinctive and testable theories. The existing propositions can be grouped into two parts. The
first part follows Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (Henderson, 1998;
Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000; Davis, Jaggers, & Moore, 1997; Fox, 2013). According to
Huntington (1993), “civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture,
tradition and, most important, religion” (25). The distinct variance of these civilizations from
one another, history of prolonged violent conflicts, and other political factors may heighten the
conflict between each other. More specifically, the cultural features between the different

9

I am concerned with religious identities as sources of mobilization. Seul (1999) argues that ‘religious conflicts’ are
not necessarily about religion or religious conversion, and usually have non-religious causes.

5

civilizations drive the polarizations between the Eastern and Western spheres. Huntington
(1996) includes various elements in the way he defined ‘civilization’, yet he maintains that
culture is a common theme (Ellis, 2010). Particularly, Huntington (1996) argues that
‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ denote “the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a
culture writ large” (41).
The second part follows the argument that a threat to an ethnic group by an out-group
may dictate vengeful treatment and conflict behavior. Rai and Fiske (2011) broadly explain that
the importance of unity is partially captured by supporting the in-groups’ integrity through a
sense of collective responsibility and common fate (61). Smith (1981, 1986) argues that national
movements are ‘multidimensional’ and include cultural aspects such as religion yet he focuses
on specific ethnic group conflicts: Tamils, Tibetans, Sikhs, Pakistanis, and Indians. Smith (1981,
1986) does not make a direct link between these groups’ religious identities and respective
national movements. Smith (1999) does not test systematically whether religious differences
between the selected groups increase their likelihood to engage in intrastate conflict. Smith’s
works (1981, 1986, 1999) all have important elements for understanding group differences,
features of nationalism, and group conflict. Although Smith does not examine explicitly the role
of religion, his central tenets on group conflict may further a logical analysis on religious
differences and interstate conflict.
Studies exploring the effects of religion on conflict lack consistency in specifying the
concept of ‘religion’. Nearly every study that attempts to analyze the effects of religious
differences on interstate or intrastate conflicts applies the broad concepts of ‘culture’ or ‘ethnic’
dissimilarities not ‘religious’ differences. Thus these studies cannot identify the specific effect
of religious differences on various dimensions of militarized conflict. Also, these quantitative
6

studies on the link between religion and conflict have important implications for further research
because such studies need to include a more precise definition of ‘religion’ to test the specific
kinds of religious differences on different types of rivalry and war. I address such limitations in
the literature by evaluating the effects of religious differences on enduring rivalries, rivalry
recurrence, and war. This study fills a gap by determining whether religious differences between
dyads increase the probability of militarized conflict behavior.
While the literature on the role of religion in international politics has been increasing,
the theories used to explain interstate conflict behavior are still ambiguous. There is no solid
mechanism linking religion with conflict. For example, some theories emphasize how the ingroup might increase its hostility against the out-group due to the existence of religious
differences. However, these theories fall short in explaining the state’s role in this conflict.
Essentially, it is important to understand the role the state may play as an agent that propagates
hostility against the out-group. Thus, empirical studies on religion and interstate militarized
conflict remain limited and the frameworks generally used to understand such studies “remain
far too crude” (Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011: 8).
The prevailing social science literature based on social identity theory (Seul, 1999; Voye,
1999; Smith, 1999, 2000; Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011; Shaw, 2011) and social psychology
(Ellingsen, 2000; Petersen, 2002) suggests that identity may provide a mechanism that is used by
political institutions to facilitate public mobilization (Fox, 2013) in order to legitimize their
agenda (Lewy, 1974; Johnston & Figa, 1988). Building on social identity theory, Coser (1956)
argues that the in-group/out-group proposition suggests that conflict with the out-group increases
the cohesion and political monopolization of the in-group. Thus, the state can influence the ingroup’s perceptions by presenting the rival’s objectives as “evil.” By demonizing the rival, the
7

state may be able to influence the public’s existing social ties to their religious identity,
ultimately mobilizing the main population’s support for the conflict.
In line with the social identity theory, the group’s religion provides a coherent worldview
and fulfills the need to belong, which is an essential human motivation (Baumeister & Leary,
1995). I argue that a state may capitalize on such religious ‘motivation’ from its predominant
population in order to gain public support during time of conflict. More specifically, a state’s
perception of another state may be organized into “group schemas, or images, [whereby] these
images10 are organized in a systematic way [with] cognitions and beliefs regarding the target
state’s motives, leadership, and primary characteristics” (Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2005: 28).
According to Seul (1999), each group with which a given in-group is or is not associated is
positively or negatively evaluated by either group (556). When an in-group attempts to
negatively evaluate an out-group, for example, certain images may be used to achieve a
“comparatively superior position for the in-group on the basis of valued dimensions, [which] is
the key factor leading to discriminatory intergroup [conflict] behavior” (Seul, 1999: 557). Thus,
a state may exploit these ‘images’ by deriving stereotypes of the out-group state when the two
states’ main religions differ. Understanding how states may develop certain images “requires
understanding the context of intergroup relations from which these beliefs and stereotypes
directly derive” (Alexander et al., 2005: 28). Such stereotypes based on beliefs and other
defining characteristics may play an important role in determining the particular images that
states have of one another. Stereotypes or ‘images11’ of other states stem from “perceived

10

This idea is reflected in Image Theory, which is a theory of “strategic decision making that identifies the primary
judgments guiding international images, or stereotypes, and the selection of international policies” (Alexander,
Levin, & Henry, 2005: 28).
11
Here, image theory examines the possible role of social identity, particularly in the context of religious differences
and militarized conflict.

8

relationships between [states] and serve to justify a [state’s] desired reaction or treatment toward
another [state]” (Alexander et al, 2005: 29). Accordingly, I rely on social identity theory to
explain enduring and rivalry recurrence and war because the theory suggests that groups of
people may engage in conflict when conditions such as different group identities exist. Hence,
the role of the state (as an agent that influences its population based on stereotypical images of
the out-group) is important because of the potential of mobilization of these identities. States
that engage in rivalries and/or war may support hawkish policies instead of peaceful resolutions
for several reasons, though. Thus, I control for other factors that may cause states to take the
militarized conflict route.
Now, war is distinct in that it requires a weightier decision and more resources by the
states involved. In particular, interstate war demands more material and --human resources,
policy choices, and emotional obligations and costs on the states’ populaces. Since war has
much higher costs, states usually consider the costs against the benefits of the war outcome.
Mobilization of the state population’s religious identity may be a factor contributing to the state’s
expectations regarding the outcome of the war. Consequently, mobilization based on identity
may increase the state’s optimism regarding its performance in war and prospect of victory. I
utilize the theory of false optimism as it is considered in the literature a significant explanation of
war (White, 1970; Stoessinger, 1974; Jervis, 1976, 1988; Levy, 1983; Blainey, 1988; Van Evera,
1999; Johnson, 2004) and describe how my argument fits in this theoretical framework.
According to false optimism in relation to war, a state may sometimes suffer from hubris, a level
of overconfidence whereby the state ultimately resorts to militarized behavior instead of seeking
peaceful settlements. The level of ‘false optimism’ “is the extent to which a state’s perception of
how well it will fare in a war exceeds the reality” (Altman, 2015: 287). The optimism theory as
9

a mechanism is used in this research to link religious differences to the onset of war. Given the
plurality of religious adherents, a state may have exaggerated expectations about winning the war
since that population may be seen as a source to support and energize the war effort.
Accordingly, interstate war behavior may be explained by a state’s hawkishness when the other
state has a different religion.
Blainey (1988) argues that in the past three centuries, war unfolds repeated clues which
highlight the causes of war and peace. Since warfare is costly and risky, there should exist
negotiated agreements. When political bargaining fails, states may choose war over further
diplomacy. Although the theory of false optimism is not a comprehensive explanation for war,
the theory suggests a persuasive added part of the war puzzle12. This argument is merely the
start of discerning how false optimism is relevant to understanding how different religious
identities in a dyad may be a contributive factor of war. According to Slantchev and Tarar
(2011) “[optimism] is only a starting point: it shows why the actors might be unwilling to offer
each war-avoiding peace terms” (136). The mechanism orients the effect on the war policy of at
least one state in the dyad. Whereas the literature on the link between religion and conflict does
not sufficiently and systematically explore the mechanism leading to war, my argument broadly
applies false optimism to explain why states with varying religions may go to war over peace as
a viable option. The identities in two different predominant religions between states may lead to
hawkish policies via the populations’ support. Kahneman and Renshon (2007) argue that “a
hawk’s preference for military action over diplomatic measures is often built upon the
assumption that victory will come easily and swiftly” (37). Thus, there are also precursory

12

Johnson (2004) argues that “there is some probability of war even if there are no positive illusions (owing to a
variety of other causes)” (38).

10

structural conditions that affect the impact of false optimism on war, “or more specifically on the
forms of overconfidence it engenders” (Johnson, 2004: 38). I focus on one such condition:
religious differences between the two states.
I examine whether religious differences between states may contribute to rivalry and war
in the time period between 1945 and 2001. Conducting the analysis during this time period
allows me to hold several factors constant including the founding of international institutions
aimed at preserving word peace, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund,
and the European Union among others. In addition, since the end of World War II, scholars
began questioning the validity of the category of religion in all parts of social life and politics
and whether the world was moving toward a period of secularization. This is commonly known
as the theory of secularization, “namely, the decline of religion and the privatization of religion”
(Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012: 4). However, this secularization proposition was challenged by
events around the world and was “severely jolted with the establishment of the first modern
theocracy in 1979 in Iran” (Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012: 2). By the late 1980s religious political
movements had emerged in Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad, Senegal, Turkey,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Guatemala, Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Israel,
Punjab in India, Canada, and Britain (Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012: 2). These religious
movements challenging secular states were Muslim, Protestant, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, and
Orthodox Jews. Reviving the role of religion within a state highlighted not only the importance
of religion for these groups, but also contributed to the creation of competitions, negative
relationships, polarization, and greater separations between major religious groups (Shah,
Stepan, & Toft, 2012). Since major religions demanded greater public presence, interreligious
hostilities began to emerge between states (Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012). Thus studying the role
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of religion in interstate militarized conflict during the 1945-2001 period may inform further the
theory of secularization.
Now, the time period ranging from 1945 to 2001 is known for the changing world order
that affected relationships between states. For the most part, the Cold War covered much of this
study’s time period (i.e., 1945 to 1989) whereby some countries allied and/or established treaties
and agreements with one of the two major powers: the United States or Soviet Union (Charap &
Shapiro, 2016). The interstate relationships that were established during the Cold War period
either suppressed conflicts between each major power’s allies or intensified conflict between
those states allied with the United States and those allied with the Soviet Union. For example,
Afghan-US relations became significant during the Cold War period. The United States
supported Afghanistan’s efforts against the Soviet Union by offering military and financial
assistance throughout this time (Charap & Shapiro, 2016). Similarly, interstate relations formed
with the Soviet Union to achieve victory against the Soviets’ enemies (i.e., US allies). Such
interstate relations may have contributed to interstate militarized conflict. Thus, conducting the
study using this time period may introduce systematic error in the conduct of analysis.
Answering the question on whether religiously different dyads have a proclivity to
conflict requires unique theories and systematic analyses to capture the causes of rivalry and war.
Pearce (2006) argues that “given the frequency of religious conflict, the evidence shows that
there are circumstances under which religion can, in fact, provoke rather than resolve conflict. I
present the theories that probe the link between religious identity and conflict by exploring how
such identity of the predominant population may contribute to at least one state’s optimism and
overconfidence to pursue war. I rely on social psychology’s Social Identity Theory and False
Optimism Theory to explain the mechanisms used for the various dimensions of militarized
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conflict behavior. By applying the theories relative to the religion-conflict nexus, I seek to
provide a new explanation on how religious differences between dyads may be used to affect
hawkish state policies. I test hypotheses based on the above arguments.
Enduring Rivalry
Based on Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) new rivalry approach, the phenomenon of
rivalry is based on the intensity and frequency of militarized interstate disputes between two
states (333-334). The empirical dimension of studying rivalry “focuses on phenomena ignored
by standard conflict theories” (Diehl & Goertz, 2000: 2). While conflicts do not necessarily
involve a military interaction, rivalries specifically involve several militarized disputes and/or
systematic militarized violence between two sovereign states. According to Goertz and Diehl
(1992), studies that use the rivalry framework are more equipped “to reflect actual conflict
patterns and to allow scholars to understand irregular, but interconnected, conflict over long
periods of time” (162). In particular, rivalries are identified as three or more “interconnected13”
militarized disputes between two sovereign states in a dyad (Klein et al., 2006: 337). I adopt
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) definitions of different dimensions of rivalry in “New Rivalry
Dataset: Procedures and Patterns” (334). Klein et al. (2006) consider the initial “dyadic dispute
to be the first behavioral sign that a rivalry exists” and the end of the last militarized interstate
dispute (MID) “is the last behavioral manifestation of rivalry14” (338).
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According to Klein et al. (2006), “disputes may [be] connected by the presence of unresolved issues that persist
over a broad period” (337).
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Klein et al. (2006) “consider the rivalry to have ended in the 10—15 years” after the “last behavioral sign of the
rivalry” (338-39).
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Unresolved political goals may lead adversaries to turn to “militarized means of settling
their disagreements” (Hensel, N.d.: 3). Studies on enduring rivalries, or longstanding disputes
between states, started to emerge in the 1990s (Klein et al., 2006). Scholarly works suggest that
enduring rivalries “tend to be more violent and more escalatory than confrontations between
non-rival adversaries” (Hensel, N.d.: 3). Goertz and Diehl (1996) argue that the concept of
rivalry has prompted the “rivalry approach” to war and peace, “which focuses scholarly attention
on contextual issues” that are often overlooked in interstate conflict research (Hensel, N.d.: 4).
The rivalry approach focuses attention on the background (i.e., context) in which interstate
relationships occur (Hensel, N.d). Basically scholars seek to identify various circumstances that
may affect interstate rivalry behavior. One such rivalry approach examines the processes that
lead to the onset or evolution of rivalry (i.e., enduring or proto rivalries) (Hensel, N.d.: 4). Diehl
and Goertz (2000) argue that [rivalry] behavior is a function of past conditions (e.g., arms races
and military buildup, power transition, deterrence, etc.) under which conflict ensues between
states. It is these past conditions that characterize the unique stability of rivalries, “which is
reinforced by the expectation of future conflict” (Diehl & Goertz, 2000: 77). The rivalry
approach assumes that the link between past conditions and the outbreak of rivalry between two
states in a dyad is more likely when the states have the same suspicion and/or hostility (Hensel,
N.d.). I predict that the religious differences between the two states motivates that suspicion
and/or hostility.
Manifestations of militarized conflict are inherent in the state’s efforts to survive in the
international system, and states are rational actors who calculate the expected benefits versus the
costs prior to participating in interstate rivalry. For example, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita (1985)
argues that war can be rational if “both sides have expected utility for fighting; that is, if the
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expected utility of war (expected benefits less costs)” outweighs the expected utility of
“remaining at peace” (161). Since religious difference may be used to decrease the costs of
conflict it may be reasonable to argue that such difference between the states may increase the
likelihood of the rivalry escalating to a full-fledged enduring rivalry.
Religious differences between states may play an important role in the development of
enduring rivalry. The relationship between two states that has been marked by a history of
repeated militarized interactions is susceptible to manipulation by at least one of the two states.
Hensel (1998) argues that two adversaries’ relations at any given period are impacted by the
context of relationships between them. As two states increase their history of conflict with one
another, I argue that the states’ religious differences may be a contributing factor to this history.
Consequently, at least one state in the dyad may use the existence of religious differences in its
public rhetoric to mobilize the main population’s support for the rivalry cause.
Rivalry Recurrence
Hensel (1998) argues that “past interactions between two adversaries are likely to affect
their future expectations, as when a history of frequent militarized conflict between them or a
history of unsuccessful peaceful settlement attempts leads to the expectation of future conflict
and the perception that peaceful means of settlement are unlikely to succeed in settling the issues
at stake” (4). Various dyadic rivalries erupted in the 20th century to establish political and
economic domination, among other reasons. In spite of territorial modifications, regime
transformation, new leadership and generational change in both states, the rivalry resumed after
decades of armistice.
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According to Rudkevich, Travlos, and Diehl (2013), “there must be some concerns for
the conditions surrounding the end of the original rivalry, but no study examines historical
factors in the relationship, and certainly not whether there was a previous rivalry between the
states, in accounting for rivalry onset” (160). I argue that one historical factor may be a
country’s predominant religion, which ultimately embeds tradition and distinct principles for
society. Thus, this study incorporates “religious difference” as a social dimension to the
Rudkevich et al. (2013) model.

A population’s predominant religion differentiates their state

from another, thus widening the gap between them. Could religious difference be a partial
underlying cause of rivalry recurrence? Rudkevich et al. (2013) stress “the longer that rivalries
endure and the more frequent their hostile interactions, the less they are influenced by single
events and more by the entire history of the rivalry, or the legacy of the past” (161). In other
words, the more systematically active the rivalry in a dyad, the higher the likelihood it is
renewed in the future. Thus, I extend the Rudkevich et al. (2013) analysis of rivalry recurrence
by testing the religious differences as a causal factor. I argue that rivalry recurrence among
states may not only be politically motivated, but religious differences may be an additional
explanatory factor. Discerning past rivalry interactions and social and political patterns may help
explain states’ prospective behaviors.
Religious difference may be an important factor for rivalry recurrence to occur. To be
sure, I test rivalry cases after the end of World War II, which highlight religious differences
between states that reentered into interstate rivalry decades after the initial rivalry was
terminated. Based on this method I examine whether religious difference has been a cause since
the rivalry’s inception. Other factors such as the state’s political regime and leaders might have
changed since the initial rivalry, but the state’s main religious affiliation remained constant (for
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the most part). Hence, I argue that religious differences between dyads may be the catalyst of
interstate rivalry recurrence years after the initial rivalry’s termination. Iterating the historical
enmity among states in a dyad is more likely when their predominant religions diverge. The
newly constructed model may increase our understanding on the factors that account for rivalry
recurrence.
War
Severe conflicts such as interstate wars between two enemies are very costly. Interstate
war is a more distinct type of militarized conflict because it necessitates more material and
human resources, political strategies, and emotional commitments and sacrifices from the states’
populations. Considering the high costs of war, states typically weigh their costs against the
benefits of the war outcome. If one or both states believe that they will win the war (otherwise
known as the false optimism15 explanation of war), their costs do not appear so high (Slantchev
& Tarar, 2011). Lebow (1981) argues that most interstate conflicts include “underlying
hostility” (i.e., a rivalry relationship of “past experience”) to explain subsequent militarized
behavior between two states (337). Diehl and Goertz (2000) make an important claim when
conceptualizing rivalry: “disputes and wars occurring in the rivalry are not independent of each
other because they belong to the same relationship” (7). Klein et al. (2006) argue that “rivals
expect that mutual disputes, crises, and war are likely to continue into the future” (335) and that
one device “by which disputes are linked in rivalry is through the ‘pull of the past’” (342). The
‘pull of the past’ refers to the history of disputes between two states in a dyad, which makes
future hostility more likely (Klein et al., 2006: 342). The expectations of future hostility are

15

In this dissertation, I use the theory of false optimism to explain war only.

17

“mechanisms to keep the rivalry going and provide continuity between present and future
conflicts” (Klein et al., 2006: 335).
The historical link of disputes between two states may trigger future hostility based on
religious differences. Leaders may rely on the population’s support for the war cause. I use
exclusively the theory of false optimism to explain the link between religious differences and
war. States may activate “a sizable portion of the public” to generate support for an imminent
war (Hensel, 1998: 18). States may obtain the population’s support for war with the inculcation
of rivalry hostility into domestic society. The state population’s support may be used to
exaggerate the state’s optimism about winning the war. Due to such factors as having the
backing of the main population to “sustain the war effort”, interstate negotiations may cease and
“war becomes the inevitable outcome” (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011: 135).
Types of Religious Differences
This study creates a more precise measure of ‘religious differences’. I begin by defining
‘religion’ and then measuring difference in religions. I define ‘religion’ as a “belief system of an
individual or a group of individuals that contains several elements: belief in supernatural beings
(gods); a distinction between sacred and profane objects; a moral code believed to be sanctioned
by the gods; prayer and other forms of communication with gods; a more or less total
organization of one’s life based on the worldview; a social group bound together by the above”16
(Alston, 1967). I identify “religious affiliation” by the plurality of the dominant population of
religious adherents within the state during a given militarized conflict. The dataset I use shows
that states have large pluralities of a single religion. In order to ensure reliable coding of each
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For a more thorough definition on “religion”, see Maoz and Henderson’s World Religions Codebook (2013: 2)
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state’s predominant religion in a dyad, I rely on Maoz and Henderson’s (2013) World Religion
Project that measures each state’s religious adherents based on denominational level data, which
are aggregated into the relevant religious families. My models also control for ethnic and
linguistic differences. There is a historical component in certain types of religious differences
that may increase the chances of rivalry and war. I am testing for the effects that other types of
‘religious difference’ have on rivalry such as dyads with Christian-Muslim differences and dyads
with different religious denominations. Berger (1990) argues that “men go to war and men are
put to death amid prayers, blessings, and incantations” (44). States may convey religious
messages to influence their population’s endorsement for conflict. Thus, I examine rivalries
between dyads with Christian-Muslim differences to determine whether this type of religious
difference is associated with enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence and war. For example,
Christian/Muslim dyads may be more inclined to pursue war. Thus, given the existence of
religious differences in general or more specifically between Christian/Muslim dyads, states may
espouse people’s support for war by reifying their religious fervor. Consequently, for adherents,
the decision for war becomes good in itself, rather than a means to an end (Horowitz, 2009: 163).
I also examine whether difference in the major religious denominations of each state in a dyad is
related with each conflict dimension. These religious orientations may drive states to engage in
enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war.
Significance of Research
My contribution to the body of literature on religion and conflict allows both academics
and policy makers to better understand the unique impact that religious differences may have on
militarized conflict behavior. This rigorous study with its unique theoretical argument advances
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this area of research by offering a more nuanced approach to studying religious differences and
different dimensions of rivalry and war. Also, policy makers may improve their international
policies by exhausting diplomatic efforts prior to deciding on military action.
Dissertation Plan
Each of the chapters in this dissertation expands on the concepts discussed thus far, and
examines a unique description of religious differences and its analytical connections.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature and theories, illustrating how the concept of ‘religious
differences’ has developed prompting a clearer understanding of the concept, however also
generating some drawbacks. I then discuss how the view of religious differences is relevant to
my work. I postulate that there is an association between religious differences and militarized
conflict in interstate dyad. Based on this assumption, I continue with a literature review of the
connection between religion and various dimensions of interstate conflict. After defining
interstate rivalry and establishing the distinctions among the various types of rivalry and war, I
outline the prevailing explanations for these different types of militarized conflicts in the
literature and present my arguments. Next, I discuss this study’s theoretical framework and
derive the hypotheses to be tested.
Chapter 3 consists of the research design. In Chapter 3, I proceed to discuss the
‘religious differences’ measure, data measurement and methodology, and argue alternative
explanations of the different dimensions of rivalry and war analyzed in this study. In addition, I
offer a detailed discussion of the variables used in the datasets on enduring rivalry, rivalry
recurrence, and war. Further, I distinguish between ‘religious’, ‘linguistic’, and ‘ethnic’
differences on the likelihood of militarized conflict by treating ‘linguistic’ and ‘ethnic’
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differences as separate control variables. This method seeks to determine the independent effect,
if any, of ‘religious differences’ on different types of rivalry and war.
Chapter 4 describes the estimated effects. To analyze whether religious differences
between dyadic states are linked with various levels of rivalry behavior and war, I conduct a
quantitative study using statistical models that incorporate alternative explanations on these
different dimensions of rivalry and war. I also examine closer the link between religious
differences17 and war using a qualitative analysis of the case of India and Pakistan. To examine
war proneness, I offer an illustration of the India-Pakistan war of 1947. Chapter 5 concludes and
discusses the contribution of this study to the literature of militarized conflict.
This dissertation has several objectives; however, the main one is to contribute to the way
scholars and policy makers perceive the role of religion in militarized disputes. Through the use
of more rigorous testing, I hope to transform the way this subject is understood and written
about.
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In addition the broad religious differences (e.g., Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc.) between states, I
test other dynamics of religious differences: that is, ‘Christian-Muslim’ differences, ‘different religious
denominations’, and ‘different religious denominations’ while aggregating Protestants and Anglicans on the
likelihood of rivalry behavior (i.e., enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war).

21

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Literature Review
In this chapter first I review the literature on the link between religion and conflict and
next I present my theoretical framework of the relationship between religious difference in a
dyad and enduring rivalries, recurring rivalries, and war.
Conceptual Limitations
While the literature supports the argument that religion affects conflict proneness, there is
not sufficient research on the connection between religion and armed conflict. In addition, there
are conceptual ambiguities that limit the study of this relationship. Huntington (1993, 1996)
predicts that the extent of conflicts after the end of the Cold War will be civilizational in nature.
The existence of different identities such as religion may serve as a condition in exacerbating
conflicts (Henderson, 1997), yet it is difficult to determine if religion may be a cause since
“religion is subsumed under the ethnic and [civilizational] categories” (Henderson, 1997: 660;
Carment, 1993; Carment & James, 1995). For example, several scholars argue that Huntington’s
(1993, 1996) definition of “civilization” is controversial (Jervis, 1997; Buzan, 1997).
Katzenstein (1996) explains that “although they are real, the defining characteristics of
“civilization” ([i.e.] history, ethnicity, language, culture, tradition, and religion) cannot be
grasped easily” (533). Basically, it is difficult to observe such a broad, all-encompassing
concept as “civilization”; whereas, studying “religion” directly may serve as a basis for
clarification in the study of the link between religion and conflict (Seul, 1999).
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Thus although Huntington (1993, 1996) provides a compelling argument, he falls short in
his definition of ‘civilizational difference’. On one hand, he refers to his causal variable as
‘culture’, and then argues that the different ‘religions’ between states cause wars. Though
Huntington uses ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ interchangeably, he also stresses their differences
whereby they “share common elements such as religion, language, customs, history, and
institutions” (Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000: 587). Additionally, Huntington (1993) separates
ethnic and religious identities to explain the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ relationship between people of
different ethnicity and religion (29). Further, Huntington (1993, 1996) interchangeably uses
nationality and religious affiliation of a group, which creates confusion between the two
concepts. For example, he says “many Arab countries. . .” and then he refers to them as Muslim
countries (32). Ethnicity and religious affiliation may not necessarily reflect the same
demography. Fox (2002) suggests that differences in culture seem to be a practical cause of
ethnic conflict. However, there are several deficiencies when this relationship is tested
empirically. If “culture” is used as a proxy for “religion”, then cultural identity will be
misidentified. Thus, there are several inconsistencies in integrating the religious dimension into
other conceptual categories. The reasoning of using “religion” as an element of “culture” may be
partially justified, however, it does not permit for study of the direct association between religion
and militarized conflict; the literature that follows Huntington’s thesis muddies the direct effect
of religion on conflict.
Fox (2002) studies Huntington’s definition of civilization and presents an argument using
his own concept of religion to analyze how either factor influences ethnic conflict. He conducts
a quantitative analysis using the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 dataset and collects data
independently on religions and civilizations (Fox, 2002). Fox’s (2002) findings support his
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initial argument that “religion” and “civilization” are not identical, despite their overlapping
features.
The religious differences can be between the two states’ major religions, Christianity and
Islam, and also their varying religious denominations. Nevertheless, the literature remains split
and concepts are not exclusive. Nearly every study that analyses the effect of religious
differences on interstate conflict talks in platitudes by applying concepts of “cultural” or “ethnic”
differences. This broad generalization has many limitations. The literature rarely addresses
whether religion is the main affiliation that stimulates interstate conflict. Much of the literature
considers cultural identity as a multidimensional category that includes religion, nationalism,
language, etc. Such an approach does not provide an observable religious variable in relation to
interstate conflicts. The central claim of this literature informally depicts that a state’s particular
religion may impact conflict. But there is no literature that studies systematically the connection
between major religions or religious denominations and interstate conflict.
In sum, due to these conceptual limitations, studies that attempt to estimate the
explanatory power of religious differences on interstate conflict cannot capture the exclusive
impact of religion on militarized conflict (i.e., enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war). My
thesis provides conceptual clarity regarding religious, ethnic and linguistic differences and
estimates the independent effect of religion on interstate conflict.
The Link between Religion and Conflict
The association between religion and conflict has emerged as an increasingly significant
area of research over the past decade and a half. There is an emerging literature that explores the
connection between different “religious dimensions and the escalation, duration, and termination
of armed conflict” (Svensson, 2007: 930). However, there is lack of systematic studies of this
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association and those that attempt to analyze the effect of religious differences on interstate
conflict apply the broad concept of ‘culture’ or ‘ethnic’ dissimilarities instead of ‘religious’
differences. This thesis addresses these limitations by examining religion and its connection to
conflict.
This section sheds light on how the religious differences between states may result in
various dimensions of militarized conflict. I use the literature on religion and conflict to build
my theoretical framework. I argue that the state may pursue its foreign policy objectives by
compounding the rival’s different religion into its political rhetoric to mobilize public support.
In the next section I proceed to examine perspectives in the literature regarding the connection
between religion and conflict.
Perspectives on Religious Differences and Dimensions of Conflict
There is a voluminous literature attempting to explain the causes of armed conflict.
Notably, studies on religious-based armed conflict have increased since the end of the Cold War
and those studies that exclusively test the link between religion and conflict do so by focusing on
intrastate or civil conflicts. Although the relationship between religious differences and
interstate conflict is understudied in the literature, this review provides the basis to construct my
theoretical framework.
A body of research suggests that there will be a ‘clash of civilizations’ due to
globalization facilitating the interaction of many cultures. This hypothesis is proposed by
Samuel P. Huntington (1993) and is commonly known as the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis,
Huntington (1993) makes the assumption that the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu,
Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African civilizations may engage in major conflicts along
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the borders separating them from one another (25)18. He premises his argument on the
differences between these civilizations. According to Huntington (1993), “civilizations are
differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important,
religion” (25). The distinct variance of these civilizations from one another and other political
factors may heighten the conflict between each other. Specifically, the cultural identities19
between the different civilizations drive the polarizations between the Eastern and Western
spheres. Huntington (1996) includes various elements in his concept of ‘civilization’, yet he
maintains that culture is a common theme (Ellis, 2010). In particular, Huntington (1996) argues
that ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ denote “the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a
culture writ large” (41). A central premise in Huntington’s thesis “is the importance of ‘core’ or
dominant states within civilizations and their ability to attract countries of similar culture and
repulse those that are culturally dissimilar as a means of organizing collective security” (Russett
et al., 2000: 587). This type of integration between states with similar identities may increase
cohesion and reduce antagonistic interactions (Russet et al., 2000); such cohesive security is
premised on the international relations of “smaller states under [the core state’s] hegemony—
both pacifying relations among them and controlling their relations with outsiders” (Russet et al.,
2000: 587). Huntington’s first hypothesis is based on the notion of cooperation, which liberal
theorists view as a way of ensuring peace in the international system. However, rather than
treating inter-dependence as an instrument for conflict mitigation, Huntington argues that

18

Huntington (1993) refers to these borders as “fault lines”.
‘Cultural identity’ as a broad concept includes aspects of religion, ethnicity, nationality, and language. Although I
include studies on cultural identity, I distinguish my current study by focusing exclusively on ‘religious identity’
because religious identity is vital for collective group identity. For example, a person can be half Indian and half
Syrian, but cannot be half Hindu and half Muslim. People with different ethnicity, nationality, and/or language,
might share the same religious identity. Thus, I treat ‘religion’ as a distinct concept in this research.
19
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interdependence through globalization yields dissatisfactions as exemplified by the West’s
endeavor to spread its principles. Huntington’s secondary argument borrows much of its context
from the realist remedy20 for world order in a multipolar international system (Kupchan, 1998).
Huntington’s (1993, 1996) hypothesis serves as a stepping stone for further empirical
analysis. Based on Huntington’s (1993, 1996) thesis, scholars test whether civilizational
differences increase the likelihood of military conflict. For example, Russett, Oneal, and Cox
(2000) find that Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis does not affect interstate disputes
(583-608). They test the likelihood of international disputes (from 1950 to 1992) resulting from
the states’ cultural, military, or political characteristics (591). According to Russett et al. (2000),
‘dispute’ is defined as “when one or both states in the dyad threatened to use force, made a
demonstration of force, or actually used military force against the other” (591). Furthermore, the
main explanatory variable is whether a dyad is ‘culturally heterogeneous’ based on eight
civilizations: the Western, Sinic, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, Buddhist,
and African. Their findings suggest that civilizational differences do not affect the likelihood of
international disputes.
Scholars who test Huntington’s hypothesis do so by following Huntington’s own broad
conceptual treatment of “culture”. For example, Henderson (1998) tests Huntington’s thesis that
“cultural difference” is a contributing causal factor on war participation. Henderson (1998)
argues that the requirement of “human sacrifice” to preserve religious identity may occur amid
interstate rivalry (471). In addition, for Henderson (1998) cultural difference, which includes
religious difference, “acts as a brake on nonviolent conflict resolution resulting in the increased
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In particular, Huntington’s argument seems to borrow from the hegemonic stability theory, which is commonly
connected with Giplin (1981) and Krasner (1985).
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intractability of disputes and an increased likelihood of war” (469). While states with religious
differences21 may be more inclined to seek conflict-based avenues, interstate dyads with shared
or identical religious affiliation may seek diplomacy to avoid military force. Henderson (1998)
predicts that cultural features (i.e., religious, ethnic, and linguistic similarity) may affect the
onset of interstate war (461), and conducts a multivariate analysis of state dyads from 1820 to
1989 to test his hypotheses (461). His (1998) findings do not support his proposition that
“religious similarity is negatively correlated with war onset” (473-474). Thus, Henderson’s
studies (1997, 1998) show that cultural differences have an uncertain impact on interstate war.
According to Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006), there are many other discrepancies that could
possibly be used to demarcate cultural identities (61). Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) argue that
“most statistical analyses have simply adopted Huntington’s classifications of the
relevant cultural groups (e.g., Russett et al., 2003; Henderson & Tucker, 2001; Chiozza,
2002; Bolks & Stoll, 2003). Although this is appropriate if the main interest is assessing
empirical support for Huntington’s claims, it clearly runs into the problem noted here
when attempting to move beyond the particular, even peculiar, Huntington typology”
(61).
Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) recommend that scholars use identifiable characteristics such as
religion because such identity is more suitable for [quantitative] studies than other identities (61).
Another body of literature on armed conflict centers on the effect of religion. While
empirical studies on religion and conflict are limited, the prevailing social sciences literature
(Seul, 1999; Voye, 1999; Smith, 1999, 2000) suggests that identity may be a mechanism that is
used by political institutions in order to legitimize their agenda (Lewy, 1974; Johnston & Figa,
1988) and facilitate mobilization (Fox, 2013). This argument is rooted in social identity theory
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‘Religious difference’ is concerned with states’ dissimilar religions. Each state’s religion is identified when the
plurality of the state population identify with that religion.
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(Seul, 1999; Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011; Shaw, 2011) and principles of social psychology
(Ellingsen, 2000; Petersen, 2002) that analyze interstate conflict behavior. Thus, this approach
uses the identity of the group when explaining international conflict decisions, and maintains that
groups of people engage in conflict when socio-psychological conditions are manifest in the
groups’ different identities. Rai and Fiske (2011) explain that the importance of unity is partially
captured by supporting the in-groups’ integrity through a sense of collective responsibility and
common fate (61). Thus, within in-groups, people are inclined to avoid conflict, whereas, a
threat to the group by an out-group may dictate conflict behavior.
Further, adversarial relationship once under way may lead to expectations about
additional conflict. Hensel (1998) argues that “interactions between two adversaries are likely to
affect their future expectations, as when a history of frequent militarized conflict between them
or a history of unsuccessful peaceful settlement attempts leads to the expectation of future
conflict and the perception that peaceful means of settlement are unlikely to succeed in settling
the issues at stake” (4). Once an adversarial relationship starts between states, religion may
become a component that contributes to the perpetuation of conflict.

For example, various

conflicts erupted in the early 19th and entire 20th centuries to establish political and economic
domination, among other reasons. In spite of territorial modifications, regime transformation,
new leadership, and generational change in both states, conflict perpetuated after decades of
armistice. Hensel (1998) illustrates that the French Empire warred with China from 1870 to
1927, and then again engaged in conflict with China from 1949 to 1953. Although many
conflicts may be fought over major political issues, Hensel (1998) suggests that further
systematic research is needed to address the influence of religious differences on militarized
interstate disputes. Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that although the French-Chinese
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conflict’s obvious causes were political, the underlying religious differences between the two
states might have enhanced the prospect of conflict.
Building on the notion of identity and conflict behavior, Hasencleaver and Rittberger
(2000) argue that religion may influence conflict. According to Hasencleaver and Rittberger
(2000), on a domestic level, decision makers use religion as a means to achieve their authority
and to mobilize people’s support (Fox & Sandler, 2004). Religion can be utilized as a “tool of
power and interest”, that is “leaders use new interpretations of their religions in order to justify
their actions” (Fox & Sandler, 2004: 48) because the function of religion within a society is used
to “unify society, preventing social conflict, control of society by elites”, among other related
socio-political situations (Wilson, 1982; Turner, 1991).
Several scholars make claims about the link between religion and conflict but do not test
them empirically. Smith (1981, 1986, 1999) postulates that national movements are
‘multidimensional’ and include cultural aspects such as religion. However, he does not test
systematically whether religious differences between the selected groups increase their
likelihood to engage in intrastate conflict.
Fox (2002) conducts an empirical inquiry on whether civilization or religion is a more
significant factor of ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War period. He finds that neither
civilizational nor religious differences are the primary causes of ethnic conflict. While Fox’s
(2002) study focuses on domestic conflict, his findings suggest that differentiating between
civilization and religion is a good starting point for empirical studies on religion and conflict.
Also, in a later study Fox (2004) examines the link between religion and domestic
conflicts and argues that religion is an element of an ethnic group’s identity. For instance, he
finds that states with different ethnic groups have a higher likelihood of engaging in conflict and
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expects such ethnic-based civil wars to be more “violent” than other types of conflicts. Although
Fox (2004) establishes that religion may stimulate ethnic conflict, he does not treat “religion” as
a separate factor.
A state’s predominant religion is premised on institutions, spiritual expressions, symbols,
and situations. Hassner and Horowitz (2010) consider several cases of interstate wars and
conclude it is not that religion causes wars, rather religious beliefs and practices frame the way
adherents identify themselves and actions. They argue that research analyses need to move away
from “extreme cases, involving religious extremists and fanatics, and toward the typical universe
of religion and contemporary interstate conflict” (204-205). This suggests that future studies
should focus on interstate conflict in relation to religion rather than on idiosyncratic conflict by
religious fundamentalists.
Seul (1999) studies how religion may influence domestic conflict. His main argument
centers on the importance of religion in an ethnically diverse society. Seul (1999) argues that
“religion has a protean quality: it can divide groups that otherwise are culturally similar, as in
the case of former Yugoslavia; it can align fairly neatly with ancestral and linguistic markers, as
it does, for example, in Northern Ireland; or it can serve as the basis for differentiation among
groups that are similarly diverse, as it does in the case of Indian Hindus and Muslims” (565).
These cases illustrate that religion occasionally functions as a “basis for self-identification and
group differentiation that transcends other markers” (Seul, 1999: 565). This argument suggests
that the presence of religious differences within a state increases the propensity of conflict
irrespective of other cultural similarities, whereas other forms of ‘culture’ (e.g., ethnicity,
language, heritage, etc.) sometimes inhibit a clear basis for explaining interstate rivalry behavior
(Seul, 1999: 566).
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All in all, the research pertaining to the effect of religion on armed conflict remains
ambiguous in identifying the causal mechanism.
Theoretical Framework
States are the principal agents in the international system (Legro & Moravscik, 1999).
Thus, states may pursue their goals including interstate conflict by such means that reduce costs
(Mearsheimer, 2002) including using religion as a political instrument (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl,
2006: 334). States must rely on the support of the people in times of interstate conflict. Yet,
studies that link religious differences and conflict do not account for the agents (i.e., states) that
make the decisions for conflict. Instead, the religion-conflict link is treated as a tool for political
ends without a satisfactory mechanism on how religion contributes to militarized conflict
behavior between states in a dyad. Based on the literature I construct my argument on the
relationship between religious differences (i.e., (a) all religious differences, (b) Christian/Muslim
differences, and (c) different religious denominations) and various dimensions of rivalry and
war.
Since religion may play a role in people’s social and political life (Chriss, 2013), I argue
that when some collective group identity such as religion is in place, states may use the
opportunity to mobilize the support of the population using religious rhetoric. Since, all else
equal, “religion fosters stronger loyalty and commitment than other identities” (Juergensmeyer,
1993), the religious label particularly performs the influential function of uniting and mobilizing
people to support potentially some form of collective action including militarized conflict with
another state. In addition to the range of political and material motives, religion is an important
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component for the population’s social identity; it can motivate and mobilize populations to act
and react in certain ways (Donahue, 1975).
Second, out-group movements challenging a state’s main religion may heighten the
importance of the predominant religion’s survival, for example. Seul (1999) argues that “when
intergroup comparison does produce overt conflict, an escalatory dynamic often is evident”
(556). Therefore, group identity inclines to intensify during periods of crisis (Stein, 1996). The
conflict increases as each threat disturbs the identities of the target group and its members
(Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, & Wong, 1993). Religion may become more salient under this type
of threat to the group identity, whereby allowing the state to employ religious rhetoric to
mobilize the adherents’ support against the out-group rivals. Mainly, a state may activate the
public’s support for interstate conflict by means of rhetoric that amplifies social reactions linked
to the religious identity of the out-group. Barnett (1999) argues that identity embodies “the
understanding of oneself in relation to others” (9). Thus, group identities are mainly “social and
relational” and may be contingent on the state’s interaction with others and position within the
institutional situation (Barnett, 1999: 9). Such relational perception “informs the view that . . .
state identities are partly formed” relative to other countries (Barnett, 1999: 9). Essentially,
religion serves in constructing an identity that can be informed by the state’s rhetoric (Chap,
2007). The trajectory of the interstate conflict may be influenced by the predominant group’s
religious identity in relation to cues from the state actor. When state leaders “[use] rhetoric
during a national crisis such as war, substantive religious language is overwhelmingly used”
(Warber & Olsen, 2006). Although interstate militarized conflicts may have nothing to do with
religion, “it has to do with identity and life in groups” (Sacks, 2015: 39). Such conflicts may be
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“about power, territory, and glory, things that are secular, even profane. [However,] if religion
can be enlisted [to increase the motivation for conflict], it will be” (Sacks, 2015: 39).
Ruane and Todd (2010) argue that “narrowly conceived, ethnicity is usually conceived as
a descent-based category associated with territoriality and with a distinctive origin myth
(Connor, 1994), whereas [religious identity is stronger because it] is concerned with the sacred,
and more narrowly again with confessional organizations and practices” (2). For Roe (2013)
some state policies have religious implications, which is evidenced across generations (179).
This research posits that religious identities offer believers with a purpose and belonging. In the
case of an imminent conflict between two states, the ‘we-ness’ conviction may evolve into ‘we
against them’, which becomes a state strategy. With this in mind, religion needs a certain level
of conversion, or politicization, to make it a political instrument (Stewart, 2009). Thus, a state
may transmit messages to the predominant religious adherents by employing the “religious
difference” rhetorical tool, which creates a clear distinction with the relevant out-group.
Horowitz (2009) argues that the essential truth of religious logic can “theoretically justify
the pursuit of certain ends through any means necessary, legitimizing warfare in some cases 22”
(168). States may utilize religiously based motivations to supposedly perpetuate the survival of
the religious group to ultimately mobilize their support. Theoretically speaking, collective
identity of the religious adherents may sometimes play an important role in facilitating armed
conflict onset (Basedau, Pfeiffer, & Vullers, 2014). For example, according to Chriss (2013),
religion produced a mechanical solidarity in early societies and was “one of the first systematic
forms of [informal] social control” (64). That is, societal unity was strong because of the

Horowitz (2009) adds that “this behavior does not necessarily follow from religious belief, but a violent actor
motivated by religion might use that logic” (168).
22
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perceived similarities and common interests found in religious identity. Chriss (2013) suggests
that there are several changes that have happened within societies due to globalization and
industrialization. As a result of such rapid changes in societies, religions vie for recognition and
attempt to maintain the binds of group solidarity (Chriss, 2013: 25). Chriss (2013) argues that
states realize that it is easier to foster unity through the religious identity of a group than other
types of bonds since “religions generally promote group solidarity” (Clarke, 2014: 81). Thus,
religious identity may offer the state an opportunity to mobilize such identity to gain support for
interstate conflict. The social interests for conflict generated by religious motivations can
influence how people evaluate state leaders’ decision to engage in conflict (Horowitz, 2009).
Basically, religion can unify group-level judgments about the benefits gained from conflict.
Horowitz (2009) argues that religious motivations could have an impact on the length of military
campaigns.
Satana, Inman, and Birnir (2013) argue that “while religion per se is generally not the
cause of conflict, it adds a troubling dimension to extant conflict” (33). Because religion tends to
offer a “ready issue platform that does not depend on prior political mobilization,” religion may
become that divide that can be “mobilized politically when needed” (Satana et al., 2013: 34).
According to Juergensmeyer (2006), for instance, despite the typical economic and social
sources of intergroup tension, “at some point in the conflict . . . the political contest becomes
religionized. Then what was primarily a secular struggle takes on the aura of sacred [religious]
conflict” (133-142). This argument suggests that states may use religion as a tool to reach their
preferred goals (Satana et al., 2013). Basically, state leaders may use religion as a rhetorical tool
to add momentum to their conflict objectives.
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States may mobilize religious identities to gain support, consequently increasing the
likelihood of militarized conflict. Hensel (1998) argues that “mobilization strategies, at least
when pursued successfully, lead to domestic support and legitimation for the [state] policies,
offering much greater flexibility than other strategies and amplifying the [state’s] willingness to
respond to foreign threats” (13). The state’s population that represents the predominant religion
may respond with their support when their personal interests—that is, their religious identity—
may be affected. Seul (1999) argues that “because religion provides such powerful support to
groups as they endeavor to establish and maintain secure identities, it is not surprising that much
intergroup identity competition occurs between religious groups” (567).
Additionally, drawing from the literature, there has been an emphasis on militarized
conflicts between Christian and Muslim states (Richardson, 1960; Huntington, 1996; Horowitz,
2009). Huntington’s idea of ‘Islam’s bloody borders’ is used to justify the fierce Islamic
movement against other state religions, including Christian states. Yet, Huntington does not
construct a theoretical framework to support his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. The literature on
the conflicts between the Abrahamic23 religions is presented in historiographical (Houston, 2001)
or historical (Erickson, 2001) texts with minimal systematic examination of specific events that
prompt states to use religious appeal to pursue interstate militarized combat (Henderson &
Tucker, 2001).
Thus, systematically examining militarized conflicts between Christian and Muslim states
may explain whether these religious differences play a partial role in the states’ policies. The
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Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all acknowledge Abraham as their first prophet and that his descendants have an
important role in people’s spiritual development. While the Abrahamic religions originate from the same source,
“the Abrahamic traditions contain many differences. For example, there is no equivalent to the papacy in Islam”
(Horowitz, 2009: 168).
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perceived stereotype of the intergroup relations based on the religious differences between the
in-group (Christian or Muslim) and the out-group (Muslim or Christian) states may be used in a
political context. Corresponding images and stereotypes based on historical conflicts, for
instance the Crusades, may be sought by one state to engender hostility and promote its religious
identity by disparaging the image of the out-group state. Tajfel and Turner (1986) suggest that
individuals with strong religious identification may be inspired by “desires for a positive social
identity to hold a specific type of negative image about an out-group, even above and beyond
power, status, and goal perceptions” (55). While the theoretical debates about the role of Islamic
states in fostering violence against Christian states are abundant, there are limited empirical
studies, mixed findings, and no scholarly consensus about the relationship between these two
major faiths (Fish, Jensenius, & Michel, 2010; Fox, 2004; Sorli, Petter, & Strand, 2005; Toft,
Philpott, & Shah, 2011). Thus, examining the link between states with Christian/Muslim
differences and various types of militarized conflicts may offer a clearer understanding on
whether these two groups are more conflict prone than other groups.
It is possible that the particular religious differences between Muslim and Christian states
may be more disputatious. I, thereby, conduct separate analyses of the Christian and Muslim
religions in relation to interstate conflict behavior (a) enduring rivalry, (b) rivalry recurrence, and
(c) war. I examine “whether dyads pitting Christian and Muslim states against one another are
more [conflict] prone than other dyads, as often hypothesized” (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006: 65).
The systematic distinction between dyads with Christian/Muslim differences and militarized
conflict is vital to the study of the nature of these particular rivalries.
Throughout history, we have seen militarized conflicts between Sunni and Shi’a as well
as Protestant and Catholic states (Fox & Sandler, 2004). Yet illustrative examples are not
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conclusive enough to examine the influence of different religious denominations on militarized
interstate conflicts. Another indicator of religious differences between states is employed based
on the plurality of sectarian adherents. Thus, I take a more systematic approach to supporting
my argument that religious differences between states increases the likelihood of rivalry and war.
It may also be that differences between religious denominations may contribute to various types
of rivalry and war.
In the next section, I offer a theoretical framework that explains how religious
differences affect different dimensions of rivalry and war.
Theories
The presence of religious differences may increase the likelihood of militarized
interaction between states in a dyad. Pearce (2006) argues that “given the frequency of religious
conflict, the evidence shows that there are circumstances under which religion can, in fact,
provoke rather than resolve conflict. Thus, based on my argument religious differences between
states may serve as the catalyst for militarized conflict. Examining the question “does the
existence of religious differences in a dyad increase the likelihood for two states to seek conflictbased avenues?” involves systematic analyses to capture the causes of rivalry and war. I present
the theories that probe the link between religious identity and interstate rivalry by exploring how
such identity of the predominant population may be used as a means to an end by states (i.e.,
state leaders). I rely on social psychology’s Social Identity Theory and False Optimism Theory24
to explain the mechanisms used for the various dimensions of interstate rivalry behavior and war.
By applying these theories to the religion-conflict nexus, I seek to provide an explanation on how
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I use False Optimism Theory only for war.
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religious differences between dyads may be used to affect hawkish state policies. In the
following sections I derive nine hypotheses from my theories.
Enduring Rivalry and Rivalry Recurrence Theoretical Framework, Part I
I use social identity theory to understand the connection between states with different
religions and their propensity for rivalry. Below, I describe how the predominant population’s
religious identity may be used as a mechanism by the state to mobilize the population’s support
for various types of armed rivalry, enduring and recurring, as well as war.
One social psychology theory that draws a connection between persons and groups is
social identity theory (Greenfield & Marks, 2007). The premise of social identity theory is that
people belong in a society that consists of several social groupings, “[which] stand in relative
power and status relationships to each other” (Greenfield & Marks, 2007: 2). Social identity is
shaped when people perceive that they belong to a social grouping. Such social groupings have
the ability to form an individual’s self-image. Understanding in-group and out-group behaviors
are important concepts in social psychology theories. According to Turner (1975), social
identity is based on intergroup social evaluations that intend to approve or create in-group
support to determine the “distinctiveness between in-group and out-group” (Hogg & Terry,
2000: 122). Additionally, Tajfel (1972) argues that social identity is based on “the knowledge
that [one] belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance
of . . . the group membership” (31). In other words, the sense of obligation by an in-group might
be heightened when the out-group has a different identity. Based on this notion, it is logical to
assume that conflict is more likely when the two states have varying religions. When two states

39

identify with different religions, they may become more conflict prone due to the indelible nature
or religion (Henderson, 1998).
In this section, I argue that the connection between religion and armed rivalry, enduring
and recurring, and war can partly be explained by differences in religions between the states. I
propose the mechanism of social identity theory that explains how out-group identity affects the
likelihood of rivalry. The present-day reality is that religion is used to fuel conflict (Fox &
Sandler, 2004). Thus, when religious identity is framed strategically by the state, it can become
an important factor in interstate rivalry. Scholars utilize social identity theory as a useful
mechanism in explaining how people develop an essential component of their identity from
belonging to a group and they have a strong positive preference in favor of their group adherents
(Powers, 2015; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Brown, 2000). Social identity theory can be
applied to states and their populations. States are principally rational, self-interested actors that
want to maintain power and a reference to common identity may be used to mobilize public
support for a rivalry. Thus, the division between the in-group and the out-group population may
become increasingly significant when different religions dominate each group, which sets the
stage for out-group “hatred.” The presence of religious differences between two states may,
therefore, increase the likelihood of enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war via
mobilization of the populations’ support.
Weiner, Tennen, and Suls (2012) suggest that “categorizing people, which often occurs
rapidly and automatically, profoundly affects people’s perceptions, cognitions, feelings, and
behavior” (430). Recognition of intergroup differences may, in turn, stimulate prejudices.
Specifically, Weiner et al. (2012) argue that “social identity theory is relative not only to
prejudice but also to more intergroup dynamics . . . and drawing from [this] theory, salient social
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identity also arouses corresponding group-based emotions” (432). Such emotions are induced by
significant signals that may in turn intensify the “function of in-group identification” (432). This
insight extends the religious differences argument and may determine a more thorough account
of the relationship between religious politics and various dimensions of rivalry. Stein (1996)
suggests that because individual identity is somewhat dependent upon the legitimacy of the ingroup’s identity, threats to the in-group qualify as dangers to the entire group.
Individuals who share the same identity may demonstrate instantaneous solidarity and
“precipitate hostility toward outsiders” (Brewer, 2001: 28). Since state populations typically
lack information, states may tactically use the existence of religious differences “to feed low
intercultural perceptions [in their rhetoric]” to mobilize the population’s support for conflict
(Hauk & Mueller, 2015: 369). I primarily focus on enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war
because all of these conflict types have escalatory characteristics due to their severity, repetition,
and intensity. In such militarized conditions, the appeal to religion by states [i.e., leaders] may
be used to mobilize the predominant population’s support. This support is possibly generated
prior to the onset of rivalry by states so that the predominant population becomes inclined to
support the state government in the rivalry behavior against the out-group state.
Research on social identity and intergroup relations have traditionally argued that an
important facet of the self is the link between the individual and the collective self (Brewer,
1991; Brewer & Caporael, 1990; Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996). The
collective self characterizes an internalization of group norms and values, which serve to guide
cognition, behavior, and evaluation (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). The strength and endurance of
largely populated religious groups are partially due to the inherent social nature of these
collectives (Kramer, Leonardelli, & Livingston, 2011). Since the predominant population may
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have limited information compared to the state regarding interstate conflict, the state may
highlight the religious differences to gain the main population’s support for the militarized
conflict. The religious difference between the two states is used as simplified method to
influence the predominant group’s support for the armed rivalry. The state can influence the
predominant public’s perception by presenting the rival’s objectives as “evil”. By demonizing
the rival, the state may be able to influence the public’s social ties to their religious identity,
ultimately mobilizing the predominant population’s support for rivalry, per se.
Enduring Rivalry and Rivalry Recurrence
I adopt Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) new rivalry approach25, to include rivalries that
specifically involve numerous militarized disputes and/or include some type of systematic
militarized violence between states in a dyad. The inclusion of the rivalry approach in
systematic studies is to determine conflict patterns based on interconnected26 conflicts between
the same two states over an extended period (Goertz & Diehl, 1992). In particular, Klein et al.
(2006) consider the first militarized dispute between two states in a dyad as the “first behavioral
sign that a rivalry exists” and the termination of the last militarized interstate dispute is the last
behavioral sign of rivalry27 (338).
First, a rivalry between two states that occurs for a long period of time is known as an
enduring rivalry (Klein et al., 2006). According to scholars, enduring rivalries are more severe
and escalatory (Hensel, N.d.). Considering the complexity of rivalries, one rivalry approach is to
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The new rivalry approach is a phenomenon of rivalry that is based on the intensity and frequency of militarized
interstate disputes between two states (333-334).
26
Rivalries are identified as three or more “interconnected26” militarized disputes between two sovereign states in
a dyad (Klein et al., 2006: 337).
27
Klein et al. (2006) “consider the rivalry to have ended in the 10—15 years” after the “last behavioral sign of the
rivalry” (338-39).
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treat ‘rivalry’ as a dependent variable in order to test the factors that affect the initiation of
rivalry (i.e., enduring or proto rivalries) (Hensel, N.d.: 4). A rivalry between two states is argued
to be a manifestation based on past conditions, which distinguish the unique stability of rivalries
and is bolstered by the prospect of impending conflict (Diehl & Goertz, 2000: 77).
Since I consider states as rational actors in the international system, I assume that they
calculate the expected benefits versus the expected costs before engaging in rivalry. At least one
state out of the two in a dyad may perceive that the expected benefits outweigh other political
options (Darnton, 2011). The religious differences between the two states may be a condition
that facilitates the onset of enduring rivalry by mobilization of the predominant population’s
support. Although the origins of a rivalry may be political in nature, the existence of the main
population’s support (due to the religious differences between the two states in a dyad) may
reduce the costs of conflict for at least one state in a dyad. Based on my argument, it is
reasonable to expect that the religious differences within a dyad may increase the probability of
an enduring rivalry.
Second, another important dimension of rivalry that is rarely studied is rivalry recurrence.
Rudkevich, Travlos, and Diehl (2013) argue that “there must be some concerns for the conditions
surrounding the end of the original rivalry, but none of these studies examines historical factors
in the relationship, and certainly not whether there was a previous rivalry between the states, in
accounting for rivalry onset” (160). Rivalry recurrence is a classification of rivalry that repeats
after the initial rivalry had terminated. There are some conditions surrounding the termination of
the initial rivalry that sometimes render peaceful negotiations unsuccessful (Hensel, 1998). For
example, the dyadic rivalries during the 20th century manifested in order to secure political,
economic, and territorial dominance, among other reasons. Nevertheless, even after the
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emergence of new regimes and leaderships, the dyadic rivalries restarted after having terminated
for many decades.
A state’s main religion can serve as a promoter of the rivalry’s recurrence. A state’s
predominant religion may be part of that state population’s identity, which may be used to
mobilize the population of adherents to support the recurring rivalry. Rudkevich et al. (2013)
argue that the longer that rivalries last and higher the frequency of aggressive conflicts, “the less
they are influenced by single events and more by the entire history of the rivalry, or the legacy of
the past” (161). Basically, the recurrence of rivalry between two states may be influenced by
more than one rivalry interaction. A state may utilize the existence of religious differences to
mobilize the predominant population’s support to perpetuate a rivalry with an old enemy. The
social interests for conflict generated by religious motivations can influence how the main
population evaluates the value of the state reengaging in conflict (Horowitz, 2009). Religion can
unify group-level judgments about the benefits gained from reengaging in conflict. Horowitz
(2009) argues that religious motivations could have a bimodal impact on the length of military
campaigns. The character of religious mobilization, which exacerbates the “othering” process
common in armed conflict, could generate a stronger desire to eliminate enemies and seek
decisive battles. Alternatively, when decisive battles are difficult, religiously motivated
campaigns are likely to perpetuate and may create outcomes similar to recurring rivalries
(Horowitz, 2009: 170).
This dissertation integrates “religious difference” as a social element to the Rudkevich et
al. (2013) model. Including various types of religious dimensions may improve our
understanding of how religion is a causal factor in rivalry recurrence. The religious differences
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between two states may be a key reason for rivalry to recur. To determine the link between
religious differences and rivalry recurrence, I test rivalry cases from 1945 to 2001. I identify
whether states in a dyad with different religions have reentered into rivalry decades after the
initial rivalry had terminated. This approach observes whether the presence of religious
differences between two states may be used as the impetus for the recurring rivalry. Hence, I
predict that the recurrence of rivalry between two states in a dyad is more likely when their
predominant religions are different.
Based on the above arguments, two hypotheses are tested empirically:
H1: Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry than
dyads with the same religions.
H2: Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence than
dyads with the same religions.
The link between two states, which has been categorized by a frequency of past
militarized interactions, may be influenced by several conditions that stimulate further hostility.
The longer the history of rivalry, the more intractable the relationship becomes between two
states (Hensel, 1998). Based on the argument in the literature on the fighting between Christians
and Muslims (Huntington, 1996), I predict that dyads with Christian/Muslim differences may be
more predisposed to engage in enduring rivalry and rivalry recurrence. The different dimensions
of religion such as Christian/Muslim Differences within two states in a dyad may affect the
likelihood of armed rivalry, enduring and recurring.
Thus, I derive two hypotheses to test empirically:
H3: Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in enduring
rivalry.
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H4: Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in rivalry
recurrence.
Other religious groupings based on denominational differences require a more systematic
approach. Some sects within major religions constitute irreconcilable groups (e.g., Sunnis versus
Shiites, Catholics versus Protestants, Catholics versus Orthodox, etc.). Gartzke and Gleditsch
(2006) suggest that “the Protestant reformation prompted a period of intense armed conflict in
Europe in the late 16th and 17th centuries, and [conflict] between Catholics and Protestants in
Northern Ireland has, at best, only recently come to an end” (60). Also, the sectarian violence
between Sunni and Shiite groups in the 20th and 21st centuries, among other sectarian conflicts
between Sikh and Hindus, illustrate that denominational differences in a dyad may increase
rivalry propensity. Thus I consider the relationship between different religious denominations in
a dyad and likelihood of enduring and recurrent rivalry. Based on the major religions (e.g.,
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, etc.) in each state in a dyad, I classify the religious
denomination based on the large plurality of adherents within each state (e.g., Christianity:
Protestants, Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglicans, and Other Christian; Judaism:
Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform; Islam: Sunni, Shi’a, Ibadhi, Nation of Islam, Alawite, and
Ahmadiyya; Buddhism: Mahayana and Theravada; etc.). In such cases where states vary in
religious denominations, at least one state uses the existence of different religious denominations
as a tool to mobilize the public’s support for enduring rivalry and rivalry recurrence.
Another way I group the Different Religious Denominations is by aggregating Protestants
and Anglicans under one denomination. According to The World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010:
Logic, Estimates, and Trends (Maoz and Henderson, 2013), some sources grouped Protestants
and Anglicans under one denominational level since they share several religious tenets. Thus, I
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consider this discrepancy by aggregating Protestants and Anglicans in one denominational
category and test separately (e.g., Christianity: Protestants and Anglicans Combined, Roman
Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Other Christian; Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, and
Reform; Islam: Sunni, Shi’a, Ibadhi, Nation of Islam, Alawite, and Ahmadiyya; Buddhism:
Mahayana and Theravada; etc.).
Based on the arguments above, two hypotheses and two sub-hypotheses are tested
empirically:
H5: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in
enduring rivalry.
H5: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans
Combined) are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry.
H6: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in
rivalry recurrence.
H6: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans
Combined) are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence.
War Theoretical Framework, Part II
Since interstate wars28 are relatively far more costly than other types of conflict, to
explain the connection between differences in religion in a dyad and war I incorporate my
argument in the ‘false optimism’ theory used to explain war in the literature.

28

The underlying hostility and past experience included in conflicts may reach the threshold of interstate war
(Lebow, 1981: 337). A history of militarized conflicts between state rivals are expected to precipitate future hostility
(Klein et al., 2006: 335). According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), various types of rivalry (i.e., militarized disputes and
wars) between two states are connected and are interdependent (7). Such rivalry types are linked through the ‘pull
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Considering the heavy costs associated with interstate wars, scholars argue that some prewar rational decision making process may explain why some states go to war despite the costs.
A state may suffer from hubris, a level of overconfidence whereby the state ultimately resorts to
militarized conflict. This level of ‘false optimism’ “is the extent to which a state’s perception of
how well it will fare in a war exceeds the reality” (Altman, 2015: 287). Altman (2015) shows
that false optimism may heighten the state’s confidence—enough to make bold moves towards
warfare. Further, Clausewitz (1976) argues that “boldness in war . . . must be granted a certain
power over and above successful calculations involving space, time, and magnitude of forces.
[Basically, boldness in war] is a genuinely creative force” (190). Based on the false optimism
theory, states expect that they will win the war, which ultimately reduces the costs of entering
into war (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011). White (1970), Stoessinger (1974), Jervis (1976, 1988),
among others, suggest that false optimism is considered one of the most significant explanations
of war (Levy, 1983; Blainey, 1988; Van Evera, 1999; Johnson, 2004). I link religious
differences and war via this well-known theory of false optimism. I go one step beyond this
analysis here and suggest that the support of the predominant population by means of rhetoric
may exaggerate the state’s perception of the prospect of victory in war.
Some states still undertake costs and risks when they have the opportunity to prevent war.
To begin with the rationalist perspective, scholars argue that states (i.e., rational decision
makers) should not pursue fighting because negotiating a prewar bargain could avert costs and
risks. That is, according to Johnson (2004), “both sides could obtain a similar result without the

of the past’” (Klein et al., 2006: 342). Accordingly, wars are considered as part of the ‘pull of the past’ since they are
part of a thread that links the disputes together (Klein et al., 2006: 342).
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costs and risks of war” (4). But that is not the case since wars do happen when “states
overestimate their relative power” (Johnson, 2004: 4). Goemans (2000) argues that the estimated
war costs “depend on beliefs about relative strength, relative resolve, [structural and] random
factors” (26). State decision makers do not always have complete information for their
calculations, which consequently leads states to become “strategic calculators who go to war”
with “imperfect information” (Goemans, 2000: 26). Thus, a state may still decide to pursue war
despite the incomplete information because of its perceived relative strength. In the absence of
complete information, a state may rely on private information that can be used to exaggerate its
outlook of winning the war.
At first glance, the rational assumption may appear incompatible with false optimism
theory, since the former relies on cost-risk calculations and the latter relies on psychological
explanations of how state actors behave. But as Goemans (2000) argues despite the cognitive
limitations, states still make decisions under uncertainty. In fact, before the war both states may
expect that they are stronger than the other because of some private information such as “new
weapon or some innovative strategy” (Goemans, 2000: 28). This private information may
overestimate one or both states’ expectations about the war outcome, and therefore the expected
utility for fighting seems rational. I argue that religious differences between the two states may
be a condition that contributes to false optimism.
According to Johnson (2004), [optimism] is likely to rise in times of threat and more
specifically at the beginning of the event than at the end of it (40). States are disposed to
exaggerated estimations of their own advantage, and expectations about their ability to control
actions, and of the future (Johnson, 2004). Nevertheless, the rational choice framework ought
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not to be removed from understanding a state’s false optimism since decision making requires
cognition, which is not independent of psychological processes. Actually, understanding a
state’s decision to initiate war requires the study of “cognitive biases . . . to effectively model
foreign policy choices (Schafer, 1999: 183). According to Schafer (1999), “several scholars
[e.g., Downs, 1989; Mintz & Geva, 1997; Tetlock, 1998) argue for research to bridge the gap
[between rational and psychological schools] (183). While a rational explanation is a good
starting point, false optimism “leads to war as a result of strategic behavior by the optimistic
actors” (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011: 137). The crossroads between the two schools of thought are
summed accordingly: Jervis (1988) argues that “excessive military optimism” is often linked to
war initiation, whereas for Blainey (1988) anything which augments that optimism may become
a “vital prelude to war” (Johnson, 2004: 3). When coupled with the rationalist explanation of
war, tracing the origin of optimism with which most wars were started by states offers a more
nuanced explanation of wars (Blainey, 1988). In sum, the basic tendency in a state’s (i.e.,
leader’s) overassessment and overconfidence of its relative capabilities fluctuates systematically
with particular conditions.
Building on the false optimism theory, Johnson (2004) deconstructed the war puzzle by
using the positive illusions argument. Johnson (2004) argues that “positive illusions are a source
of the overconfidence that exists before many wars” (Bas & Schub, N.d.: 4). In responding to
information, states’ positive illusions are closer to reality with “an optimistic spin on things”
(Johnson, 2004: 40). Such illusions may be driven by the decision maker’s psychological
perceptions (Jervis, 1976, Kahneman & Renshon, 2007). According to Kahneman and Renshon
(2007), “social and cognitive psychologists have identified [biases] in the ways that humans
judge situations and evaluate risks” (34). During imminent conflict situations, states (i.e.,
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leaders) may have optimistic biases based on “highly favorable estimates of the outcomes of
war” (Kahneman & Renshon, 2007: 35). Kahneman and Renshon’s (2007) 40 year of
psychological research on biases discovered that:
“All the biases in [their] list favor hawks. These psychological impulses incline national
leaders to exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries, to misjudge how adversaries
perceive them, to be overly [optimistic] when hostilities start, and overly reluctant to
make necessary concession in negotiations” (36).
For Kahneman and Renshon (2007) “optimism is one of the most significant biases that
psychologists have identified” (37). Dolan (2009) argues that “war involves putting [states’]
beliefs about how they can win against the test of reality” (11). Thus state optimism in relation
to outside threats may influence the likelihood of war.
Blainey argues that at least one state resorts to militarized force because based on its
subjective appraisal of winning the war depends on, among other things, the ability of its
“population to sustain the war effort” (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011: 135). Blainey’s widely
accepted argument is known as the mutual optimism explanation of why war occurs (Slantchev
& Tarar, 2011; Johnson, 2004; Lebow, 1981: 242-43; Levy, 1983: 82-86; Stoessinger, 2005:
211; Van Evera, 1999: 16; Wittman, 1979). I use the mechanism of false optimism as an
underlying behavioral link between states’ optimistic beliefs and war. In particular, I use the
state’s predominant population of religious adherents’ support for the war as the condition of
optimism that increases the likelihood of war.
The false optimism theory suggests a persuasive added part of the war puzzle29.
Looking closely at the explanatory power of religious differences may add to our understanding

29

Johnson (2004) argues that “there is some probability of war even if there are no positive illusions (owing to a
variety of other causes)” (38).
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of this puzzle. According to Slantchev and Tarar (2011) argue that “[optimism] is only a starting
point: it shows why the actors might be unwilling to offer each war-avoiding terms” (136). The
mechanism orients the effect on the war policy of at least one state in the dyad. I argue that the
condition of different religious identities is used by at least one state to mobilize the main
population’s support, whereby this public support may augment the state’s optimism. A state,
thus, conflates its optimism about the imminent war because of different factors including the
main population’s support. In cases where the rival state has a different religion, one or both
states might leverage the conflict cause by using rhetoric against the out-group state to mobilize
the population’s support. Accordingly, the identities of the two different predominant religions
between states may lead to hawkish policies through the populations’ endorsement. Kahneman
and Renshon (2007) argue that “a hawk’s preference for military action over diplomatic
measures often built upon the assumption that victory will come easily and swiftly” (37). Thus,
there are also precursory structural circumstances that affect the impact of false optimism on
war, “or more specifically on the forms of overconfidence it engenders” (Johnson, 2004: 38). I
focus on one such condition: religious differences between the two states.
Conditions for False Optimism
Since false optimism is typically generated in the time before a war, a state may receive
feedback from numerous factors in the decision making process (Johnson, 2004). I suggest that
one of the key conditions affecting whether a state experiences false optimism is the support of
the predominant population when religious differences exist between the two states, all else
being equal. As part of its optimistic calculus, the state may mobilize the predominant
population’s support by demonizing the rival state by means of rhetoric, and consequently
inflating expectations about the state’s likelihood of victory. Such exaggerated optimism may
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manifest under conditions where the enemy adheres to a different religion, a state may activate
the populace’s support by means of contentious rhetoric (e.g., public addresses, press releases,
etc.).
Taylor (1991) suggests that people seek positive social affiliations in threatening times
because such relationships offer support to sustain one’s cause. Thus, a state’s optimism may
increase as a result of its population’s support prior to the onset of war. Thus, a state’s selfserving aggrandizement of its capabilities may be exaggerated and war initiation may seem more
favorable because the state believes it will emerge as the victor. In other words, the state
exaggerates its prospects of victory when the predominant population supports the state’s cause.
My contribution to the false optimism theory parallels well with Johnson’s (2004) phenomenon
of ‘group illusions’. He argues that when it comes to group behavior, the group
“is bound together by a kind of group narcissism, one that subscribes to the familiar
positive illusions: an unrealistically positive sense of itself, the somewhat grandiose
sense of how much the group can make a difference . . . and an overly optimistic sense
that things will turn out well” (Johnson, 2004: 20).
In-group positive illusions and out-group deprecation seem to be related to group conflict
(Johnson, 2004). Baumeister and Boden (1998) argue that “groups whose members demonstrate
higher levels of [confidence] also demonstrate higher levels of hostility and violence” (115-116).
This type of group violence is often linked in specific beliefs “in the superiority of the violent
group” (Baumeister & Boden, 1998: 115-116). Such optimistic biases may be exaggerated
because “group think results in reinforcing perceptions of superiority” (Johnson, 2004: 21).
According to Johnson (2004), such perceptions include (but not limited to):
“an unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality; stereotyping out-groups as too
evil . . . or too weak to be a threat; a collective illusion of unanimity in a majority
viewpoint (based on the faulty assumption that silence means consent)” (21).
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Thus, groupthink and positive illusions may energize each other intensely (Johnson, 2004). The
state’s main population’s support is mostly vital in times of war30 (Johnson, 2004) because the
infusion of such support may augment the state’s degree of confidence. Volkan (1985) argues
that “anyone trying to deal with interethnic or interstate conflict must grasp the psychological
cogency of man’s need to have enemies as well as allies, and his stubborn adherence to
identification with a group when undergoing hardship and danger” (219). Accordingly, in-group
positive illusions and out-group deprecation can be corroborated in the insistent ambition of
states that eventually lead to war.
According to Bas and Schub (N.d.), “if both states in a crisis appear willing to go to war,
rational actors will infer that they either underestimated the opponent’s strength or overestimated
their own” (5). I extend the basic reasoning to include information due to one or both states’
nonmaterial capabilities (i.e., the main population’s support). In particular, war becomes more
probable due to optimism when at least one state has the support of its predominant population
practicing a different religion than the rival state. In addition to other explanations of war, “the
theory of [false optimism] can add to our understanding of why war breaks out when it does”
(Johnson, 2004: 38). Essentially, the predominant population’s support, which can boost the
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Hensel (1998) argues that “an important domestic actor that can have a profound influence on the [state’s]
choices regarding conflict is the mass public, which is generally responsible for the [state’s] continuation of power”
(7). The mass public’s support for the state cause is germane in both democratic and authoritarian systems. The
role of the mass public in the former system is to elect, reelect or replace the chief executive. In the latter system,
the mass public also play a critical role in instituting the chief executive, “whether directly (through protests, riots
or open revolution) or indirectly (by encouraging elements in the military or government to overthrow the
government)” (Hensel 1998: 7). Thus, the state needs to be strategic in both systems to mobilize and sustain
popular support throughout the conflict campaign. A state may frame the interstate conflict into an ‘us against
them’ tactic, suggesting that the adversary’s religious difference poses a threat on their religious identity. A state’s
strategy of using the predominant religion may be a uniting force in mobilizing domestic support and a validation
for the state’s policy.
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state’s expectation for victory, may be used to legitimize the state’s optimism. This theoretical
addition highlights the significance of the main population of religious adherents as a stimulus to
the state’s optimism.
Generally, religion provides the “most secure basis for maintenance of a positively
regarded social identity, and it frequently supplies the fault line along which intergroup identity
and resource competition occurs” (Seul, 1999: 564). Thus, when conflict between two religious
groups does occur, the predominant populations of each state may be “emboldened by a sense of
religiously defined identity and purpose”, and their traditions may provide “symbolic, moral,
institutional, and other resources that can be used to mobilize the group and legitimate its cause”
(Seul, 1999: 564). Thus, religious rhetoric may be used to mobilize the religious adherents in
support of the war cause. Rhetoric about the superiority of the state’s religion and moral
obligation to support the war cause may add leverage to the state’s overconfidence of winning
over the adversary. Essentially, religious rhetoric may heighten the main population’s
sentiments and consequently mobilizes their support for war. Aside from the state’s material
capabilities, the population’s support may offer a robust, albeit virtual, defense prior to
experiencing optimism about its victory.
Considering this history of different identities, religious adherents (of at least one state)
may ascertain that the choice for war is good in itself when a state communicates a message of
religious obligation [against an enemy] (Horowitz, 2009: 163). Also, based on the assumed link
between religious differences and militarized conflict, I expect that dyads with Christian/Muslim
differences are more likely to pursue war. States may promote people’s support for war via
rhetoric by generating their religious fervor in cases where the two states have religious
differences in general or more explicitly in dyads with Christian/Muslim differences and dyads
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with different religious denominations. Basically, I am interested in identifying whether dyads
with different types of religious differences are more inclined to participate in war. Thus, I
derive three hypotheses to test empirically:
H7: Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in war than dyads with
the same religions.
H8: Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in war.
H9: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in
war than dyads with the same religious denomination.
H9: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans
Combined) are more likely to engage in war than dyads with the same religious denomination.
I test these nine hypotheses using statistical modeling. Also, I use a qualitative study of
the case of the 1947 India-Pakistan War to look more closely at the mechanism linking religious
differences and war.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN
In this chapter I describe the research design I use to test the hypotheses I derived in
Chapter 2. I develop a novel criterion for operationalizing religious differences, the main
independent variables, and focus on more nuanced types of militarized conflict, the dependent
variables in this study.
Data and Empirical Strategy
I expand the scope of research on the link between religious differences in a dyad and
conflict consisting of various types of militarized conflicts: Enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence,
and war. All of these dimensions of conflicts include militarized disputes between two states in a
dyad. This study covers the time period from 1945 to 2001. A list of the variables, their
operationalization and sources are included in Appendix B.
To test my hypotheses I employ three dependent variables. They are three different
dimensions of rivalry, enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war. The unit of analysis is the
“dyad” for enduring rivalry and war. The unit of analysis for rivalry recurrence is “rivalry” and
the unit of observation is “post-rivalry year”. The dependent variables are all binary (0, 1), thus
the method of analysis is logit regression. I begin with the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) “The
New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns” to identify the list of rivalries according to the
criteria of Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War from 1945 to 2001. For Enduring
Rivalry, I use the Klein et al. (2006) list of proto and enduring rivalries (N= 219) over the period
1945-2001.
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For Rivalry Recurrence, I replicate the Rivalry Recurrence variable in Rudkevich,
Travlos, and Diehl’s 2013 study that is consistent with the Klein et al. (2006) list of dyadic
rivalries that are militarized in nature. In this model N= 1,567.
For War, I examine rivalry cases, consistent with the Klein et al. (2006) “The New
Rivalry Dataset”, which involved sustained combat, including organized armed forces, resulting
in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period (N= 225).
Main Independent Variables
The militarized conflict between two states may be associated to their religious
differences. The main independent variables in my Models are (1) All Religious Differences, (2)
Christian/Muslim Differences, (3) Different Religious Denominations, and (4) Different
Religious Denominations with Protestant and Anglican denominations combined.
I adopt Alston’s (1967) conceptual definition of religion that is a “belief system of an
individual or a group of individuals that contains several elements: belief in supernatural beings
(gods); a distinction between sacred and profane objects; a moral code believed to be sanctioned
by the gods; prayer and other forms of communication with gods; a more or less total
organization of one’s life based on the worldview; a social group bound together by the above”31.
I operationalize a state’s predominant “religious affiliation” by the plurality of the population
that adheres to a specific religion during a given rivalry and war. In order to ensure reliable
coding of each state’s predominant religion in a dyad, I rely on Maoz and Henderson’s (2013)
“World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010: Logic, Estimates, and Trends” that generates each state’s

31

For a more thorough definition on “religion”, see Maoz and Henderson’s World Religions Codebook (2013: 2)
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religious adherents based on denominational level data, which are aggregated into the relevant
religious families. In their dataset Maoz and Henderson (2013) use the same country IDs as in
the Correlates of War dataset.
Using Maoz and Henderson’s (2013) “World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010, I provide a
brief description of the magnitude of the pluralities of religious differences in my data.
Appendix C, Figure 1 shows the minima and maxima and distributions of religious pluralities in
the states in dyads for Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War models. For example, in
1945, 79% of the total population in the United States of America identified as Christian. In
1950, 81% of the total population in the US identified as Christian, and 82% identified as
Christian in 1995. In 1950, 48% of the total population in the former Soviet Union (Russia)
identified as Non-religious; and in 1975, 54% of Russia’s total population identified as Nonreligious. But in 2000, 72% of Russia’s total population identified as Christian. In 1985, 96% of
the total population in Saudi Arabia identified as Muslim; and in 2000, 93% of its population
identified as Muslim.
Appendix C, Figure 2 shows the minima and maxima and distributions of pluralities of
religious denominations pluralities in the states in dyads for the Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry
Recurrence, and War models. Appendix C, Figure 3 shows the minima and maxima and
distributions of religious denominations (Protestant and Anglican Combined) in the states in
dyads for each of the models. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show that, for the most part, the pluralities for
the various types of religious differences used in my models are large.
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To construct (1) All Religious Differences, first I aggregate all the appropriate
denominations under their religion family. For example, I add the populations of Catholics,
Protestants, Anglicans, and Eastern Orthodox in a “Christianity” category32. Thus I create the
following religious categories: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Zoroastrian, Hindu,
Sikh, Shinto, Bahai, Taoism, Confucianism, Jain, Syncretic Religions, Animism, Non-Religious,
and Other (Maoz & Henderson, 2013). Second, I identify each state’s “predominant” religion
based on the plurality of total adherents. The World Religion Project offers data at five-year
intervals from 1945 to 2010 on the population of religious adherents of states (Maoz &
Henderson, 2013: 267). Thus, I use the year in religious differences most proximate to the
rivalry year. In cases where I use the most proximate year, I double check each state’s religious
populations using the CIA World Factbook and Britannica Book of the Year. I then identify
each state’s religion (within a dyad) based on the country code and the initial year of conflict.
“Religious Differences” means that states in a dyad have different predominant religious
affiliates based on the plurality of the dominant population of religious adherents within the state
during a given militarized conflict. The coding is 1 if a dyad is characterized as having two
different religions and 0 if a dyad shares the same religion.
“Christian/Muslim Differences” tests whether specifically Christian/Muslim dyads have
conflict-proneness. It is argued in the literature that Islamic and Christian states may have a
“general tendency . . . to engage in conflict” (Fox, 2002: 206; Huntington, 1993, 1996) but this
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From 1945 to 1989, some communist countries had made substantial efforts to suppress or ignore religious
practice (i.e., atheist, nonreligious, or areligious) (Helble, N.d.: 217). Therefore, I include atheist, nonreligious, or
areligious communist countries until 1989.
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prediction has not been tested systematically. Given these propositions in the literature, I
examine whether Christian/Muslim Differences may increase the likelihood of interstate
militarized conflict. The variable is coded as 1 for Christian/Muslim differences, and 0 if not.
“Different Religious Denominations” examines whether dyads with different religious
denominations have conflict-proneness also. Based on the major religions (e.g., Christianity,
Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, etc.), I identity the religious denomination based on the large
plurality of adherents within each state (e.g., Christianity: Protestant, Roman Catholic, Eastern
Orthodox, Anglican, and Other Christian; Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform; Islam:
Sunni, Shi’a, Ibadhi, Nation of Islam, Alawite, and Ahmadiyya; Buddhism: Mahayana and
Theravada; etc.). Furthermore, I include a separate variable aggregating Protestant Anglican
denominations into one denomination (i.e., Protestant-Anglican). Again, I rely on the World
Religion Project (Maoz & Henderson, 2013) to collect my data on religious denominations. The
variable is coded as 1 if the dyad consists of different denominations, and 0 if not.
Dependent Variables
To determine the relationship between religion and various dimensions of rivalry and
war, I identify rivalry and war cases over the period of 1945-2001 (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl,
2006). According to Klein et al. (2006), the players in rivalries “consist of states and rivalries
are dyadic” (333). Basically, rivalries include the same pair of states who engage in militarized
conflicts with each other, “and the expectation of a future conflict relationship is one that is
specific as to whom the opponent will be” (Klein et al., 2006: 333). Below, I conceptualize and
operationalize the three types of conflict as the dependent variables in this study.
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Enduring Rivalry
Following Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) conceptualization of “Enduring Rivalry”,
they begin by selecting potential “dyads with three or more militarized disputes” (337). Klein et
al. (2006) determine “whether [militarized] disputes belong to the same rivalry” by looking at the
interrelation of issues between the two states. States consider other states as rivals mainly
through their history of repeated confrontations or by the “presence of unresolved issues that
persist over a broad period of time” with that enemy (Klein et al., 2006: 337). An enduring
rivalry is operationalized as a “competition between the same two states that involves six or
more militarized disputes over a period of 20 years” (Goertz & Diehl, 1995: 33). The variable
“Enduring Rivalry”, taken from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s 2006 New Rivalry Dataset, includes
“the cases of enduring rivalry (coded as 1) experience a mean of 13 disputes and last on average
of 36 years from the first until the last behavioral sign of rivalry” (340). Proto rivalries are
operationalized as those conflicts that produce three to five disputes in a 15-year period (Goertz
& Diehl, 1995: 33). Proto rivalries “experience a mean of four disputes and last on average of 11
years” are coded as 0 (Klein et al., 2006: 340). I rely on the Klein et al. 2006 list of dyads that
are candidates for enduring and proto rivalries from 1945 to 2001 (N= 219).
Rivalry Recurrence
Following the Rudkevich et al. (2013) study, I “examine only those [interstate dyadic]
rivalries that are candidates for rivalry recurrence, namely, those rivalries that have terminated.
[That is] a rivalry [is] terminated when it experiences a period of approximately 15 years without
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a militarized dispute (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004)33; the end date of the last dispute is
conventionally defined as the end of the rivalry” (165). Following the Rudkevich et al. (2013)
alternate specification, I allow the “possibility for a rivalry to recur every year after the initial 15year cutoff for rivalry termination until the 40-year cutoff for recurrence from 1945 to 2001
(165). “Rivalry Recurrence”, is derived from the Rudkevich et al. (2013) dataset, which is taken
from the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) list of rivalries. They define “rivalry recurrence” when
dyadic rivals reenter into rivalry once the initial rivalry has terminated. Rudkevich et al. (2013)
conceptualize a terminated rivalry as having ‘recurred’ “if it is followed by the beginning of a
new rivalry between the same states between approximately 15 and 40 years following the
termination of the original rivalry. I operationalize “rivalry recurrence” according to the
specification presented by Rudkevich et al., (2013), whereby “they allow the possibility for a
rivalry to recur every year after the initial 15-year cutoff for rivalry termination until the 40-year
cutoff for recurrence”; however, no more years for that case are considered once a rivalry has
recurred (166). My research timeline is from 1945 to 2001 and thus N= 1,567. To illustrate
using the US/USSR example: if the rivalry terminates in 1947, the observations start with 1948
until either the rivalry recurs or until 1987 (when 40 years pass) and “once a rivalry has recurred
[between 15 and 40 years] (coded as 1), however, no more years for that particular case are
considered” (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 166). If a rivalry does not resume in 40 years (coded as 0),
there are no more observations on it. According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), “the 15-year period
is consistent with existing standards in rivalry termination research and reflects a significant,
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According to Rudkevich et al. (2013), the word “approximately 15 years” is used according to the original Klein et
al. (2006) source that “determined rivalry termination according to a sliding scale of dispute-free periods. The year
period is consistent with existing standards in rivalry termination research and reflects a significant, inductively
determined breakpoint in rivalry patterns” (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 165).
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inductively determined breakpoint in rivalry patterns” (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 165). The
maximum 40-year lapse reflects the effects of generational change in politics and society (166).
This is suitable because a lot of political changes may occur within a maximum span 40 years
since the initial rivalry terminated. States may experience changes in leadership, regime
infrastructure, or even changes in religion following large demographic changes. It is interesting
to explore whether religious difference has an effect on recurring rivalry despite the generational
and other changes that may take place over time.
War
War is viewed as an organized form of violence or “use of force” (according to
Clausewitz) that occurs primarily between political organizations (Vasquez, 2009). More
precisely, “war” is a “group activity, fought between and directed at collectivities” (Vasquez,
2009: 39). I operationalize the concept of war as a binary variable. It is coded 1 if, according to
the Correlates of War, the two states engaged in war throughout their conflict. If the militarized
dispute between the two states did not escalate to war, then it is coded 0. I operationalize
interstate war as cases that “must involve sustained combat, [including] organized armed forces,
resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month
period” (Correlates of War Data, v4.0). Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) argue that “one way to
examine . . . the occurrence of wars [is] in the sequence of disputes within the [militarized
dispute]” (342). Thus, I use the Klein et al. (2006) list of militarized disputes between states that
are candidates for interstate war from 1945 to 2001 (N= 232).
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Control Variables
All nine models have several common control variables. I include in the models the
following control variables which may increase the likelihood of enduring rivalry, rivalry
recurrence, and war. See Table 1 for the 9 models estimated in this study.
Territorial Issue: I predict that incompatibilities over territory increase the likelihood of
enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war. “Territorial issue” reflects whether the dyadic
interstate conflict between two states involved a territorial dispute. Henderson (1998) stresses
that “the most important “step” in the conflict process—and Vasquez’s underlying “cause” of
interstate militarized conflict—is the rise of a territorial dispute between states (468). Goertz and
Diehl (1992) explain that states are more likely to engage in militarized conflict if they consider
a territorial transfer as invalid. Thus, dyadic rivals who fight over territorial matters may
intensify feelings of nationalism towards protecting their right to the territory, which may lead to
different levels of rivalry and war. I identify whether the dyadic interstate rivalry involved a
territorial dispute using the “(Militarized Interstate Dispute) MID3 Dataset: Procedures, Coding
Rules, and Description (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2005). Enduring rivalries, recurring rivalries,
and wars that are fought over a territorial issue are coded as 1 and those that were not are coded
as 0.
Contiguity: I predict that the closer the states are to one another, the more likely they engage in
different types of rivalry and war. Consistent with the interstate rivalry and war literature, I
employ “Contiguity” as a control variable. Empirical tests have repeatedly revealed that
contiguous dyads have higher likelihoods of conflict (Bremer, 1992; Goertz & Diehl, 1992;
Gochman, 1991). “Contiguity” is a binary variable created on whether two states in the dyad
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share a land border (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0) (Rudkevich, Travlos, & Diehl, 2013). I
identify whether the dyadic interstate conflict was contiguous using the “MID3 Dataset:
Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2005). “Contiguity” is
operationalized with the coding standards from the Correlates of War Project (2005). Henderson
(1998) identifies “pairs of states within 400 miles by sea are coded as (1) if contiguous and those
apart are coded as (0) or noncontiguous” (471).
Major power dyad: I employ the Major Power dyad to reflect whether both states in the dyad
were major powers in accordance to the Correlates of War Project (2008) “State System
Membership List, V2008.1” criteria. Based on the Correlates of War dataset, I operationalize
“major power” as both states possessing political status and overall observable capabilities (i.e.,
military and economic). According to the Correlates of War Project, “states must behave as
major powers, with global interests and reach and must be regarded by the other major powers as
‘members of the club’” (2008). Major Power dyad is conceptualized as those states that the bulk
of coders agree are major powers (Singer & Small, 1972). “Major power dyad” is binary
whereby dyads that include both major powers are coded as 1 and those that do not are coded as
0. The emphasis is on the status of the states as great powers, which is a matter of reputation
and capabilities. Dyads with major power capabilities may “reinforce the legacy of past
hostility” due to the accessibility and control over major resources such as weapons, money,
international support, etc. (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 160).
Joint Democracy: Building on the democratic peace thesis, states that are both democratic are
less likely to engage in conflict as opposed to states of opposing regime types. I rely on the
Polity IV Project (2010) “Center for International Development and Conflict Management”
dataset to operationalize “Joint Democracy;” Democracies are identified based on a Polity IV
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score of 6 or higher, which is a conventional threshold point (Hensel, Goertz, & Diehl, 2000).
Joint Democracy is a binary variable that is coded as 1 if both states within the dyad share the
same democratic regime. If neither, or just one, state in the dyad is identified as a democracy,
then it is coded as 0.

According to Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl (2000), joint democracies

increase the likelihood of seeking peace talks as opposed to resorting to enduring rivalry, rivalry
recurrence, and war.
Incongruent outcomes: “Incongruent outcomes” examines the initial rivalry’s incompatible
termination procedures and outcome. Accordingly, the devices used to terminate the previous
rivalry may serve as one or both rivals’ incentives to rekindle old flames. The “incongruent
outcome” of the losing party may serve as a catalyst for renewed hostilities if the victorious rival
imposes (on the losing state) an unsuitable settlement or does not offer a settlement at all (none)
(Rudkevich et al., 2013: 161). Rudkevich et al. (2013), use the “MID3 Dataset: Procedures,
Coding Rules, and Description” (2005) to derive the outcome and settlement types, and identify
incongruent outcomes. According to Rudkevich et al. (2013), “A congruent settlement is one in
which one of the following combinations occur: victory-imposed, compromise-negotiated, and
stalemate-none” (167). The remaining [“incongruent”] cases consist of victories with either
negotiated or no settlement (167). Incongruent outcome is a binary variable (coded as 1) for the
presence of an incongruent termination outcome and absence thereof is coded as 0.
Strength of Past Rivalry: Rivalry may escalate if it is severe and steadily continues to
strengthen. A rivalry’s frequency and relentlessness between opposing parties are likely to cause
rivalry recurrence. The strength of the terminated rivalry is measured according to the
militarized dispute that occurred in the rivalry between the two states in a dyad, which has at
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least five militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between the two rivals in the dyad (Rudkevich et
al., 2013: 166). These are derived from the Correlates of War (2005) data set on rivalry, which
originated from the “MID3 Dataset: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description”. “Strength of
Past Rivalry” (coded as 1) has to have a minimum of five MIDs, which is indicative of a longlasting rivalry (repetitive). A Rivalry with only three to four disputes is coded as 0. “In a recent
update of their original work, Goertz and Diehl 1993, 1995) no longer include a time minimum
or maximum when defining rivalries (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, 2006)” (Conrad, 2011: 532).
Thus, I include “strength of past rivalry” as a proxy for conflict intensity in this study.
War as a Control Variable: I include “War” as a binary variable for the “presence of war in the
rivalry-ending MID” (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 167). There is mixed evidence on whether war
supports longer-term peace or not (Rudkevich et al., 2013). Werner (1999) argues that the costs
of the previous war reduce the likelihood to return to the battlefield quickly due to the effects of
war exhaustion (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014: 339). Thus, war may serve as a deterrent for future
rivalry and thus I expect a negative relationship in my findings. According to Correlates of War,
“war” includes conflict events with 1,000 or more battle-related deaths (Rudkevich et al. 2013:
167). I rely on Sarkees and Wayman’s (2010) “Resort to War: 1817-2007” Dataset for this
variable. I treat “war” as a dummy variable. Initial rivalry ending in war is coded as 1, versus
the rivalry that does not is coded as 0.
Linguistic differences: In order to test for other cultural indicators on the likelihood of rivalry
and war, I use ‘language’ as a proxy for the number of the leading ethnic groups in each country
(Fearon & Laitin, 2000). I include “Linguistic differences” as a binary variable (coded as 1 if
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both states in the dyad have different linguistic groups, 0 otherwise). I use Ellingsen’s34 (2000)
dataset, which offers annual estimates that are “based on averaging values from The CIA World
Factbook, Britannica Book of the Year and the Demographic Yearbook and interpolating missing
years” (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006: 80). The data specify each state’s linguistic identity that is
based on the largest linguistic group in each state from 1945 to 2000 (Gartzke & Gleditsch,
2006: 62 (Ibid., 2006: 62). I use these data to identify each state’s linguistic identity based on
the rivalry year. Based on each state’s linguistic identity in a dyad during the specific year of
militarized conflict, I determine whether the two states have linguistic differences.
Ethnic differences: According to Fearon and Laitin (2000), “psychological theories perceive
ethnic groups as satisfying an inherent need to belong to a group and as allowing group members
to maintain self-esteem” (717). Additionally, Horowitz (1985) and Tajfel (1982) argue that
conflict may occur when psychological conditions are somewhat threatened by a divergent
group. To determine the exclusive effect of the main independent variables, I test separately if
ethnicity influences the various types of rivalry and war. I include “Ethnic differences” as a
binary variable (coded as 1 if both states in the dyad have different ethnic groups, 0 otherwise). I
use Ellingsen’s (2000) dataset, which specifies each state’s linguistic identity based on the
largest ethnic group in each state from 1945 to 2000 (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006: 62). I
operationalizes “Ethnic difference” as the differences of each state’s ethnic identity that is based
on the largest ethnic group in each state during the specific conflict year. I use these data to

34

According to Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006), “Ellingsen reports inter-coder reliability correlation between 0.78 and
0.95, and interpolation seems adequate, since cultural traits tend to be static over short periods of time” (80).

69

identify whether states in a dyad are ethnically different or not from 1945 to 2001. I code
variables as 1 when they have ethnic differences or 0 when they are the same.
Table 1:
Models to be Estimated

Control Variables

Independent Variables

Model #
All Religious Differences

Enduring
Rivalry
1 2 3 4

Rivalry
Recurrence
5 6 7 8

9

War
10 11 12

           

Christian/Muslim Differences

           

Different Religious
Denominations
Different Religious
Denominations
(Protestants/Anglicans
Combined)
Territorial Issue
Contiguity
Major Power
Joint Democracy
Incongruent Outcome

           

Strength of Past Rivalry
War
Linguistic Differences
Ethnic Differences

 

  

    

  
  
  
  
        
        
        
  
  

Method of Analysis
As noted earlier, the three dependent variables in this study, Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry
Recurrence, and War are dichotomous (0, 1), thus I use logit regression to conduct the analysis.
The functional form of Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 (the 4 models with enduring rivalry as dependent
variable) is as follows: (Model 1) Enduring Rivalry = f (religious differences all dyads,
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territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic
differences). Model 2 evaluates separately the Christian/Muslim dyads. I explore the effect of
religion when the rivals in the dyad are “Christian/Muslim”. I use the “Christian/Muslim” dyads
as a separate independent variable: (Model 2) Enduring Rivalry = f (religious differences
CH/MU dyads, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic
differences, and ethnic differences). Model 3 tests whether different religious denominations
between states increases the likelihood of rivalry recurrence. I examine whether the theoretical
framework in this study applies to different religious denominations because there have been
historical conflicts due to denominational distinctions (i.e., different religious denominations and
different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans combined). And finally, Model 4
tests whether different religious denominations with Protestants and Anglicans combined
increases the two states’ likelihood of enduring rivalry: (Model 3) Enduring Rivalry = f
(different religious denominations, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint
democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic differences), and (Model 4) Enduring Rivalry = f
(different religious denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined], territorial issue,
contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic differences). The
following are Models 5, 6, 7, and 8: (there are 4 models with rivalry recurrence as dependent
variable): (Model 5) Rivalry Recurrence = f (religious differences all dyads, territorial issue,
contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, incongruent outcome, strength of past rivalry,
war, linguistic differences, ethnic differences). (Model 6): Rivalry Recurrence = f (religious
differences CH/MU dyads, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy,
incongruent outcome, strength of past rivalry, war, linguistic differences, ethnic differences);
(Model 7) Rivalry Recurrence = f (different religious denominations, territorial issue, contiguity,
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major power dyad, joint democracy, incongruent outcome, strength of past rivalry, war,
linguistic differences, ethnic differences) and (Model 8) Rivalry Recurrence = f (different
religious denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined], territorial issue, contiguity,
major power dyad, joint democracy, incongruent outcome, strength of past rivalry, war,
linguistic differences, ethnic differences). The following are Models 9, 10, 11, and 12 where the
dependent variable is war: (Model 9) War = f (religious differences all dyads, territorial issue,
contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic differences);
(Model 10) War= f (religious difference CH/MU dyads, territorial issue, contiguity, major power
dyad, joint democracy, linguistic difference, ethnic difference); (Model 11) War= f (different
religious denominations, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy,
linguistic differences, ethnic differences), and (Model 12) War= f (different religious
denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined], territorial issue, contiguity, major power
dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic differences).
In Chapter 4 I describe the results of the analysis.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the results of the analysis for each dependent variable: (1) enduring
rivalry, (2) rivalry recurrence, and (3) war. Appendix D provides the summary statistics of the
various groups of religious differences (i.e., Religious Differences (all dyads) and
Christian/Muslim Differences and Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious
Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) across rivalry types (i.e., Enduring
Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War). Finally, I present an illustration of the 1947 IndiaPakistan war to examine closer the mechanism of the connection between religious difference
and war.
As predicted, two states in a dyad with All Religious Differences, Different Religious
Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined])
have a greater likelihood of Rivalry Recurrence and War but not on Enduring Rivalry. Basically,
the motivation to mobilize and the support of the adherents of the predominant religion when the
other state has a different religion may contribute to rivalry and war proneness. It is logical to
infer that the enmity between the two states due to these religious differences partially
contributes to the outcome of a recurrent rivalry and war.
Results with respect to Christian/Muslim Differences are not significant, however, which
suggests that the link surrounding the Christian and Muslim states does not increase the
likelihood of Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War. The small number of
Christian/Muslim cases relative to the null cases in the models might explain the non-significant
results. In addition to the small number of the small sample size of Christian/Muslim cases
coupled with the study’s time period might explain the weak link between Christian/Muslim
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differences and the types of militarized conflicts. For a closer look, a list of the cases in
Christian/Muslim dyads are included in Appendix A35. Several control variables are significant,
each increasing the probability of Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War.
Results—Enduring Rivalry and Religious Differences
I test the relationship between religious difference and Enduring Rivalry36, using various
dimensions of religious differences. Tables 2 and 2a report the results of my analyses for the
relationships between Enduring Rivalry and (a) All Religious Differences (b) Christian/Muslim
Differences (c) Different Religious Denominations and (4) Different Religious Denominations
(Protestants and Anglicans Combined). I propose that the existence of religious differences
between two states in a dyad increases the likelihood of enduring rivalry. At least one state in a
dyad may mobilize and sustain the support of the adherents of the predominant religion when the
other state has a different religion.
Below I restate my hypotheses about the relationship between enduring rivalry and religious
differences:
H1: Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry than
dyads with the same religions.
H2: Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in enduring
rivalry.

35

I only list the Christian/Muslim cases that experience Rivalry Recurrence and War since my religious difference
variables (i.e., All Religious Difference, Different Religious Denomination, and Different Religious Denominations
(Protestants and Anglicans combined) are significant.
36
To restate, the dependent variable (Enduring Rivalry) (coded as 1) is a “competition between the same two
states that involves six or more militarized disputes over a period of 20 years” (Goertz & Diehl, 1995: 33) and Proto
Rivalry is coded as 0 if those conflicts produce three to five disputes in a 15-year period (Goertz & Diehl, 1995: 33).
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H3: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in
enduring rivalry.
H3: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans
Combined) are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry.
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Table 2:
Relationship between Enduring Rivalry and All Religious Differences and Christian/Muslim Differences
Dependent variable: Enduring Rivalry

Religious Differences

(I)
1.423
(0.493)

All Religious Differences
(II)
(III)
1.142
1.511
(0.429)
(0.545)

(IV)
1.197
(0.452)

(V)
0.897
(0.409)

Christian/Muslim Differences
(VI)
(VII)
0.756
0.912
(0.353)
(0.419)

(VIII)
0.769
(0.358)

Territorial Issue

3.452***
(1.211)

3.748***
(1.349)

3.369***
(1.189)

3.656***
(1.325)

3.493***
(1.224)

3.761***
(1.346)

3.457***
(1.216)

3.695***
(1.332)

Contiguity

2.666***
(0.963)

2.955***
(1.092)

2.583***
(0.942)

2.904***
(1.080)

2.420**
(0.847)

2.870***
(1.047)

2.368**
(0.844)

2.808***
(1.032)

Major Power

3.271
(4.148)

3.355
(4.258)

3.271
(4.147)

3.427
(4.350)

3.645
(4.616)

3.280
(4.157)

3.699
(4.688)

3.414
(4.330)

Joint Democracy

0.442
(0.508)

0.434
(0.508)

0.446
(0.510)

0.449
(0.523)

0.449
(0.505)

0.453
(0.520)

0.449
(0.504)

0.466
(0.533)

Linguistic Differences

1.907
(0.831)

Ethnic Differences

Constant

0.107***
(0.041)

0.068***
(0.034)

2.714*
(1.388)
0.758
(0.327)

0.470
(0.237)

0.134***
(0.068)

0.096***
(0.052)

2.112*
(0.867)

3.009**
(1.485)
0.871
(0.363)

0.483
(0.242)

0.137***
(0.044)

0.072***
(0.035)

0.155***
(0.076)

0.101***
(0.054)

Observations
219
219
219
219
219
Likelihood Ratio
22.880***
25.160***
23.290***
27.410***
21.900***
Pseudo-R2
0.094
0.103
0.095
0.112
0.090
Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

219
25.400***
0.104

219
22.000***
0.090

219
27.510***
0.113
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Table 2a:
Relationship between Enduring Rivalry and Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations
(Protestants and Anglicans Combined)

Religious Differences

Dependent variable: Enduring Rivalry
Different Religious Denominations
Different Religious Denominations
(Protestants & Anglicans combined)
(IX)
(X)
(XI)
(XII)
(XIII)
(XIV)
(XV)
(XVI)
1.437
1.179
1.489
1.199
1.718
1.404
1.782
1.395
(0.577)
(0.500)
(0.607)
(0.511)
(0.708)
(0.613)
(0.744)
(0.610)

Territorial Issue

3.500***
(1.226)

3.781***
(1.354)

3.434***
(1.210)

3.705***
(1.337)

3.429***
(1.205)

3.705***
(1.333)

3.352***
(1.186)

3.634***
(1.317)

Contiguity

2.730***
(1.011)

3.017***
(1.144)

2.659***
(0.993)

2.956***
(1.127)

2.837***
(1.042)

3.109***
(1.168)

2.750***
(1.021)

3.029***
(1.145)

Major Power

3.624
(4.577)

3.483
(4.399)

3.675
(4.641)

3.607
(4.558)

3.542
(4.473)

3.433
(4.336)

3.594
(4.540)

3.555
(4.492)

Joint Democracy

0.434
(0.496)

0.430
(0.503)

0.439
(0.499)

0.447
(0.520)

0.432
(0.496)

0.427
(0.500)

0.439
(0.502)

0.447
(0.522)

Linguistic Differences

1.926
(0.814)

Ethnic Differences

Constant

0.096***
(0.046)

0.063***
(0.036)

2.762**
(1.394)
0.802
(0.339)

0.476
(0.239)

0.114***
(0.066)

0.088***
(0.053)

1.813
(0.774)

2.609*
(1.332)
0.783
(0.333)

0.479
(0.242)

0.082***
(0.040)

0.057***
(0.032)

0.100***
(0.059)

0.081***
(0.049)

Observations
219
219
219
219
219
Likelihood Ratio
22.670***
25.190***
22.940***
27.370***
23.630***
Pseudo-R2
0.093
0.103
0.094
0.112
0.097
Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

219
25.650***
0.105

219
23.960***
0.098

219
27.780***
0.114
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Table 2 reports the results of the logistic regression for models I through VIII and Table 2a
reports the results of the logistic regression for models IX thru XVI. The effects of All Religious
Differences, Christian/Muslim Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different
Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) are not consistent with my
expectations. The coefficients are in the direction anticipated but not statistically significant.
These results may be due to the operationalization of enduring rivalry that may be restricting the
variable’s variation; thus the nonsignificant results may suggest that religious differences may
affect similarly both proto- and enduring rivalries.
Results—Enduring Rivalry and Effects of Control Variables
Tables 2 and 2a show that territorial issues and contiguity have positive and significant
effects on enduring rivalry. Further, the effect of linguistic differences is statistically significant
and in the direction anticipated (as shown in Models IV, VI, VIII, XII, and XVI) even when
controlling for Ethnic Differences. This shows that the coefficients are stable even when another
cultural variable (i.e., ethnic differences) is included in the models.
Results—Rivalry Recurrence and Religious Differences
Tables 3 and 3a report the results of the analyses for the relationship between Rivalry
Recurrence37 and (a) All Religious Differences (b) Christian/Muslim Differences (c) Different
Religious Denominations and (d) Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans
Combined). Table 4 reports the predicted probabilities of rivalry varying religious difference

37

Rudkevich et al. (2013) started their observations 15 years after termination and looked at years 16-40 after
termination to see at which point the rivalry would recur. Rudkevich et al. (2013) “define a rivalry as terminated
when it experiences a period of about 15 years without a militarized dispute (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004;
Diehl & Goertz, 2000)” (165).
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(from 0 to 1) and holding all other variables at their means for the models that yield significant
results. To go one step further, I examine whether a rivalry between two states (that has
terminated) has a higher likelihood of recurring38 due to the religious differences between the
states. As stated in the previous chapter, I operationalize “rivalry recurrence” according to the
requirement offered by Rudkevich et al., (2013), whereby “they allow the possibility for a rivalry
to recur every year after the initial 15-year cutoff for rivalry termination until the 40-year cutoff
for recurrence”; but no more years for that case are considered once a rivalry has recurred (166).
Since I count each rivalry every year from 16- to the 40-year cutoff and stop counting if the
rivalry recurs, I end up with an N= 1,567. This is substantially higher than the Enduring Rivalry
cases (N=219). The purpose of examining religious differences on rivalry recurrence is to better
understand the strong element of time and history of past rivalry between states in a dyad. These
past dynamics from the initial terminated rivalry may have a higher likelihood of recurring when
the two states have different religions. Thus, I propose that religious differences between two
states in a dyad increases the likelihood of rivalry recurrence. At least one state in a dyad may
mobilize and sustain the support of the adherents for the predominant religion when the other
state has a different religion. Below, I restate my hypotheses about the relationship between
recurrent rivalry and religious differences:
H4: Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence than
dyads with the same religions.

38

Rudkevich (2016) explains that the point is to see when the rivalry recurred by having a 1 for the year of
recurrence and 0 for years of non-recurrence.
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H5: Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in rivalry
recurrence.
H6: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in
rivalry recurrence.
H6: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans
Combined) are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence.
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Table 3:
Relationship between Rivalry Recurrence and All Religious Differences and Christian/Muslim Differences
Dependent variable: Rivalry Recurrence
All Religious Differences
Christian/Muslim Differences
(XVIII)
(XIX)
(XX)
(XXI)
(XXII)
(XXIII)
Religious Differences
1.692**
2.370***
1.961***
1.302
1.195
1.489*
(0.367)
(0.520)
(0.442)
(0.293)
(0.278)
(0.343)
Territorial Issue
1.309
1.595**
1.705**
1.318
1.321
1.557**
(0.266)
(0.337)
(0.363)
(0.264)
(0.265)
(0.322)
Contiguity
18.710***
18.934***
19.821***
14.934***
15.683***
14.036***
(6.004)
(6.159)
(6.402)
(4.630)
(4.877)
(4.384)
Major Power
6.048***
7.301***
7.597***
6.668***
6.488***
8.150***
(3.645)
(4.386)
(4.789)
(4.019)
(3.991)
(4.962)
Joint Democracy
0.422
0.434
0.433
0.419
0.421
0.431
(0.246)
(0.254)
(0.259)
(0.245)
(0.247)
(0.253)
Incongruent Outcome
1.243
1.185
1.238***
1.081
1.149
1.017
(0.401)
(0.379)
(0.751)
(0.344)
(0.367)
(0.322)
Strength of Past Rivalry
2.867***
3.174***
3.535***
2.496***
2.633***
2.645***
(0.586)
(0.666)
(0.751)
(0.483)
(0.521)
(0.522)
War
0.034***
0.027***
0.025***
0.038***
0.036***
0.033***
(0.035)
(0.028)
(0.025)
(0.039)
(0.036)
(0.034)
Linguistic Differences
1.171
2.177***
1.359
(0.270)
(0.586)
(0.301)
Ethnic Differences
0.237***
0.148***
0.313***
(0.070)
(0.051)
(0.088)
Constant
0.007***
0.006***
0.019***
0.015***
0.011***
0.008***
0.028***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.012)
Observations
1567
1567
1567
1567
1567
1567
1567
Likelihood Ratio
251.220*** 251.700*** 273.360*** 282.180***
244.340*** 246.290*** 260.330***
Pseudo-R2
0.234
0.235
0.255
0.263
0.228
0.230
0.243
Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
(XVII)
1.787***
(0.363)
1.306
(0.265)
18.537***
(5.959)
6.043***
(3.605)
0.422
(0.245)
1.212
(0.390)
2.816***
(0.571)
0.035***
(0.035)
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(XXIV)
1.231
(0.290)
1.688**
(0.353)
15.781***
(4.925)
8.103***
(5.235)
0.432
(0.260)
1.096
(0.351)
3.140***
(0.640)
0.028***
(0.028)
2.528***
(0.664)
0.168***
(0.057)
0.020***
(0.009)
1567
273.760***
0.255

Table 3a:
Relationship between Rivalry Recurrence and Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations
(Protestants and Anglicans Combined)
Dependent variable: Rivalry Recurrence
Different Religious Denominations
Different Religious Denominations
(Protestants & Anglicans combined)
(XXV)
(XXVI)
(XXVII)
(XXVIII)
(XXIX)
(XXX)
(XXXI)
(XXXII)
Religious Differences
7.855*** 20.748***
11.404***
18.270***
7.856*** 20.713***
11.394***
18.247***
(2.006)
(7.336)
(3.105)
(6.405)
(2.005)
(7.321)
(3.101)
(6.395)
Territorial Issue
1.290
1.319
1.655**
1.604**
1.290
1.318
1.654**
1.603**
(0.275)
(0.284)
(0.367)
(0.357)
(0.275)
(0.284)
(0.367)
(0.357)
Contiguity
29.758***
32.870***
29.930***
31.605***
29.521***
32.642***
29.766***
31.431***
(9.337)
(10.557)
(9.525)
(10.192)
(9.270)
(10.496)
(9.482)
(10.146)
Major Power
5.176**
4.756**
6.627**
6.142**
5.149**
4.737**
6.602**
6.120**
(3.754)
(3.304)
(5.053)
(4.541)
(3.726)
(3.285)
(5.026)
(4.519)
Joint Democracy
0.337*
0.290*
0.331*
0.307*
0.337*
0.290*
0.331*
0.308*
(0.218)
(0.190)
(0.221)
(0.206)
(0.217)
(0.190)
(0.220)
(0.205)
Incongruent Outcome
1.322
1.206
1.042
1.070
1.335
1.215
1.049
1.076
(0.440)
(0.404)
(0.360)
(0.360)
(0.445)
(0.408)
(0.363)
(0.363)
Strength of Past Rivalry
5.052***
5.687***
6.184***
6.364***
5.035***
5.670***
6.169***
6.349***
(1.135)
(1.320)
(1.431)
(1.490)
(1.131)
(1.317)
(1.428)
(1.487)
War
0.020***
0.022***
0.019***
0.020***
0.020***
0.022***
0.019***
0.020***
(0.020)
(0.022)
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.022)
(0.019)
(0.020)
Linguistic Differences
0.257***
0.458**
0.257***
0.458**
(0.074)
(0.151)
(0.075)
(0.151)
Ethnic Differences
0.146***
0.213***
0.146***
0.213***
(0.045)
(0.073)
(0.045)
(0.073)
Constant
0.001***
0.001***
0.003***
0.003***
0.001***
0.001***
0.003***
0.003***
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
Observations
1567
1567
1567
1567
1567
1567
1567
1567
Likelihood Ratio
323.970*** 346.110*** 360.360*** 365.880***
324.150*** 346.250*** 360.470*** 365.990***
Pseudo-R2
0.302
0.323
0.336
0.341
0.302
0.323
0.336
0.342
Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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As anticipated, All Religious Differences has a positive and significant effect on recurrent
rivalry. According to Model XVII on Table 3, religious differences raises the probability of
rivalry recurrence from 0.091 to 0.139. In other words, when two states have different religions
then they have a higher likelihood of rivalry recurrence years after the initial rivalry had
terminated39. Although the initial rivalry may be rooted in territory, economics, power politics,
and/or competition over scarce resources, the state (i.e., state decision maker) may ascribe to
religious differences when addressing the population to mobilize their support prior to the onset
of the recurrent rivalry. The leader’s interest is framed as a religious need to fight the opponent,
which may ultimately trigger the public’s moral obligation to support the state’s cause.

The

effect is roughly the same when I control for Linguistic differences in Model XVIII (P ≤0.01),
Ethnic difference in Model XIX (P ≤0.01), and both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model
XX (P≤0.01).
The effects of Christian/Muslim Differences are not consistent with my expectations (see
Table 3, Models XXI through XXIV). They are in the direction expected but not significant.
Thus the study finds no support for the hypothesis that Christian/Muslim Differences are more
likely to yield rivalry recurrence. There are 360 observations of Rivalry Recurrence that involve
Christian/Muslim dyads of which 36 involve Christian/Muslim dyads that experience rivalry
recurrence. The cases that are driving the rivalry recurrence in the years 1945 to 1986 are Italy
and Albania; Greece and Turkey; and Bulgaria and Turkey (See Appendix A for Cases in
Christian/Muslim Dyads and Rivalry Recurrence).

39

Rudkevich et al. (2013) conceptualize a terminated rivalry as having ‘recurred’ “if it is followed by the beginning
of a new rivalry between the same states between approximately 15 and 40 years following the termination of the
original rivalry.
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In Table 3a, I test the relationship between Different Religious Denominations and
Rivalry Recurrence as well as Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans
Combined) and Rivalry Recurrence. These two explanatory variables (i.e., Different Religious
Denominations and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined])
yield significant results (P≤ 0.01). According to Model XXV, the existence of different religious
denominations raises the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.038 to 0.167. These results
suggest that dyads that have different religious denominations have a higher propensity to reengage in rivalry many years after the initial rivalry between them terminated.
The “Different Religious Denominations” variable is significant even when I control for
Linguistic differences in Model XXVI (P≤ 0.01), Ethnic difference in Model XXVII (P≤ 0.01),
and both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model XXVIII (P≤ 0.01). When I control for
Linguistic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXVI), the existence of different religious
denominations raises the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.027 to 0.193. When I control
for Ethnic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXVII), the existence of different religious
denominations increases the likelihood of rivalry recurrence from 0.033 to 0.176. Finally, when
I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXVIII), the existence of
different religious denominations increases the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.028 to
0.190.
I obtain similar results when I test the link between Different Religious Denominations
(Protestants and Anglicans Combined) and Rivalry Recurrence. In Model XXIX, the existence
of different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) raises the probability
of rivalry recurrence from 0.038 to 0.167. This suggests that dyads that have different religious
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denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) have a higher probability to have rivalry
recurrence many years after the initial rivalry between them terminated.
A state in a dyad may express the “religious difference” biases to the predominant
population when engaging in various types of rivalry. These findings support the in-group/outgroup theory, which suggests that conflict with the out-group increases the state’s manipulation
of the in-group (Coser, 1956). Thus, the state can influence the in-group’s opinions by
presenting the rival’s intentions as “evil.” By vilifying the rival, the state may be able to
stimulate the main population’s bonds to their religious identity, eventually mobilizing the
predominant population’s support for the recurrent rivalry.
The “Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)” variable
is significant even when I control for Linguistic differences in Model XXX (P≤ 0.01), Ethnic
difference in Model XXXI (P≤ 0.01), and both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model
XXXII (P≤ 0.01). When I control for Linguistic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXX), the
existence of different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) raises the
probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.027 to 0.193. When I control for Ethnic Differences
(Table 3a, Model XXXI), the existence of different religious denominations (Protestants and
Anglicans Combined) raises the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.033 to 0.176. And
when I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXXII), the
existence of different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) increases
the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.028 to 0.190. Again, I provide the predicted
probabilities of the models that yielded significant results on Table 4.
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Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Rivalry Recurrence
XVII XVIII XIX
XX
All Religious Differences = 0
0.091 0.093 0.086
0.090
All Religious Differences = 1
0.139 0.136 0.154
0.142
XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII
Different Religious Denominations = 0
0.038 0.027 0.033
0.028
Different Religious Denominations = 1
0.167 0.193 0.176
0.190
XXIX XXX XXXI XXXII
Different Religious Denominations (P&A) = 0 0.038 0.027 0.033
0.028
Different Religious Denominations (P&A) = 1 0.167 0.193 0.176
0.190

Table 3a shows that Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious
Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) have positive and significant effects on
rivalry recurrence. This shows that the coefficients in these models are stable. Thus, the
introduction of the “Different Religious Denominations” and “Different Religious
Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined” variables contribute to the explanation of
rivalry recurrence.
Results—Rivalry Recurrence and Control Variables
Tables 3 and 3a show that territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, incongruent
outcomes, strength of past rivalry, and war (as a control variable) have positive and significant
effects on rivalry recurrence. In sum, each of these variables increase the probability of rivalry
recurrence. Further, the effect of linguistic differences (as shown in Table 3a, Models XXVI and
XXX) and ethnic differences (as shown in Tables 3 and 3a, Models XIX, XXIII, XXVII, and
XXXI) are statistically significant and in the direction anticipated. Thus each increases the
probability of rivalry independently of religious differences. In sum, Looking at the findings
where I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences (in Tables 3 and 3a), these variable
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are both statistically significant and in the direction anticipated across Models XX, XXIV,
XXVIII and XXXII. Thus the findings suggest that linguistic and ethnic differences both
contribute to the explanation of rivalry recurrence.
Results—War and Religious Differences
Here I examine the relationship between religious and war using several dimensions of
religious differences. Tables 5 reports the results of my analyses for the link between War and
All Religious Differences and Christian/Muslim Differences. Table 5a reports the results of my
analyses for the link between War and Different Religious Denominations and Different
Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined). Table 6 reports the predicted
probabilities of war varying religious difference (from 0 to 1) and holding all other variables at
their means for the models that yield significant results.
Interstate war is larger in scale and is distinct in that it requires a substantial decision and
more resources by the two states in a dyad. Specially, interstate war demands more material and
human resources, strategic policy decisions, and emotional obligations and costs on the states’
populations. Considering the great cost of war, states usually calculate the costs against the
benefits of the war outcome. Horowitz (2009) suggests that nonmaterial incentives (such as
religion) for war initiation may produce more support from the population of adherents than
other types of warfare (163). Thus, I propose that the existence of religious differences between
two states in a dyad increases the likelihood of war. It may be easier for at least one state in a
dyad to mobilize and sustain the support of the adherents for the predominant religion when the
other state has a different religion. Popular mobilization by the state based on identity may
increase the state’s optimism regarding its performance in war and prospect of victory.
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Accordingly, mobilization based on identity may increase the state’s optimism regarding its
performance in war and prospect of victory. Below, I restate my hypotheses about the
relationship between war and religious differences:
H7: Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in war than dyads with
the same religions.
H8: Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in war.
H9: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in
war than dyads with the same religious denomination.
H9: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans
Combined) are more likely to engage in war than dyads with the same religious denomination.
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Table 5:
Relationship between War and All Religious Differences and Christian/Muslim Differences
Dependent variable: War

Religious Differences

(XXXIII)
3.606***
(1.424)

All Religious Differences
(XXXIV)
(XXXV)
4.363***
4.363***
(1.990)
(1.990)

(XXXVI)
4.363***
(1.990)

(XXXVII)
0.716
(0.365)

Christian/Muslim Differences
(XXXVIII)
(XXXIX)
0.670
0.670
(0.345)
(0.345)

(XL)
0.670
(0.345)

Territorial Issue

6.486***
(2.447)

6.478***
(2.448)

6.478***
(2.448)

6.478***
(2.448)

6.838***
(2.503)

6.859***
(2.517)

6.859***
(2.517)

6.859***
(2.517)

Contiguity

0.802
(0.305)

0.751
(0.292)

0.751
(0.292)

0.751
(0.292)

0.623
(0.228)

0.668
(0.251)

0.668
(0.251)

0.668
(0.251)

Major Power

1.900
(2.396)

1.923
(2.425)

1.923
(2.425)

1.923
(2.425)

2.658
(3.355)

2.499
(3.158)

2.499
(3.158)

2.499
(3.158)

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Joint Democracy

(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)

Linguistic Differences

0.637
(0.316)

Ethnic Differences

Constant

0.637
(0.316)
0.637
(0.316)

0.073***
(0.031)

0.094***
(0.046)

(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)

0.094***
(0.046)

1.439
(0.619)

1

1.439
(0.619)

(omitted)

0.094***
(0.046)

1.439
(0.619)
1
(omitted)

0.188***
(0.057)

0.139***
(0.066)

0.139***
(0.066)

0.139***
(0.066)

Observations
225
225
225
225
225
Likelihood Ratio
42.400***
43.220***
43.220***
43.220***
31.270***
Pseudo-R2
0.178
0.181
0.181
0.181
0.131
Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

225
32.000***
0.134

225
32.000***
0.134

225
32.000***
0.134
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Table 5a:
Relationship between War and Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and
Anglicans Combined)
Dependent variable: War
Different Religious Denominations
(XLI)
(XLII)
(XLIII)
(XLIV)
3.331**
3.439**
3.439**
3.439**
(1.825)
(2.005)
(2.005)
(2.005)

Different Religious Denominations
(Protestants & Anglicans combined)
(XLV)
(XLVI)
(XLVII)
(XLVIII)
2.831*
2.912*
2.912*
2.912*
(1.540)
(1.719)
(1.719)
(1.719)

Territorial Issue

6.551***
(2.414)

6.536***
(2.410)

6.536***
(2.410)

6.536***
(2.410)

6.362***
(2.344)

6.345***
(2.340)

6.345***
(2.340)

6.345***
(2.340)

Contiguity

0.866
(0.332)

0.858
(0.332)

0.858
(0.332)

0.858
(0.332)

0.815
(0.310)

0.810
(0.312)

0.810
(0.312)

0.810
(0.312)

Major Power

2.644
(3.325)

2.663
(3.351)

2.663
(3.351)

2.663
(3.351)

2.616
(3.290)

2.629
(3.308)

2.629
(3.308)

2.629
(3.308)

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Religious Differences

Joint Democracy

(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)

Linguistic Differences

0.928
(0.432)

Ethnic Differences

Constant

0.928
(0.432)
0.928
(0.432)

0.057***
(0.034)

0.059***
(0.038)

(omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)

0.059***
(0.038)

0.943
(0.444)

1

0.943
(0.444)

(omitted)

0.059***
(0.038)

0.943
(0.444)
1
(omitted)

0.068***
(0.040)

0.069***
(0.043)

0.069***
(0.043)

0.069***
(0.043)

Observations
225
225
225
225
225
Likelihood Ratio
36.470***
36.500***
36.500***
36.500***
35.020***
Pseudo-R2
0.153
0.153
0.153
0.153
0.147
Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

225
35.040***
0.147

225
35.040***
0.147

225
35.040***
0.147
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As expected, All Religious Differences has a positive and significant effect on War. According
to Model XXXIII when the states in a dyad are of different religions, the probability of war
increases from 0.124 to 0.303. “All Religious Differences” is significant even when I control for
Linguistic differences in Model XXXIV, Ethnic difference in Model XXXV, or both Linguistic
and Ethnic differences in Model XXXVI. Model XXXIV on Table 5 where I control for
Linguistic Differences, Model XXXV where I control for Ethnic Differences, and Model
XXXVI where I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences all show that when the states
in a dyad are of different religions, their probability of engaging in war is one in three as opposed
to about one in nine when the dyads do not have religious differences.
The effects of Christian/Muslim Differences are not consistent with my expectations (see
Table 5, Models XXXVII through XL). They are in the direction expected but not significant.
Thus the study finds no support for the hypothesis that Christian/Muslim Differences are more
likely to yield war. There are 41 observations of War that involve Christian/Muslim dyads of
which 6 involve Christian/Muslim dyads experience war. The cases that entered into war in the
years 1958 to 1990 are: United Kingdom and Iraq; France and Iraq; United States and Iraq; Italy
and Iraq; Cyprus and Turkey; and Somalia and Ethiopia (See Appendix A for Cases in
Christian/Muslim Dyads and War). The findings for Table 5 suggest that war is associated with
religious difference between dyads, but not when in the Christian/Muslim cases.
In Table 5a, I test the relationship between Different Religious Denominations and War
as well as Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) and War.
These two independent variables (i.e., Different Religious Denominations and Different
Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) yield significant results. For a
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dyad where the militarized conflict is between states with Different Religious Denominations (in
Table 5a, Model XLI), the probability of war increases from 0.106 to 0.255. These results
confirm that states in a dyad that have different religious denominations have a higher likelihood
of engaging in war than dyads that do not have different religious denominations .
The “Different Religious Denominations” variable is significant even when I control for
Linguistic differences in Model XLII, Ethnic differences in Model XLIII, and both Linguistic
and Ethnic differences in Model XLIV. When I control for Linguistic Differences (Table 5a,
Model XLII), the probability of war increases from 0.104, or one in ten times, to 0.256, or one in
four times. When I control for Ethnic Differences (Table 5a, Model XLIII), the likelihood of
war increases from 0.104 to 0.256. When I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences
(Table 5a, Model XLIV), the probability of war increases from 0.104, or one in ten times, to
0.256, or one in four times.
I obtain similar statistical results when I test the link between Different Religious
Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) and War. For a dyad where the war is
between states with Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)
[in Table 5a, Model XLV], the probability of war increases from 0.117, or about one in nine
times, to 0.250, or one in four times.
These findings clearly support the theory of false optimism. I use the false optimism
theory as the mechanism that links religious differences to war. The support from the
predominant religious adherents against the enemy state may increase the state’s optimism for
victory. Consequently, the state’s optimism results in overestimated beliefs about war outcomes
relative to a pre-war compromise since that population may be seen as a source of support.
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Consequently, a state’s exaggerated optimism may translate into a hawkish war policy when the
other state has a different religion (i.e., All Religious Differences, Different Religious
Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined).
The “Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)” variable is
significant even when I control for Linguistic differences in Model XLVI, Ethnic difference in
Model XLVII, and both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model XLVIII. When I control for
Linguistic Differences (Table 5a, Model XLVI), a dyad that does not have different religious
denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) have a likelihood of engaging in war
approximately 0.115, or about one in nine times. But the probability of war increases to 0.251,
or one in four times, when dyads have different religious denominations (Protestants and
Anglicans Combined). Similarly, when I control for Ethnic Differences (Table 5a, Model
XLVII), the probability of war is higher when the dyads have different religious denominations
(Protestants and Anglicans Combined) versus dyads that do not have different religious
denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined). Finally, when I control for both
Linguistic and Ethnic Differences (Table 5a, Model XLVIII), the likelihood of war increases
from 0.115 to 0.251, meaning that dyads with no Different Religious Denominations (Protestants
and Anglicans Combined) have a probability of war of about one out of nine times versus one in
four times when the dyad has different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans
Combined). Looking at the findings of the models (XLVI thru XLVIII) on Table 5a, Ethnic
Differences is omitted from the analysis because the cases of Linguistic and Ethnic Differences
were identical. Basically, the introduction of the “Different Religious Denominations” and
“Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined” variables contribute
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to the explanation of war. I derive the predicted probabilities of the models that yielded
significant results on Table 6.
Table 6: Predicted Probabilities of War
XXXIII XXXIV XXXV XXXVI
All Religious Differences = 0
0.124
0.114
0.114
0.114
All Religious Differences = 1
0.303
0.316
0.316
0.316
XLI
XLII
XLIII XLIV
Different Religious Denominations = 0
0.106
0.104
0.104
0.104
Different Religious Denominations = 1
0.255
0.256
0.256
0.256
XLV
XLVI XLVII XLVIII
Different Religious Denominations (P&A) = 0 0.117
0.115
0.115
0.115
Different Religious Denominations (P&A) = 1 0.250
0.251
0.251
0.251

Results—War and Control Variables
I expect a significant positive effect of territorial issue on war. Models XXXIII thru
XLVIII in Tables 5 and 5a show that the probability of war increases when there is a territorial
issue. Additionally, I do not find statistically significant results when I control for the linguistic
differences in dyads (as shown in Models XXXIII thru XLVIII). In sum, linguistic and ethnic
differences do not contribute to the explanation of war.
Findings for Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War
The findings support my expectation of the effect of religious differences on rivalry
recurrence and war but not enduring rivalry. My argument is that at least one state in a dyad may
exploit the religious identity of its predominant population in order to increase their support for
the militarized conflict cause. I utilize social identity theory to explain enduring and rivalry
recurrence because the theory suggests that groups of people may engage in conflict when
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conditions such as different group identities prevail. Based on the findings in the Enduring
Rivalry (Tables 2 and 2a) and Rivalry Recurrence (Tables 3 and 3a), it may be more plausible to
mobilize the predominant population of adherents when two states have a history of militarized
conflict. It is reasonable to suggest that the initial terminated rivalry, in the Rivalry Recurrence
models, may be used to fuel the enmity between the two states when they have different
religions. Although enduring rivalries are intense in nature, the absence of militarized conflict
between the two states may reduce the impact of the religious differences that exist between the
two states. Since I argue that religion may be used as a proxy by states to initiate militarized
conflict, the adherents of the predominant religion in at least one state out of the two may be
more likely to support the rivalry cause when there is a history of enmity. The history of fighting
is found in the Rivalry Recurrence cases but not in the Enduring Rivalry ones.
States that engage in rivalry recurrence and war may support combative policies because
the conditions of religious differences may facilitate the initiation of interstate conflict behavior.
Evidently, the presence of religious differences between states in a dyad has a significant
positive effect on rivalry recurrence and war. Also, the existence of different religious
denominations and different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans combined) in a
dyad has considerable positive effects on rivalry recurrence and war, respectively. In other
words, I find evidence for my argument that rivalry recurrence and war may result from the
state’s use of religious rhetoric to mobilize and sustain the support of the adherents of the
predominant religion when the other state has a different religion. In the case of war, in
particular, the state’s ability to mobilize and sustain the support of adherents to support the war
effort may exaggerate its optimism about victory. This sense of false optimism increases the
state’s proclivity to engage in war when the rival state has a different religion. The significant
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results in Tables 5 and 5a support the in-group out-group mechanism coupled with false
optimism increases the likelihood that at least one state may engage in war.
The India-Pakistan War of 1947
I illustrate the case of the India-Pakistan War of 1947 for a close examination of the link
between religious difference and war. To begin, I rely on my War dataset (N= 232) to randomly
select one case that resulted in war and involved a dyad with different religions. The 1947 IndiaPakistan War case study aims to examine whether religious differences between two states in a
dyad may increase the likelihood of engaging in war with each other. Since I argue that at least
one of the two states in the dyad may use religious differences to mobilize the support of the
adherents to the predominant religion by means of rhetoric, I use the Pakistan’s role in the events
leading to war. The case of the 1947 India-Pakistan War suggests that Pakistan’s mobilization of
such support may have contributed to Pakistan’s optimism regarding the outcome of the war thus
increasing the likelihood of war with India. Religion may introduce a condition for false
optimism. Under certain occasions, the state may miscalculate the chances of winning, which
may explain the onset of war. Thus, the case shows that rhetoric was used to mobilize the
support of the predominant population and increase optimism for a war victory.
My analysis focuses on how mobilizing the Muslim population’s support by means of
rhetoric for the 1947 War contributed to Pakistan’s optimism regarding the outcome of war, that
victory was highly likely. Evidence from the India-Pakistan War demonstrates that collective
animosity that was heightened via rhetoric shaped the two populations’ commitments to support
the onset of war. In 1947, the major religious identity of India was Hinduism based on an 80%
plurality of adherents and the religious identity of Pakistan was Islam based on a 90% plurality.
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According to Jalal (1990) Pakistan was particularly unwise in believing that a war with India
over Kashmir would end in a Pakistani triumph. During the India-Pakistan War, the armed
struggles were mainly fought between Hindus and Muslim forces. The anti-Hindu rhetoric and
policies of the new Pakistani state led to the initiation of this war. The goal of this case study is
to illustrate that at least one state (i.e., leader) may capitalize on the existence of religious
differences between two states to mobilize the support of the predominant population of
adherents for the war cause. Consequently, the state’s optimism about winning the war may
increase when mobilization of the population is achieved. Essentially in the India-Pakistan War
of 1947, the transmission of Islam by means of rhetoric40 may be ascertained as the uniting
banner, which was meant to mobilize the support of the Muslim population and possibly
contributing to the increase in Pakistan’s optimism about winning the war.
The main architect of the mobilization of the predominant Muslim population that
employed the rhetoric in support of a Muslim state of Pakistan was Mohammed Ali Jinnah
(Ganguly, 2001). In his speeches it can be discerned that there was a need to construct a Muslim
majority state to restore the Muslims’ political role in the region. Muslim scholars like Abudl
Ala Maududi publicly supported Jinnah’s cause to reestablish a Muslim ummah41 (i.e.,
community), suggesting that all those who supported Pakistan’s cause were part of a collective
Muslim community (Ganguly, 2001). Aside from the conflict over the territory of Jammu and
Kashmir, evidence suggests that mobilizing support for a Muslim majority state and society was
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The rhetoric was used to temper the threat of the Hindu state on the survival of a Muslim majority state.
Ummah means “community”, which is not based on common ancestry or geography. Rather, it is a “supranational community with a common [Islamic] history” (Ahmad, 1997: 11).
41
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the momentum behind the consequent militarized conflict between India and Pakistan.
According to Slantchev and Tarar (2011),
“The formal literature that has emerged over the past two decades has provided us with
coherent accounts whose fundamental insight is that [Mutual Optimism42] causes actors
to engage in behavior that ends in war even in environments where settlements exist that
would make both better off and where they would be able to locate such settlements if
they had better information” (136).
When states are exceedingly optimistic, “they can end up taking actions that commit them to
war” (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011: 140; Fearon, 1994). That is not to say that optimism basically
drives states to prefer war to peace. The state’s ability to mobilize its population to endorse the
war policy via rhetoric may be a means through which a state’s optimism can end in war. Under
the context of a supportive state population, a state can boost its capability in conflict, despite the
rival’s military power, because [such support] “boosts resolve and/or bluffs43 the enemy into
submission” (Wrangham, 1999: 3). At this juncture, a state is actually deliberate or “conscious”
in projecting publicly its resolve after activating the population’s support, which is intended as a
signal to the other state. Positive illusions, another form of false optimism, may strengthen a
state’s conviction about “certain facts [of victory], even if the interpretation of those facts was
largely skewed in the first place for political purposes” (Johnson, 2004: 12). A simple
illustration can be that the states in a dyad (State A and State B) have two different religions.
State A’s task to mobilize its population by means of rhetoric may be furthered when State B has
a different religion. State A addresses publicly the population of adherents by using religious
rhetoric against State B. Johnson (2004) argues that a possible source of overconfidence may be
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Mutual Optimism is also used by scholars to describe the basic principles of ‘false optimism’.
According to Johnson (2004), “the word “bluff” implies conscious deception, but the positive illusions hypothesis
suggests that the bluff occurs subconsciously—that one is not aware of overestimating oneself” (11). However, the
conscious and subconscious components may in fact work simultaneously (Johnson, 2004).
43
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that the inclusion of religious forces (such as god’s will) “offer superior powers and protection”,
which would potentially heighten the population’s support for war (7). The state can create the
necessary religious narrative that supports its war cause in its rhetoric when addressing the main
population. The manipulation of religious rhetoric based on the surrounding circumstances is
used to persuade the population that ‘war against the enemy’ is for a holy cause since it is
decreed by god and is necessary to maintain the survival of the religion. Consequently, State A’s
supportive population of religious adherents is used to propel the state’s cause for war and
augment expectations of a victorious end thus creating false optimism to engage in war. At least
one state in the dyad may use rhetoric of identities against the other state to mobilize the
population’s support and therefore energize the onset of war.
Ganguly (2001) favors the argument that false optimism is an element that increased the
likelihood of the war between India and Pakistan. For example, at the root of the 1947-48, 1965,
and 199944 wars, Pakistan clearly miscalculated India’s military capabilities and its military
responses (Ganguly, 2001). Johnson (2004) argues that “the anti-Indian and chauvinistic
ideology of the authoritarian Pakistani state repeatedly contributed to a flawed assessment of
India’s military capabilities and will” (32). According to Van Evera (1999):
“Chauvinist nationalism is a prime source of false optimism about the balance of will.
Nationalist propaganda often inflates the bravery of one’s own people and denigrates the
opponents’ toughness and character . . . . Such propaganda is bound to foster illusions
about one’s own fortitude and that of others” (7).
‘Chauvinist nationalism’ reflects Pakistan’s need to establish a firm identity of a Muslim society,
which is based on Islamic principles (Ganguly, 2001). While ‘chauvinist nationalism’ was the
initial purpose, its essential primordial [religious] cause waned in later years. Van Evera (1999)
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I only focus on the 1947 war between India and Pakistan.
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argues that “false optimism seems a potent and pervasive cause of war. States are far more
warlike when they are in the thrall of false optimism” (16). False hopes of victory can occur
when rival states misinterpret their relative strength and power, their relative will, their relative
population, among other considerations (Van Evera, 1999). Van Evera (1999) argues that there
is some degree of false optimism about relative power prior to every war since 1740. Based on
the description of states, “scholars trace war to human nature, biological instincts, frustration,
fear and greed, the existence of weapons, and similar factors (Levy, 1998: 141). According to
Altman (2015), “when a state selects the strategy it sees as best, it tends to pick a strategy whose
effectiveness it has exaggerated” (292). A state would essentially utilize such strategies that are
more efficient than others (Altman, 2015). Hence, war may be more likely when “states hold
optimistic, and therefore conflicting, estimates about the prevailing power balance” (Bas &
Schub, N.d.: 1), and such optimism may lead at least one state to opt for war. In the following
sections, I explain the background of the India-Pakistan War of 1947 and how the condition of
religious differences played a role in Pakistan’s false optimism prior to the onset of the 1947
War.
Background of the India-Pakistan War of 1947
Following the time of India’s independence from Britain and Pakistan’s partition45 in
1947, two conflicting ideas of state-building activated the Indian and Pakistani nationalist
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According to Khan (2007), ‘partition’ “refers not only to the division of the Bengal province of British
India into East Pakistan and West Bengal (India), and the similar partition of the Punjab Province into West
Punjab (West Pakistan) and East Punjab (now Punjab), but also to the respective divisions of other assets, including
the British Indian Army, the Indian Civil Service and other administrative services, the railways, and the central
treasury” (46).
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movements (Wolpert, 1984). First, the Indian National Congress’s46 (INC) nationalist
undertaking pursued the creation of a “secular and democratic post-independence India”
(Ganguly, 2001: 8). Second, the particular ethnic, regional, and cultural differences of India
presented challenges to the INC’s political plan and created considerable resistance among the
non-Hindu population (Ganguly, 2001). Namely, Jinnah’s ‘two-nation’ idea, which required the
establishment of an official Muslim homeland, was thwarted by the INC’s political strategies.
An Indian nation dominated by Hindus and backed by British colonial ideology dictated the
emergence of Pakistani patriotism. It is beyond the scope of this section to delve into the sources
of Hindu-Muslim ideologies of state-building. Rather, my analysis traces how the divergent
religious ideologies between the Hindus and Muslims were used to mobilize the Muslim
population’s support for a war with India, which energized Jinnah’s optimism about the outcome
of the 1947 war. According to Ganguly (2001), it was the creation of this obviously Hindudominated community that consequently strengthened Jinnah’s plan for the establishment of an
exclusive state based on religious affiliation (10). After the creation of the independent Muslimmajority state of Pakistan, the states of Jammu and Kashmir47 created a complex problem for
both Hindus and Muslims. The leaders of the ‘princely states’ (i.e., Jammu and Kashmir) were
now anticipated to choose one of the two nascent states, India or Pakistan, considering the
geographic position and demographic features (Campbell-Johnson, 1953). However, a dilemma
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According to historians, the INC at the time of its origin in 1885 was primarily composed of upper-middle-class,
predominantly Hindu, members. It was an Anglicized institution concerned with the “constitutional and
incremental growth of self-government in India” (Ganguly, 2001: 8). But after Mohandas Gandhi’s leadership in
the 1920s, the INC evolved into a mass-based party that represented the diverse Indian population.
47
Jammu and Kashmir were considered ‘princely states’ in the region. They “were nominally independent but
recognized the ‘paramountcy’ of the British Crown (Ganguly, 2001: 13).
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emerged because Kashmir had a Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, a predominantly Muslim
population, and it was contiguous to both India and Pakistan (Lamb, 1992).
Jinnah sought the support of key Muslim figures in Kashmir, such as Mirwaiz Yusuf
Shah and Ghulam Abbas, prior to aggressively leaning toward Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan
(Ganguly, 2001). Despite the religious leaders’ support, Kashmir’s Muslim population lacked
enthusiasm to back Pakistan’s accession plans for Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, it is logical to
assume that Jinnah pursued another method to mobilize public support and expand Pakistan’s
rule. Jinnah was able to mobilize the population’s support by appealing to their religious
identity. He successfully embedded an Islamic cause in establishing the separate country of
Pakistan and continued this purpose in mobilizing the populace’s support for the war with India.
A potentially costly war on the structure of the Pakistani state and its society seemed to
be worth the risk for Jinnah. It appeared that Jinnah believed that his war policy against India
would yield an easy victory. The role of Pakistan’s military efforts to continue the conflict with
India in the period following the partition in 1947 has puzzled politicians and scholars alike.
Basically, why was Jinnah highly optimistic about the perceived cadre of the Pakistani military,
which he believed would yield a victory over India (Khan, 2007)? Haqqani (2006) argues that
“Pakistan’s military has traditionally drawn its legitimacy from the fact that it is the
defender of Pakistan against the existential threat from India and that it is the institution
that will get Kashmir for Pakistan. If the existential threat from India [was]
acknowledged as no longer real and that the issue of Kashmir [was] already settled, the
Pakistani military would lose its legitimacy as the arbiter of the nation’s destiny” (12).
Since the Islamic religion was at the heart of the ‘existential threat’ due to the atrocities that were
inflicted on the Muslim population by the Indian government (Khan, 2007), Jinnah highlighted
the survival and independence of Islam to unify both Pakistan and Kashmir’s Muslim
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populations. While Jinnah’s actions leading to the 1947 war with India may have been for
political purposes, his Islamic cause gained prominence among the Muslims in Pakistan (Bahl,
2007). According to my analysis, Jinnah used the religious differences to energize Pakistani
Muslim population’s support, and his strategy exaggerated his expectation of victory. Thus, I
focus on Jinnah’s pre-war efforts to mobilize his population’s support for the war cause via
rhetoric, which essentially produced overconfidence about a Pakistani victory.
Pakistan: Explaining the Condition for False Optimism Prior to the 1947-48 War

The newly created state of Pakistan did not have the military might to initiate war with
India in 1947. Scholars seek to explain the conditions that generated Pakistan’s false optimism
upon entering into the First Kashmir War, which unfolded between October 24, 1947 and
January 1, 1949 (Ganguly, 2001). Yet, no research has yet attempted to show that the religious
differences between the two states might have been used to leverage Pakistan’s optimism and
eventual war initiation. This research uncovers Jinnah’s speeches to Pakistan’s Muslim-majority
population aimed at generating their enthusiasm and support for the war cause. Although the use
of religious rhetoric against India is not a factor that explains the overall state of violence
between the two states, state mobilization of religious identity may be considered a predisposing
condition for war (Ganguly, 2001). The existence of religious differences between India and
Pakistan was an opportunistic situation that Jinnah used to generate hostility and intensify his
war cause. Emboldened by the Muslim population’s support, Jinnah initiated war with India
thinking that he would achieve victory (Ganguly, 2001). Ganguly (2001) argues that “Pakistan’s
decision to resort to war . . . stemmed from false optimism and perceived windows of
opportunity” (51). The framing of Jinnah’s speeches was on perpetuating the legacy of Islam
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through unity and sacrifice, which served as the momentum behind the Muslim population’s
support. The existential threat was taken seriously by the Muslim majority. The process of
Muslim ethnic cleansing that had started prior to the 1947 partition was used to validate the war
cause and mobilize the support of the Muslims in Pakistan” (Khan, 2007). The saliency of this
struggle due to recent experience with India motivated the Muslim civilians to enlist in the
Pakistani army (Haqqani, 2006). The Muslim population’s overwhelming support for the war
cause may have strengthened Jinnah’s perception of Pakistan’s capabilities. Basically, the
putative bond of the Muslims in Pakistan was the momentum behind Jinnah’s optimism about
the war outcome.
The following speech excerpt preceded Pakistan’s mission to invade Kashmir48. Some
evidence can be deduced from Jinnah’s speech on the day of Eid-ul-Azha49, in which he sought
to emphasize the Islamic message of sacrifice in order to mobilize the support of Pakistan’s
Muslim population. Jinnah exemplifies how Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) was ready to sacrifice
his son, Ismael, because God decreed it. Consequently, Jinnah uses Ibrahim’s obedience to
demonstrate that a Muslim must make sacrifices to show obedience to God. Although Jinnah
was not spiritual, he was resolved in referencing Islam’s cultural history of obedience and
sacrifice. Jinnah’s speech identifies the spirit of sacrifice in the Islamic religion in order to gain
the Muslim’s support for the October 24, 1947 War between India and Pakistan (Protip Sen,
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According to Singh (2012), on the night of October 24, “the Government of India received an emergency
telegram from Srinagar informing them about [Pakistan’s] invasion with urgent please for dispatch of Indian
troops. Vice President, Secretary of States, Government of India flew to Srinagar the next day and reported on the
grave situation prevailing in Srinagar. He accompanied Prime Minister of Kashmir State to New Delhi. On October
26, 1947, the Instrument of Accession was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in Jammu. VP Menon carried the
document to New Delhi on the same day and the merger of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of
India was completed” (136).
49
Eid-ul-Azha is the Islamic holiday of Sacrifice.
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1988): In Pakistan, Zindabad, Jinnah says on October 24, 1947 (See Appendix E for Jinnah’s
full speech):
“Eid-ul-Azha Message to the Nation: Allah often tests and tries those whom he loves. He
called upon Prophet Ibrahim to sacrifice the object he loved most. Ibrahim answered the
call and offered to sacrifice his son. Today too, Allah is testing and trying the Muslims of
Pakistan and India. He has demanded great sacrifices from us. Our new-born State is
bleeding from wounds inflicted by our enemies. Our Muslim brethren in India are being
victimized and oppressed as Muslims for their help and sympathy for the establishment
of Pakistan. Dark clouds surround us on all sides for the moment but we are not daunted,
for I am sure, if we show the same spirit of sacrifice as was shown by Ibrahim, Allah
would rend the clouds and shower on us His blessing as He did on Ibrahim. Let us,
therefore, on the day of Eid-ul-Azha which symbolizes the spirit of sacrifice enjoined by
Islam, resolve that we shall not be deterred from our objective of creating a State of our
own concept by any amount of sacrifice, trials or tribulations which may lie ahead of us
and that we shall bend all our energies and resources to achieve our goal. I am confident
that in spite of its magnitude, we shall overcome this grave crisis as we have in our long
history surmounted many others and notwithstanding the efforts of our enemies, we shall
emerge triumphant and strong from the dark night of suffering and show the world that
the State exists not for life but for good life.
On this sacred day, I send greetings to our Muslim brethren all over the world both on
behalf of myself and the people of Pakistan. For us Pakistan, on this day of thanksgiving
and rejoicing, has been overshadowed by the suffering and sorrow of 5 million Muslims
in East Punjab and its neighborhood [Jammu and Kashmir]. I hope that, wherever
Muslim men and women foregather on this solemn day. They will remember in their
prayers these unfortunate men, women and children who have lost their dear ones, homes
and hearths and are undergoing an agony and suffering as great hand cruel as any yet
inflicted on humanity. In the name of this mass of suffering humanity I renew my appeal
to Muslims wherever they may be, to extend to us in this hour of our danger and need,
their hand of brotherly sympathy, support and co-operation. Nothing on earth now can
undo Pakistan.
So my message to you all is of hope, courage and confidence. Let us mobilize all our
resources in a systematic and organized way and tackle the grave issues that confront us
[in Jammu and Kashmir] with grim determination and discipline worthy of a great
nation” (Ahmad, 1997).
What is important about Jinnah’s initial speech in the pre-war period was his focus on the
Muslim population’s unified strength, which would yield a “great nation”, instead of focusing on
India’s military strength. Despite the various sources of intelligence confirming India’s military
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might that “had been divided on a 30:70 ratio between Pakistan and India” (Ganguly, 2001: 19),
Jinnah still showed resolve. Based on Jinnah’s narrative, it is implied that the Muslims will
triumph by their strength and determination. It is possible that Jinnah believed that Muslims
were good soldiers and fighters (Rudkevich, 2016), which may have been the source of Jinnah’s
optimism. Thus Jinnah aimed at mobilizing the Muslim population’s support by invoking the
Islamic cause several times in his speeches, consequently increasing his optimism and
expectations for the war outcome. He emphasized that this was a “noble” cause that requires the
unity of the Muslims in Pakistan and the world, writ large. His speech produced considerable
influence on the population to the extent that they appealed to the Pakistani government to wage
war on their enemy state of India (Khan, 1970). It appears that Jinnah determined the gauge of
Pakistan’s military strength and eventual victory partially based on the Muslim population’s
support. The analysis of Jinnah’s speech shows that he actually used rhetoric to generate higher
mobilization, which may have contributed to his expectation of a war victory.
Pakistan’s perceived holy Islamic cause in aiding the other Muslims in Jammu and
Kashmir had considerable impact on the bulk of the population (Khan, 1967). Even though
Pakistan’s military realm was blatantly inequitable, Jinnah believed that Pakistan can become
victorious (Ganguly, 2001: 53). Van Evera (1999) refers to the Pakistan’s Muslim support as
‘chauvinist nationalism’. Van Evera (1999) argues that
“Chauvinist nationalism is a prime source of false optimism about the balance of will.
Nationalist propaganda often inflates the bravery of one’s own people and denigrates the
opponents’ toughness and character . . . . Such propaganda is bound to foster illusions
about one’s own fortitude and that of others. [Reference to Islamic history] exaggerates
the righteousness of the national cause, leading groups to misread the balance of
legitimacy between their own and their adversary’s claims. Thus, a misreading of the
balance of legitimacy will likely lead to a misreading of the balance of will. Those who
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conclude that ‘our side is right’ will deduce that ‘our adversaries know we are right, they
are testing us to see if we know it too, and they will back down if we stand firm.’
Adversaries will back down because ‘once they earn we know we are right, they will
realize that we have more will than they do and that we can outlast them; so they will fold
if we stand firm.’ These chains of misperception rest on a false chauvinist-nationalist
definition of the situation [with Pakistan and India]” (27).
Consequently, the Indian government urged the United Nations Security Council to censure
Pakistan for inciting the population’s “complicity in [this] act of aggression [in Kashmir]”
(Ganguly, 2001: 20). The Pakistani government refuted India’s claim by arguing that appealing
to the Muslim population was necessary because “India was responsible for carrying out a
genocidal policy toward its Muslim population in the wake of the Partition” (Ganguly, 2001: 20).
Jinnah’s message to the Pakistani population emphasized that mobilizing their support was an
essential task to show solidarity with their Muslim brethren outside of Pakistan.
Akbar Khan, a retired Pakistani Major-General, captured the sentiments of Jinnah’s
decision to incite a war with India in 1947, despite the debilitating military shortcomings:
“In the remotest of our villages, the humblest of our people possess a self-confidence and
ready willingness to march forward into India—a spirit the equivalent of which cannot be
found on the other side . . . In India, in the absence of homogeneity [as opposed to the
Muslim unity], a generation in any direction can result in separation of differing units
geographically as well as morally because there is no basic unity among Shadras,
Brahmins, Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims who will follow their own different interests”
(Khan, 1970: 191).
Khan (1970) recalls the time before the 1947 war by saying that there was an
“atmosphere of cheerfulness and confidence that prevailed . . . [but] the unpleasant truth was that
there was complete ignorance about the business of anything in the nature of military operations”
(17). Khan (1970) admits that Pakistan’s [i.e., Jinnah’s] exaggerated optimism may be explained
as follows:
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“From the start there existed the serious danger that the whole scheme would lack
effective central control, [which] was a very disturbing thought. But at the time it was
not difficult to persuade myself into thinking that all would be well in the end. We had
just achieved independence from the British after a hundred years or so—and we had just
achieved a new homeland, the State of Pakistan. Within less than a month of this, news
of the uprising of Kashmiri Muslims came and spread through the country like wild fire.
People responded with enthusiasm everywhere and they felt the smell of blood in their
noses” (18).
Khan (1970) suggested that the pre-war sentiment among Pakistan’s Muslim population was
fairly optimistic. Considering Kashmir’s Muslim majority population, Pakistan expected that
Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan would be effortless (Khan, 1970). However, the
majority of the Muslim population in Kashmir saw a brighter future in India (Copland, 1991).
Accordingly, India’s Prime Minister, Nehru, agreed to offer military assistance to Jammu and
Kashmir against Pakistan under the precondition that the princely states accede to India
(Ganguly, 2001: 17). Hence, the princely states gave their allegiance to India.

Some scholars argue that the conflict between the Muslims of Pakistan and the Hindus of
India is due to the primordial basis, which is embedded in the contradictory and basically
opposing world views of Islam and Hinduism (Burk, 1974; Cohen, 1976). The implicit and
explicit contexts that Jinnah and his principal military leaders have expressed confirm that
unifying the Muslim population in support of the war cause is necessary to uphold Muslims’
interests. Khan (1970) echoes Jinnah’s sentiments about the advantage that Pakistan was due to
its Muslim population’s unity. Jinnah’s use of rhetoric to ignite the support of Pakistan’s
population might have given him the leverage to dismiss any pre-war negotiation efforts and
pursue war instead.
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Days later, on October 30, 1947, Jinnah addressed the people of Pakistan in a speech that
outlines the days ahead. I provide an excerpt of Jinnah’s speech that implied Jinnah’s anti-Hindu
rhetoric. Jinnah’s prejudiced belief was used once again, which “contributed to a flawed
assessment of India’s military capabilities” and exaggerated assessment of Pakistan’s will to win
the war (Ganguly, 2001: 7). The following is an excerpt of Jinnah’s chauvinist propaganda,
which invokes on the Pakistani people that the war cause is a good in itself since the ultimate
goal is peace, a reiterated concept in Islam (See Appendix F for Jinnah’s full speech):
“We thank Providence for giving us courage and faith to fight these forces of evil. If we
take our inspiration and guidance from the Holy Quran, the final victory, I once again
say, will be ours . . . .
Do not be overwhelmed by the enormity of the task. There is many an example in history
of young nations building themselves up by sheer determination and force of character.
You are made of sterling material and are second to none. Why should you also not
succeed like many others, like your own [Muslim] forefathers? You have only to develop
the spirit of the "Mujahids". You are a nation whose history is replete with people of
wonderful grit, character and heroism. Live up to your [Islamic] traditions and add to it
another chapter of glory.
All I require of you now is that everyone of us to whom this message reaches must vow
to himself and be prepared to sacrifice his all, if necessary, in building up Pakistan as a
bulwark of Islam and as one of the greatest nations whose ideal is peace within and
peace. Your immediate task is the rehabilitation of millions of our distressed and
unfortunate brethren who are either already with us or who have still to join us in
Pakistan, bereft of all they possessed or had in this world. The least we now can do for
them is to receive them as our own brethren. No decent or sane person should consider
that they are unwelcome burden thrust on us. Save all you can and give towards the relief
of these victims of bestiality and vandalism who have suffered all this for the sole reason
that they are Muslims” (Ahmad, 1997).
Jinnah stressed to his domestic society that this war was necessary to protect the Muslim
community in Jammu and Kashmir. To validate the Muslims’ hostility and rouse their support
for war, Jinnah referred to the history of Islam, which requires sacrifice and struggle (i.e., Jihad).
A particularly interesting fact is that although Jinnah was considered a secular leader (Cohen,
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1976), he strategically championed an Islamic cause to gain widespread support for war. It
appears that Jinnah was a war hawk with the false optimism to win the war. Evidenced by
Jinnah’s pre-war strategy to gain public support, he undervalued the Indian military competence
and India’s possible responses to military trials (Ganguly, 2001). Jinnah’s anit-Hindu
propaganda and prejudiced Muslim support repeatedly “contributed to a flawed assessment of
India’s military capabilities and will” (Ganguly, 2001: 7). In fact, Pakistan’s political discourse
on India’s military evaluations and capabilities were seldom aired in Pakistan’s media outlets
(Khan, 1985). Essentially, Jinnah’s agitation strategies “consolidated the Muslim community”
(Ganguly, 2001: 10), which exaggerated Pakistan’s expectation of victory over India.

On the same day of October 30, 1947, Jinnah broadcasted the following speech on
Pakistan’s radio station in Lahore. He resounded his earlier message by proclaiming Islamic
unity and faith in Allah. Additionally, Jinnah said that Pakistan’s role in the war is considered “a
sacred undertaking” (Ahmad, 1997). The following excerpt illustrates Jinnah’s effort to mobilize
Pakistan’s population of 70 million Muslims to unite for Pakistan’s cause in Jammu and
Kashmir. Jinnah says:
“It is now up to the leaders and those responsible and in charge of the Governments to
make their supreme effort to make amends for this indelible stigma. While the horizon is
beset with dark clouds, let me appeal to you and give this message to the people of
Pakistan. Create enthusiasm and spirit and go forward with your task, with courage and
hope and we shall do it. Are we downhearted? Certainly not. This history of Islam is
replete with instances of velour, grit and determination. So march on notwithstanding
obstruction, obstacles and interference; and I feel confident that a united nation of 70
million people with a grim determination and with a great civilization and history need
fear nothing. It is now up to you to work, work and more work; and we are bound to
succeed. And never forget our motto: Unity, Discipline and Faith [in Allah]” (Ahmad,
1997).
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Jinnah says with “unity, discipline, and faith . . . they need fear nothing”. On this occasion,
Jinnah dismisses the challenges that Pakistan will face in the days ahead by stressing “a united
nation of 70 million people”. Hinging on the history of Islam, Jinnah suggests that Pakistan will
prevail as a victorious nation. Jinnah succeeded in energizing the support of his population by
appealing to Islamic unity. Jinnah’s reference to “unity” increased the population’s morale about
their position in the war. Consequently, Jinnah may have justified the war with India since he
thought Pakistan had a great likelihood of winning this war.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Do religious differences between states in a dyad partly affect the extent of rivalry? This
dissertation seeks to explain the connection between militarized conflict and religion. While
there are many contending theories about the role of religion in stimulating conflict, there are
few studies that examine this link systematically (Fish, Jensenius, & Michel, 2010; Fox, 2004).
The extant research on the link between religion and conflict largely relies on case studies,
ambiguous concepts of ‘religion’ or inclusion of confounding factors, and a focus on intrastate
conflict with scant studies of interstate conflict.
This thesis conducts a systematic study of the link between religion and interstate
military conflict and sheds light on the role of religion in interstate militarized conflict. Findings
confirm that religious difference between two states in a dyad is associated with a higher
probability of engaging in various types of conflict (i.e., rivalry recurrence, and war).
This study contributes to the literature by examining the exclusive impact of religious
differences on conflict behavior. For the most part, studies that examine the effect of religious
differences on interstate conflict apply concepts of “cultural” or “ethnic” differences. This
conceptual ambiguity has many limitations. The literature seldom explores whether religion has
an independent effect on interstate conflict. Much of the literature considers instead cultural
identity as a multidimensional category that includes religion, nationalism, language, ethnicity,
etc. Such an approach does not provide a distinct religious variable in relation to interstate
militarized conflicts. The central claim of this literature is that a state’s particular religion may
impact conflict. But there is no literature that studies systematically the association between
major religions or religious denominations and interstate conflict. I study this question
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systematically by using the distinct concept of ‘religion,’ while controlling for other differences
such as ethnic and linguistic differences.
This study challenges the theory of secularization because this study finds that religion
has an effect on conflict contrary to that theory. Essentially, the role of religion appears to be
more significant since the end of World War II. The argument about the association between
religion and conflict is spiking among international relations scholars and also among states and
religious organizations. In today’s international conflicts, it appears that religion is viewed by
some as a key cause of conflict; whereas others argue that religion is a proxy used by politicians
to initiate conflict. This study suggests that religious identity may be used as an effective tool of
uniting and mobilizing people to sustain potentially some form of collective action including
conflict with another state. Although many factors contribute to different dimensions of rivalry
and war between states, a state’s predominant religion may account partly for various dimensions
of rivalry and war with states where the predominant religion is different from that in the former
state. Thus, this dissertation shows that religious differences may partly explain why certain
states in a dyad may be more likely to engage in various types of militarized conflicts than
others.
Summary of Findings
In recent decades, religion may have a high social relevance around the globe (Ellis &
Haar, 2009), which is supported by claims that “religion and religious differences cause
conflicts” (Ellingsen, 2006: 17; Thomas, 2000). In this dissertation I undertake a study of the
link between religion and militarized conflict behavior between states in a dyad and hypothesize
that differences between the predominant religions within two states may increase the likelihood
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of different dimensions of interstate rivalry and war. Based on the expectation that interreligious
dyads are more likely to be involved in interstate rivalry (Basedau, Pfeiffer, & Vullers, 2014), I
extend distinct propositions to understand religious differences and interstate rivalry.
The main argument for this study applies to specific conflicts. The mechanism of a state
using religious rhetoric when the two states have different religions may reinforce the proclivity
of militarized conflict. These kinds of mobilizations may make future conflicts more likely since
the enmity between the two states may become difficult to escape. Empirically, I examine these
effects on rivalry, enduring rivalry and rivalry recurrence, and war.
I explore how different dimensions of rivalry and war are impacted by the religious
differences between the states in a dyad. These findings may be important to the field of security
studies. It is important to inform decision makers that religious difference between rivals may
play an intrinsic role in rivalry recurrence and war. Further research may provide a better
specification of these models. This may lead to further analyses of the relationship between
interstate conflict and the characteristics of the states within the dyad.
The substantive results suggest that dyads with “religious difference” are associated with
rivalry recurrence and war. Testing separately for the effect of “Christian/Muslim Differences”
does not yield significant results. Thus, the study finds no support for the hypothesis that
Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to yield enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, or
war. The results of this study show that rivalry recurrence is associated with religious difference
between dyads, except in Christian/Muslim cases. This finding contradicts general arguments in
the literature that assume a link between Christian/Muslim cultural differences and conflict.
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The study tests four variations of religious differences: All Religious Differences,
Christian/Muslim Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious
Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined).
Religious Differences and Enduring Rivalry:
Contrary to my expectations the religious differences variables (i.e., All Religious
Differences, Christian/Muslim Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different
Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) do not have any impact on the
likelihood of Enduring Rivalry. There is no strong link between the religious differences
variables and Enduring Rivalry. These results may be due to the operationalization of enduring
rivalry that may be restricting the variable’s variation; the nonsignificant results may suggest that
religious differences may increase the likelihood of both proto and enduring rivalries.
Religious Differences and Rivalry Recurrence:
The effects of religious differences variables on rivalry recurrence are as anticipated.
These forms of religious differences (i.e., All Religious Differences, Different Religious
Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined])
are significant predictors of rivalry recurrence. The findings suggest that there is a strong link
between these types of religious differences (i.e., All Religious Differences, Different Religious
Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined])
and rivalry recurrence. A state may be inclined to use the “religious difference” rhetorical tool to
activate the support of the predominant populations of adherents. This type of support may be
used to sustain rivalry recurrence.
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Religious Differences and War:
Based on the false optimism theory, the overall results are favorable. There is a strong
link between the effects of religious differences (i.e., All Religious Differences, Different
Religious Denominations, Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans
Combined]) on War. Religious difference may matter when states mobilize the main population
to support the war cause. At least one state in a dyad may use religious rhetoric to mobilize the
support of the predominant adherents when the rival state has a different religion.
The Case of the India-Pakistan War of 1947:
The case of the India-Pakistan War of 1947 in Chapter 4 illustrates that the causal
mechanism of the false optimism theory may apply in Pakistan’s case. This case study shows
that Jinnah’s decision for war partially depended on the robust support of the predominant
Muslim population, whereby that support energized the war cause and Pakistan’s perceived
likelihood of victory. This suggests that Pakistan’s ability to mobilize and sustain its main
population’s support generated an artificial sense of preponderance that would lead to Pakistan’s
war victory. This perceived expectation of winning the war may have strengthened Pakistan’s
resolve to initiate war with India. Based on the pattern of findings, it is reasonable to suggest
generally that at least one state in a dyad may use religious rhetoric to mobilize and sustain the
support of the adherents of the predominant religion in cases where the other state has a different
religious identity and that effectively mobilizing the main population’s support may energize the
state’s perception of victory.
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Policy Implications
The lessons from these findings are important to the field of security studies.

The

findings may inform decision makers that religious differences between states in a dyad may
play an inherent role in rivalry recurrence and interstate war. States may highlight the “religious
difference” biases to generate the public’s support for a militarized campaign. The state’s
ability to mobilize the main population’s support is based on strong group identities that are
linked to historically formed perceptions of religious differences. Despite an extensive time
lapse from the terminated rivalry to the recurring rivalry and heavy cost of war two states may
engage in militarized conflict when they have different religions.
Just as important as these findings on the link between religious differences and conflict
is the interfaith dialogue that needs to develop on a grassroots level. Interfaith initiatives by
policy makers and all levels of society such as education may dismantle or moderate the “us
versus them” culture, which may make it more difficult to mobilize popular support based on
religious differences. This paradigm shift may unite, rather than fragment, citizens worldwide in
an attempt for world peace. Further research on the religion-conflict nexus is necessary, of
course, to decide how useful my remedy is on this issue.
Contribution in the Study of Religion and Conflict
The literature provides primary guidance in advancing the research on religious
difference and different dimensions of rivalry and war. This study eschews the conceptual
ambiguity in the literature and establishes clear operational distinctions of religious, ethnic and
linguistic differences; further it conducts systematic tests of their independent effects on specific
types of militarized conflict. Specifying explicitly different types of religious difference allows
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for a closer examination of the connection between religion and militarized conflict behavior.
This study examines the effect of religious differences on militarized conflict independently of
other social identity differences such as ethnic and linguistic differences. To be sure, my study
includes cases from 1945 to 2001, and in two cases (Rivalry Recurrence and War) I find a
significant relationship; extending the time period and getting similar results may strengthen the
external validity of this study. The in-depth research through the current literature produced a
few studies that test systematically the link between religious difference and militarized conflict.
The existing suggestions in the literature are mainly on cultural, ethnic, and civilization
differences in relation to conflict onset. The existing literature’s argument outlines a causal
connection between broadly defined cultural differences and inter- or intra- state conflict, which
may also be non-militarized. Based on the conceptual clarity of ‘religion’ as a unique identity, I
argue that religious difference may have explanatory value that may drive the two states in a
dyad to engage in different dimensions of rivalry and war.
The scholarly works discussed above present some limitations; and variables on religious
and political affiliations provide suggestions for further research. These studies’ indicators of
religion encompass other factors besides each state’s predominant religion, which do not offer a
direct test of the effect of religion per se. Based on the findings, I not only find religious effects
(i.e., All Religious Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious
Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) but I find significant linguistic and ethnic
effects in Enduring Rivalry (Tables 2 and 2a) and Rivalry Recurrence (Tables 3 and 3a) models.
Thus, it is logical to argue that some interstate relations may have a concealed logic behind their
behavior: different social identities such as religion, ethnicity, and language may be embedded
in their decision making process.
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In addition, my findings in relation to the Christian/Muslim models appear to challenge
Huntington’s prediction that Muslim states are more prone to conflict with states from the West
(e.g., predominantly Christian states). Further analysis regarding the Christian/Muslim relation
may help explain why there is not a strong link between Christian/Muslim dyads and militarized
conflict. Although I did not find any significant religious effects on the Enduring Rivalry
models, states in a dyad with Linguistic Differences may increase the likelihood of enduring
rivalry controlling for ethnic differences. Thus at least one state in the dyad may become more
susceptible to enduring rivalry when the opponent does not share the same language. Also,
Linguistic and Ethnic Differences between states increase the likelihood to re-engage in rivalry
(i.e., Rivalry Recurrence). These are interesting findings that increase the relevance of this
study. Since differences in religion have predictive power, negotiators have to be aware that this
may be a factor in their decision making process. These findings increase the information
available for policy makers.
Future Research
The findings of this research may be important to future studies in the field of security
studies and international relations. Based on the implications in the findings, scholars may be
motivated to build on the models by including additional intervening variables such as religious
political parties that may play a role in the state’s decision making process. Including this and
other institutional components of religion in such models may be important in furthering our
understanding of the state’s decision making process. Groups of adherents who are connected
through institutions may also be a variable that partially explains a state’s behavior in engaging
in militarized conflict.
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In addition, I may expand the study’s temporal scope of religiously different dyads on
enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war to examine whether there is a link between religion
and these types of militarized conflicts prior to 1945. Expanding the range of the time period
may shed light on the link between religion and conflict outside the Cold War period, for
example. This may lead to further understanding how interstate religious differences may
motivate different degrees of conflict instead of building bridges.
These findings may be important to future studies in the field of security studies and
international relations. Furthermore, discerning interstate interactions and patterns may help
explain the states’ likely behaviors. For instance, controlling for emergence of factions, relative
success and failure of previous rivalry, or continued popular support throughout the duration of
rivalry, may be associated with likelihood of rivalry. Based on the seemingly rising importance
of religion in politics, it would be very productive for future research to build on these empirical
findings.
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Cases in Christian/Muslim Dyads and Rivalry Recurrence = 1
Obs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Dyad
ITAALB
ITAALB
ITAALB
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
GRCTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
BULTUR
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Year
1950
1951
1952
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Cases in Christian/Muslim Dyads and War = 1
Obs
1
2
3
4
5
6

Dyad
UKGIRQ
FRNIRQ
USAIRQ
ITAIRQ
CYPTUR
SOMETH
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Year
1958
1990
1987
1990
1965
1960

APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND MEASURES

124

Table 7:
Summary of Variables and Measures. All variables are dichotomous.
Operationalization

Data Sources

Enduring Rivalry

An enduring rivalry is operationalized as a
“competition between the same two states that
involves six or more militarized disputes over a
period of 20 years

Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F.
1995. The Initiation and
Termination of Enduring
Rivalry: The Impact of
Political Shocks.
American Journal of
Political Science, 39:1.

Rivalry Recurrence

Possibility for a rivalry to recur every year
after the initial 15-year cutoff for rivalry
termination until the 40-year cutoff for
recurrence.

(Independent Variable)

(Dependent Variable)

Variable

War

Cases must involve sustained combat,
[including] organized armed forces, resulting
in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related
combatant fatalities within a twelve month
period.

All Religious Differences

States in a dyad have different predominant
religious affiliates based on the plurality of the
dominant population of religious adherents
within the state during a given rivalry.

Christian/Muslim
Differences

Dyad that consists of Christian/Muslim
combinations based on the plurality of the
dominant population of Christian- and Muslimadherents within the state during a given
rivalry.

Different Religious
Denominations

The state’s religious denomination based on
the plurality of adherents within each state
(e.g., Christianity: Protestant, Roman Catholic,
Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, and Other
Christian; Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative,
and Reform; Islam: Sunni, Shi’a, Ibadhi,
Nation of Islam, Alawite, and Ahmadiyya;
Buddhism: Mahayana and Theravada; etc.).

Different Religious
Denominations
[Protestants/Anglicans
Combined]

The same operationalization rules of Different
Religious Denominations but I also include a
separate variable for Protestants and Anglicans
by aggregating them under one denomination
(i.e., Protestant-Anglican).
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Klein, Goertz, & Diehl.
2006. The New Rivalry
Dataset: Procedures and
Patterns. Journal of
Peace Research, 43:3.

Maoz & Henderson.
2013. The World
Religion Dataset, 19452010: Logic, Estimates,
and Trends.
International
Interactions, 39.

(Control Variable)

Summary of Variables and Measures.
Variable

Operationalization

Territorial Issue

The dyadic interstate conflict between two states
involved a territorial dispute.

Contiguity

Two states in the dyad share a land border and
are within 400 miles by sea.

Major Power
Dyad

Both states possess political status and overall
capabilities (i.e., military and economic).

Correlates of War Project. 2008.
State System Membership List,
V2008.1. Retrieved from
http://correlatesofwar.org.

Joint
Democracy

Two states have the same democratic regime
type according to the Polity IV score of 6 or
higher—both states within the dyad are
categorized as democracies.

Polity IV Project. 2010. Center for
International Development and
Conflict Management. Retrieved
from
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polit
y/polity4.htm.

Incongruent
Outcomes

The outcome and settlement types identify as
having incongruent outcomes.

Strength of Past
Rivalry

The militarized dispute that ensued in the rivalry
context, which has at least five militarized
interstate disputes (MIDs) between the two
rivals in the dyad.

War

The presence of war (with 1,000 or more battlerelated deaths) in the rivalry-ending MID.

Linguistic
Differences

Both states in the dyad have different linguistic
groups.

Ethnic
Differences

Both states in the dyad have different ethnic
groups based on the name of proportional size of
ethnic group for each state.
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Data Sources
Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer. 2005.
The MID3 Data Set: Procedures,
Coding Rules, and Description.
Conflict Management and Peace
Science, 21:2.

Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer. 2005.
The MID3 Data Set: Procedures,
Coding Rules, and Description.
Conflict Management and Peace
Science, 21:2.

Sarkees & Wayman. 2010. Resort
to War: 1817-2007. Washington,
DC: CQ Press.

Ellingsen. 2000. Colorful
Community or Ethnic Witches’
Brew? Multi-ethnicity and
Domestic Conflict During and After
the Cold War. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 44.
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Figure 1 Religious Pluralities: Summary Statistics and Distributions. Dyads.
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Figure 2 Religious Denomination Pluralities: Summary Statistics and Distributions. Dyads.
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Figure 3 Religious Denomination (Protestants & Anglicans) Pluralities: Summary Statistics and Distributions. Dyads.
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Enduring
Rivalry

All Religious Differences
No
Yes
87
77%
78
74%
26
23%
28
26%
113
100%
106
100%
Pr= 0.559

Christian/Muslim Differences
No
Yes
132
74%
33
80%
46
26%
8
20%
178
100%
41
100%
Pr= 0.397

Different Religious Denominations
No
Yes
43
75%
122
75%
14
25%
40
25%
57
100%
162
100%
Pr= 0.984

Different Religious Denominations (P&A)
No
Yes
44
79%
121
74%
12
21%
42
26%
56
100%
163
100%
Pr= 0.516

All Religious Differences
No
Yes
761
87%
780
92%
111
13%
71
8%
872
100%
851
100%
Pr= 0.003

Christian/Muslim Differences
No
Yes
1217
89%
324
90%
146
11%
36
10%
1363
100%
360
100%
Pr= 0.696

Rivalry
Different Religious Denominations
Recurrence
No
Yes
No
372
93%
1169
88%
Yes
30
7%
152
12%
Total
402
100%
1321
100%
N=1,723
Pr= 0.021

Different Religious Denominations (P&A)
No
Yes
398
93%
1143
88%
30
7%
152
12%
428
100%
1295
100%
Pr= 0.006

No
Yes
Total
N=219
Enduring
Rivalry
No
Yes
Total
N=219
Rivalry
Recurrence
No
Yes
Total
N=1,723

War
No
Yes
Total
N=232

All Religious Differences
No
Yes
102
89%
80
68%
12
11%
38
32%
114
100%
118
100%
Pr= 0.000
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Christian/Muslim Differences
No
Yes
147
77%
35
85%
44
23%
6
15%
191
100%
41
100%
Pr= 0.235

War
No
Yes
Total
N=232

Different Religious Denominations
No
Yes
53
91%
129
74%
5
9%
45
26%
58
100%
174
100%
Pr= 0.006
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Different Religious Denominations (P&A)
No
Yes
52
91%
130
74%
5
9%
45
26%
57
100%
175
100%
Pr= 0.007
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Eid-ul-Azha Message to the Nation, on 24th October, 1947
God often tests and tries those whom he loves. He called upon Prophet Ibrahim to sacrifice the
object he loved most. Ibrahim answered the call and offered to sacrifice his son. Today too, God
is testing and trying the Muslims of Pakistan and India. He has demanded great sacrifices from
us. Our new-born State is bleeding from wounds inflicted by our enemies. Our Muslim brethren
in India are being victimized and oppressed as Muslims for their help and sympathy for the
establishment of Pakistan. Dark clouds surround us on all sides for the moment but we are not
daunted, for I am sure, if we show the same spirit of sacrifice as was shown by Ibrahim, God
would rend the clouds and shower on us His blessing as He did on Ibrahim. Let us, therefore, on
the day of Eid-ul-Azha which symbolizes the spirit of sacrifice enjoined by Islam, resolve that
we shall not be deterred from our objective of creating a State of our own concept by any amount
of sacrifice, trials or tribulations which may lie ahead of us and that we shall bend all our
energies and resources to achieve our goal. I am confident that in spite of its magnitude, we shall
overcome this grave crisis as we have in our long history surmounted many others and
notwithstanding the efforts of our enemies, we shall emerge triumphant and strong from the dark
night of suffering and show the world that the State exists not for life but for good life.
On this sacred day, I send greetings to our Muslim brethren all over the world both on behalf of
myself and the people of Pakistan. For us Pakistan, on this day of thanksgiving and rejoicing, has
been overshadowed by the suffering and sorrow of 5 million Muslims in East Punjab and its
neighborhood. I hope that, wherever Muslim men and women foregather on this solemn day.
They will remember in their prayers these unfortunate men, women and children who have lost
their dear ones, homes and hearths and are undergoing an agony and suffering as great hand
cruel as any yet inflicted on humanity. In the name of this mass of suffering humanity I renew
my appeal to Muslims wherever they may be, to extend to us in this hour of our danger and need,
their hand of brotherly sympathy, support and co-operation. Nothing on earth now can undo
Pakistan.
The greater the sacrifices are made the purer and more chastened shall we emerge like gold from
fire.
So my message to you all is of hope, courage and confidence. Let us mobilize all our resources
in a systematic and organized way and tackle the grave issues that confront us with grim
determination and discipline worthy of a great nation (Ahmad, 1997).
Pakistan Zindabad
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Speech at a Mammoth Rally at the University
Stadium, Lahore on 30th October. 1947
We have achieved our cherished goal of freedom and have established Pakistan as an
independent, sovereign State, fifth largest in the world. That freedom can never be attained by a
nation without suffering and sacrifice has been amply borne out by the recent tragic happenings
in this subcontinent. We are in the midst of unparalleled difficulties and untold sufferings; we
have been through dark days of apprehension and anguish; but I can say with confidence that
with courage and self-reliance and by the Grace of God we shall emerge triumphant.
Some people might think that the acceptance of the June 3 Plan was a mistake on the part of the
Muslim League. I would like to tell them that the consequences of any other alternative would
have been too disastrous to imagine. On our side we proceeded to implement this plan with a
clean conscience and honest intentions. Time and history will prove that. On the other hand,
history will also record its verdict on those whose treachery and machinations let loose forces of
disorder and disruption in this subcontinent causing death of lakhs, enormous destruction of
property and bringing about suffering and misery to many million by uprooting them from their
homes and hearths and all that was dear to them. The systematic massacre of defenseless and
innocent people puts to shame even the most heinous atrocities committed by the worst tyrant
known to history. We have been the victims of a deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy
executed with utter disregard of the elementary principle of honesty, chivalry and honor. We
thank Providence for giving us courage and faith to fight these forces of evil. If we take our
inspiration and guidance from the Holy Quran, the final victory, I once again say, will be ours.
Do not for a moment imagine that your enemies can ever succeed in their designs. But at the
same time do not make light of the situation facing you. Search your hearts and whether you
have done your part in the construction of this new and mighty State.
Do not be over whelmed by the enormity of the task. There is many an example in history of
young nations building themselves up by sheer determination and force of character. You are
made of sterling material and are second to none. Why should you also not succeed like many
others, like your own forefathers? You have only to develop the spirit of the "Mujahids". You are
a nation whose history is replete with people of wonderful grit, character and heroism. Live up to
your traditions and add to it another chapter of glory.
All I require of you now is that everyone of us to whom this message reaches must vow to
himself and be prepared to sacrifice his all, if necessary, in building up Pakistan as a bulwark of
Islam and as one of the greatest nations whose ideal is peace within and peace. Your immediate
task is the rehabilitation of millions of our distressed and unfortunate brethren who are either
already with us or who have still to join us in Pakistan, bereft of all they possessed or had in this
world. The least we now can do for them is to receive them as our own brethren. No decent or
sane person should consider that they are unwelcome burden thrust on us. Save all you can and
give towards the relief of these victims of bestiality and vandalism who have suffered all this for
the sole reason that they are Muslims.

137

Along with this, keep up your morale. Do not be afraid of death. Our religion teaches us to be
always prepared for death. We should face it bravely to save the honor of Pakistan and Islam.
There is no better salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a righteous cause.
I would also impress upon every member of this State, particularly our youth, to show the right
spirit of devotion, courage and fortitude, to give a lead to the others and to set a nobler and
higher example for those who may follow us and the coming generations.
Remember that the scrupulous maintenance and enforcement of law and order are the
prerequisites of all progress. The tenets of Islam enjoin on every Mussalman to give protection to
his neighbors and to the minorities regardless of caste and creed. Despite the treatment, which is
being meted out to the Muslim minorities in India, we must make it a matter of our prestige and
honor to safeguard the lives of the minority communities and to create a sense of security among
them. I would like to impress upon every Mussalman, who has at heart the welfare and the
prosperity of Pakistan, to avoid retaliation and to exercise restraint, because retaliation and
violation of law and order will ultimately result in weakening the very foundations of the edifice
you have cherished all these years to erect.
Do your duty and have faith in God. There is no power on earth that can undo Pakistan. It has
come to stay. Our deeds are proving to the world that we are in the right and I can assure you that
the sympathies of the world, particularly of the Islamic countries, are with you. We in turn are
grateful to every nation who has stretched out to us its hand of help and friendliness.
In the end, I once again appeal to the good sense of every subject and citizen of our State not to
take law and order into his own hands but so to behave and act as to be a pillar of strength to his
Government and leaders who are sincerely doing their best to put an end to the miseries and
hardships of our unfortunate brethren seeking shelter with us, and battling against grave danger
and menace which is facing us (Ahmad, 1997).
Pakistan Zindabad

138

LIST OF REFERENCES
Ahmed, W. 1997. Quaid-I-Azam Muhammed Ali Jinnah: The Nation’s Voice, Unity, Faith, and
Discipline. Annotated Speeches and Statements. Qaid-I-Azam Academy.
Alexander, M. G., Levin, S., & Henry, P. J. 2005. Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social
Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International
Images. Political Psychology, 26:1.
Alston, J. P. 1967. Rural-urban Differences in Reported Attitudes and Behavior. Washington,
D.C.: Clearinghouse.
Altman, D. 2015. The Strategist’s Curse: A Theory of False Optimism as a Cause of War.
Security Studies, 24:1.
Appleby, S. 2000. The Ambivalence of the Sacred. NY: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Ayoob, M. 1997. Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Bahl, A. 2007. From Jinnah to Jihad: Pakistan’s Kashmir Quest and the Limits of Realism.
Atlantic Publishers and Distributors.
Barnett, M. 1999. Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo.
European Journal of International Relations, 5: 1.
Bas, M. A., & Schub, R. N.d. Mutual Optimism as a Cause of Conflict: Secret Alliances and
Conflict Onset. Unpublished typescript.
Basedau, M., Pfeiffer, B., & Vullers, J. 2014. Bad Religion? Religion, Collective Action, and
the Onset of Armed Conflict in Developing Countries. Journal of conflict Resolution, 130.
139

Baumeister, R. F., & Boden, J. M. 1998. Aggression and the Self: High Self-Esteem, Low SelfControl, and Ego Threat. In R. G. Green, & E. Donnerstein (Eds.), Human Aggression:
Theories, Research, and Implications for Social Policy. San Diego, CA: Academic
Press.
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. 1995. The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal
Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117: 3.
Berger, P. L. 1990. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New
York: Anchor Books.
Blainey, G. 1988. The Causes of War. NY: Free Press.
Bolks, S., & Scroll, R. 2003. Examining Conflict Escalation within the Civilizations Context.
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 20: 2.
Bremer, S. A. 1992. Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War,
1816-1965. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36.
Brewer, M. B. 1991. The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17: 5
Brewer, M. B. 2001. The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology.
Political Psychology, 22:1.
Brewer, M. B., & Caporael, L. R. 1990. Selfish Genes Versus Selfish People: Socio-biology as
Origin Myth. Motivation and Emotion, 14: 4.
Brewer, M. B., & Chen, YR. 2007. Where (Who) are Collectives in Collectivism? Toward
Conceptual Clarification of Individualism and collectivism. Psychological Review, 114:
1.

140

Brewer, M. B., & Garnder, W. 1996. Who is this “We”? Levels of Collective Identity and Self
Representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71: 1.
Britannica Book of the Year. 2004, 2006. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.
Brown, R. 2000. Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future
Challenges. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30:6.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. 1985. The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model.
American Political Science Review, 79.
Burke, S. M. 1974. Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Buzan, B. 1997. Civilizational Realpolitick as the New World Order. Survival, 39:1.
Cambell-Johnson, A. 1953. Mission with Mountbatten. New York: Aico Publishing House.
Carment, D. 1993. The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and
Theory. Journal of Peace Research, 30.
Carment, D., & James, P. 1995. Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 39.
Chap, C. 2007. Religious Campaign Rhetoric: The Consequences of Religious Language on
Presidential Candidate Evaluations. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association.
Charap, S., & Shapiro, J. 2016. US-Russian Relations: The Middle Cannot Hold. Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, 72:3.
Chiozza, G. 2002. Is there a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International
Conflict Involvement, 1946-97. Journal of Peace Research, 39.
Chriss, J. J. 2013. Social Control: An Introduction (2nd ed.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
141

CIA World Factbook. 2013. The World Factbook.
Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
Clarke, S. 2014. The Justification of Religious Violence. Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell.
Clausewitz. (1976/1993). On War. M. Howard and P. Paret, eds./trans. NY: Everymans
Library.
Cohen, S. P. 1976. The Strategic Imagery of Elites. In James Roherty, ed. Defense Policy
Formation. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Connor, W. 1994. Ethno-nationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Conrad, J. 2011. Regime Similarity and Rivalry. International Interactions, 37: 1.
Copland, I. 1991. The Abdullah Factor: Kashmiri Muslims and the Crisis of 1947. In D. A.
Low, ed. The Political Inheritance of Pakistan. NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Correlates of War Project. 2002, 2005, 2008. State System Membership List, Version 2008.1.
Retrieved from http://correlatesofwar.org.
Coser, L. A. 1956. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York, NY: Routledge.
Cox, E. 2010. Why Enduring Rivalries Do or Don’t End. Boulder, CO: First Forum Press.
Darnton, C. 2011. Rivalry and Rapprochement in Early Cold War Central America. Security
Studies, 20.
Davis, D. R., Jaggers, K., & Moore, W. H. 1997. Ethnicity, Minorities and International Conflict
Patterns. In David W. Carment and Patrick James (eds.) Wars in the Midst of Peace: The
International Politics of Ethnic Conflict. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Diehl, P. F., & Goertz, G. 2000. War and Peace in International Rivalry. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press.
142

Dolan, T. M. 2009. Declaring Victory and Admitting Defeat. Ohio State University: Ph. D.
Dissertation.
Donahue, B. 1975. The Political Use of Religious Symbols: A Case Study of the 1972
Presidential Campaign. The Review of Politics, 37:1.
Downs, G. W. 1989. The Rational Deterrence Debate. World Politics, 41.
Ellingsen, T. 2000. Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Multiethnicity and
Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44:2.
Ellingsen, T. 2006. Toward a Revival of Religion and Religious Clashes? Terrorism and
Political Violence, 17:3.
Ellis, G. 2010. Gauging the Magnitude of Civilization Conflict. Conflict Management and
Peace Science, 27:3.

Ellis, S., & Haar, G. T. 2009. Religion and Politics: Taking African Epistemologies Seriously.
Journal of Modern African Studies, 47: 3.
Erickson, E. J. 2001. Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Fearon, J. D. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and Escalation of International Disputes.
American Political Science Review, 88: 1.
Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. 2000. Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity.
International Organization, 54: 4.
Fish, M. S., Francesca, R., & Michel, K. E. 2010. Islam and Large-Scale Political Violence: Is
There a Connection? Comparative Political Studies, 43.

143

Fox, J. 2002. Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of
Huntington’s Thesis. British Journal of Political Science, 32.
Fox, J. 2004. Is Ethno-religious Conflict a Contagious Disease? Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 27.
Fox, J., & Sandler, S. 2004. Bringing Religion into International Relations. Basingstoke, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Fox, J. 2013. An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory and Practice. London:
Routledge.
Ganguly, S. 2001. Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947. NY: Oxford
University Press.
Gartzke, E., & Gleditsch, K. S. 2006. Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that
Divide. European Journal of International Relations, 12: 1.
Ghosn, F., Palmer, G., & Bremer, S. 2004. The MID3 Dataset, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding
Rules and Description. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 21:2.
Gill, A. 2001. Religion and Comparative Politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 4.
Giplin, R. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Gochman, C. S. 1991. Interstate Metrics: Conceptualizing, Operationalizing, and Measuring
the Geographic Proximity of States since the Congress of Vienna. International
Interactions, 17.
Gochman, C. S., & Maoz, Z. 1984. Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures,
Patterns, and Insights. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28.

144

Goemans, H. E. 2000. War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First
World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. 1992. The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries.
International Interactions, 18.
Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. 1993. Territorial Changes and International Conflict. Journal of
Peace Research, 29: 4.
Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. 1995. The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalry: The
Impact of Political Shocks. American Journal of Political Science, 39:1.
Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. 1996. Taking ‘Enduring’ out of Enduring Rivalry: The Rivalry
Approach to War and Peace. International Interactions, 21.
Greenfield, E. A., & Marks, N. F. 2007. Religious Social Identity as an Explanatory Factor for
Associations between More Frequent Formal Religious Participation and Psychological
Well-Being. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 17:3.
Haqqani, H. 2006. India and Pakistan: Is Peace Real this Time? Tara Press.
Hasenclever, A., & Rittberger, V. 2000. Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical
Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict. Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, 29:3.
Hassner, R. E., & Horowitz, M. C. 2010. Correspondence: Debating the Role of Religion in
War. International Security, 35: 1.
Hauk, E., & Mueller, H. 2015. Cultural Leaders and the Clash of Civilizations. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 59: 3.
Haynes, J. 1994. Religion in Third World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Hechter, M. 2004. From Class to Culture. American Journal of Sociology, 110.
145

Helble, M. N.d. On the Influence of World Religions on International Trade.
Henderson, E. A. 1997. Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the
Onset of War, 1980-1989. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41: 5.
Henderson, E. A. 1998. The Democratic Peace through the Lens of Culture, 1820-1989.
International Studies Quarterly, 42.
Henderson, E. A., & Tucker, R. M. 2001. Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of
Civilizations and International Conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 5.
Henne, P. S. 2012. The Ancient Fire: Religion and Suicide Terrorism. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 24: 1.
Hensel, P. R. 1998. Domestic Politics and Interstate Rivalry. Tallahassee, FL: Department of
Political Science.
Hensel, P. R. N.d. Interstate Rivalry and the Study of Militarized Conflict. Tallahassee, FL:
Florida State University.
Hensel, P. R., Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. 2000. The Democratic Peace and Rivalries. Journal of
Politics, 62:4.
Hogg, M. A., & Terry, D. J. 2000. Social Identity and Self-Categorization Processes in
Organizational Contexts. Academy of Management Review, 25:1.
Horowitz, D. L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Horowitz, M. C. 2009. Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading.
International Security, 34: 2.
Houston, C. 2001. Islam, Kurds, and the Turkish Nation State. Oxford, UK: Berg Editorial
Offices.

146

Huntington, S. P. 2002. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. NY:
Simon and Schuster.
Huntington, S. P. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72: 3.
Huntington, S. P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. NY:
Touchstone.
Jalal, A. 1990. The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of
Defense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jervis, R. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Jervis, R. 1997. Book Review of the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
Political Science Quarterly, 112:2.
Jervis, R. 1988. War and Misperception. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18:4.
Johnston, H., & Figa, J. 1988. The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative Perspectives
on Mobilization against Authoritarian Regimes. Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion, 27: 1.
Johnston, D. 2004. Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Juergensmeyer, M. 1993. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Juergensmeyer, M. 2006. Religion as a Root Cause of Terrorism. In Louise Richardson, ed.
The Roots of Terrorism. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Kahneman, D., & Renshon, J. 2007. Why Hawks Win. Foreign Policy, 158: 1.

147

Katzenstein, P. J. 1996. Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World. In Peter J.
Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.
NY: Columbia University Press.
Keddie, N. R. 1998. The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do
‘Fundamentalisms’ Appear. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40, 4.
Khan, A. 1970. Raiders of Kashmir. Narrative of 1947-48 Into-Pakistan Conflict. Pak Jang
Publishers.
Khan, A. M. 1985. Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience. London: Zed
Books.
Khan, M. A. 1967. Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Khan, Y. 2007. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan. London: Yale
University Press.
Klein, James P., Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. 2006. The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and
Patterns. Journal of Peace Research, 43:3.
Kramer, R. M., Leonardelli, G. J., & Livingston, R. W. 2011. Social Cognition, Social Identity,
and Intergroup Relations. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Krasner, S. 1985. Structural Conflicts: The Third World against Global Liberalism. Berkley,
CA: University of California Press.
Kupchan, C. 1998. After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources
of a Stable Multipolarity. International Security, 23:2.
Lamb, A. 1992. Kashmir, 1947: The Birth of a Tragedy. Herting Fordbury: Roxford Books.

148

Lebow, R. N. 1981. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Legro, J. W., & Moravcsik, A. 1999. Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security, 24: 2.
Levy, J. S. 1983. Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical
Problems. World Politics, 36:1.
Levy, J. 1998. The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace. Annual Review of Political
Science, 1.
Lewy, G. 1974. Religion and Revolution. New York: Oxford.
Lynch, M. 2010. Islam Divided Between Salafi-Jihad and the Ikhwan. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 33: 6.
Maoz, Z., & Henderson, E. A. 2013. The World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010: Logic,
Estimates, and Trends. International Interactions, 39.
Mearsheimer, J. J. 2002. Realism, the Real World, and the Academy. In Michael Brecher and
Frank P. Harvey, eds. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Mintz, A., & Geva, N. 1997. The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. In
Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (ed.), Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The
Cognitive-Rational Debate. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Moghadam, A. 2009. Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of
Suicide Attacks. International Security, 33:3.
Paracha, N. F. 2014. Google Images. Retrieved from http://www.dawn.com/news/1153105.
Pearce, S. 2006. Religious Rage: A Quantitative Analysis of the Intensity of Religious
Conflicts. Terrorism and Political Violence, 17:1.

149

Petersen, R. D. 2002. Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in
Twentieth Century Eastern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Polity IV Project. 2010. Center for International Development and Conflict Management.
Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
Powers, K. E. 2015. Nationalism and Foreign Policy: Does Internal Equality Reduce External
Conflict? Dartmouth College.
Protip Sen, L. 1988. Slender Was the Thread. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. 2011. Moral Psychology is Relationship Regulation. Psychological
Review, 118.
Ray, J. L. 1995. Democracy and International Conflict. Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press.
Richardson, L. F. 1960. Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press.
Roe, P. 2013. Societal Security. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Ruanne, J., & Todd, J. 2010. Ethnicity and Religion: Redefining the Research Agenda.
Ethnopolitics, 9:1.
Rudkevich, G., Travlos, K., & Diehl, P. F. 2013. Terminated or Just Interrupted? How the End
of a Rivalry Plants the Seed for Future Conflict. Social Science Quarterly, 94.
Rudkevich, G. Personal Communication, June 16, 2016; June 29, 2016.
Russett, B. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Russett, B. M., Oneal, J. R., & Cox, M. 2000. Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism
Déjà Vu? Some Evidence. Journal of Peace Research, 37:5.
Sacks, J. 2015. Not in God’s Name: Confronting Religious Violence. NY: Schocken Books.
Sadowski, Y. 1998. Ethnic Conflict. Foreign Policy, 111.
150

Sarkees, M. R., & Wayman, F. 2010. Resort to War: 1817-2007. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Satana, N. S., Inman, M., & Birnir, J. K. 2013. Religion, Government Coalitions, and
Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 25: 1.
Schafer, M. 1999. Explaining Groupthink: Do the Psychological Characteristics of the Leaders
Matter? International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International
Relations, 25: 2.
Seul, J. R. 1999. Ours is the Way of God: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict. Journal
of Peace Research, 36.
Shaw, J. E. 2011. The Role of Religion in National Security Policy since September 11, 2001.
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
Sing, R. 2012. Operations in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-48. Scholar Warrior.
Singer, D., & Small, M. 1972. The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc.
Slantchev, B. L., & Tarar, A. 2011. Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War.
American Journal of Political Science, 55: 1.
Smith, A. D. 1981. The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Smith, A. D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Smith, A. D. 1999. Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive? Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Smith A. D. 2000. The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism. Millennium, 29: 3.
Sorli, M., Petter, G. N., & Strand. 2005. Why is there so much Conflict in the Middle East?
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49:1.
151

Stein, J. G. 1996. Image, Identity, and Conflict Resolution. In Chester A. Crocker and Fen
Osler Hampson, editions. Managing Global Chaos. Washington DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press.
Stewart, F. 2009. Religion versus Ethnicity as a Source of Mobilization: Are there Differences?
CRISE Working Paper No. 70.
Stoessinger, J. G. 1974. Why Nations Go to War. NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Stoessinger, J. G. 2005. Why Nations Go to War. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Svensson, I. 2007. Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51: 6.
Tajfel, H. 1972. Social Categorization. In Moscovici, S., eds./trans. Introduction a
Psychologie Sociale. Paris: Larousse.
Tajfel, H. 1982. Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Annual Review of Psychology,
33:1.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. 1986. The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. S. Worchel and W. G. Austin. Chicago:
Nelson-Hall.
Taylor, S. E. 1991. Positive Illusions: Creative Self-deception and the Healthy Mind. New
York: Basic Books, Inc.
Tetlock, P. E. 1998. Social Psychology and World Politics. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske and G.
Lindzey (eds.). The Handbook of Social Psychology. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Thomas, S. M. 2002. Religion and International Conflict. In Religion and International
Relations, ed. Ken R. Dark. New York: Palgrove.
Tilly, C. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. NY: Random House.
152

Toft, M. D., Philpott, D., & Shah, T. S. 2011. God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global
Politics. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company.
Turner, J. C. 1975. Social Comparison and Social Identity: Some Prospects for Intergroup
Behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5:1.
Turner, J. C. 1991. Social Influence. Brooks Publishing Company.
Van Evera, S. 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Vasquez, J. A. 1993. Distinguishing Rivals that Go to War from Those that Do Not: A
Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War. International Studies
Quarterly, 40: 4.
Vasuez, J. A. 2009. The War Puzzle Revisited. University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
Volkan, V. D. 1985. The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach.
Political Psychology, 6.
Voye, L. 1999. Secularization in a Context of Advanced Modernity. Sociology of Religion,
60:3.
Warber, A., & Olsen, L. 2006. Religion and the Public Presidency. Paper Presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.
Weiner, I, B., Tennen, H. A, & Suls, J. M. 2012. Handbook of Psychology, Personality and
Social Psychology. Wiley Inc.
White, R. K. 1970. Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars.
Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
Wilson, B. R. 1982. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

153

Wittman, D. 1979. How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 23.
Wolpert, S. A. 1984. Jinnah of Pakistan. Oxford University Press.
Wrangham, R. 1999. Is Military Incompetence Adaptive? Evolution and Human Behavior, 20.

154

